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FEAR, AWE AND THE SUBLIME IN RELIGION:

A CHAPTER IN THE STUDY OF INSTINCTS, IMPULSES, AND MOTIVES IN
RELIGIOUS LIFE.


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The deeper purport of this paper and its place in a psychological study of religion will not be fully understood unless the general view of religion held by the author be first indicated. I shall, therefore, prefix the following statement.

Objectively considered, religious life consists of a portion of the actions by which man strives to reach the ends of existence: protection and increase. Subjectively considered, it consists in the psychic correlates of these actions: impulses, desires, feelings, ideas. It is unnecessary to state fully here how and where is drawn the line of demarcation between the religious and the secular actions and experiences. It will suffice to say in general terms that the line of cleavage follows the distinction made very early by man between the anthropomorphic or the personal and the mechanical in his conception of the kinds of energy which act upon him and which he may use to secure his desires.

In this view, religious, no less than secular, life is an expression of the lust for life, of the passion for growth. In it the psycho-physiological organism performs the same functions as in the rest of life. Will, feeling and intellect have in religion the place which belongs to them in the general economy of animal and human existence and no other. It is a wrong conception of the nature of religion, or a faulty



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psychology, or both, which lead to the belief that feelings and emotions play a peculiar rôle in religious life. They may be more obvious and more intense in some phases of it and in certain persons, but they bear to religious life no other relation than to industrial, to literary, to scientific activities. In religion, no less than in the other departments of life, the will is primal. Every instinct and impulse, the most ferociously egoistic as well as the most purely altruistic, and every desire may be a spring of religion. There are no specifically religious instincts or motives. Any and every throb of life may give rise to a religious moment. In order that it be so, it is only necessary that the realization of the will be thought to depend upon certain personal beings.

The more fundamental of the animal and human needs have, in the course of biological development, come to express themselves in instinctive emotional reactions. *Fear, Awe, the Sublime*,¹ to name only three related forms, are as many different ways of responding according to one's nature to different impressions made by the outside world. They are primarily conative manifestations, racial ways of realizing one's nature.

These reactions have played, and still play, a conspicuous part in religious life because they express what is oldest and fundamental in human nature. One may therefore appropriately begin the study of instincts and impulses in religion with the consideration of its relation to fear and to the emotions most nearly allied thereto.

I have made some use in this paper of about 300 letters sent me in answer to a set of questions on religious life. These answers have frequently been supplemented by a personal correspondence. The information thus secured on the subject of the present paper would be completely inadequate for statistical purposes. It is, however, of material value to one content to use it with caution for what it is worth, *i. e.*, as 'qualitative' information upon the religious condition of our contemporaries. It will be observed that the results of the *questionnaire* have been used here more to illustrate or to confirm statements based upon wider considerations, than to establish them.

¹ I shall use the word sublime to designate the emotion itself, as well as the objective cause of it.

I. Fear.

To keep alive in the face of ever recurring dangers is the prime concern of the wild man. One might therefore expect fear to play a leading rôle in the religiosity of primitive human societies. Encompassed by dangers, the wild man seeks the protection of, or assistance against, the agents surrounding him: men, animals, celestial bodies, storms, etc.

Every student of the lowest forms of religion has noticed in them the preponderance of fear; some have seen in it the very origin of religion. "Fear begets gods," said Lucretius.¹ Hume concluded that "the first ideas of religion arose . . . from a concern with regard to the events of life and fears which actuate the human mind." A similar opinion is maintained by many of our contemporaries. The distinguished historian of religion, Tiele, holds that "in the animistic religions fear is more powerful than any other feeling, such as gratitude or trust."² Among psychologists, Ribot, for instance, affirms that "the religious sentiment is composed first of all of the emotion of fear in its different degrees, from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to the faith in an unknown, mysterious, impalpable Power, able to render great services, and, more especially, to inflict great injuries; for historians have always remarked that, in early times, it is always malevolent and terrible genii who are adored; the good and merciful ones are neglected; in the following period this state of things will be reversed."³

That fear was the first of the well-organized emotional reactions to appear in religious life, follows from the fact, now generally admitted, that it is the first to have been established in the course of animal development. It is now chronologically the first emotional reaction in the young animal and in the infant, according to the observations of Preyer and of many others. If it were objected that the lust for life must necessarily have worked itself out into aggressive actions (those for securing food, for instance) before the protective fear-reactions could have been established and that, therefore, we should expect to find in religious life positive, aggressive desires antedating

¹ *Primus in orbe timor fecit deos.*

² *Outlines of the History of Religion*, p. 11.

³ *The Psychology of the Emotions*, Th. Ribot, p. 309.

the protective fear-reaction, the sufficient answer would be that these desires, although they certainly preceded the formation of the fear-instinct, did not give rise to any emotional reaction possessing the constancy, definiteness and poignancy of fear. Therefore it is that the negative, protective, emotion affirms itself so conspicuously in early religions. But it need not be—it certainly is not—the only way in which man expresses himself religiously at the beginning.¹ For the rest, we are not concerned here with the *original* form of religiosity, but only with what is dominant in the primitive religions known to us.

Among the more significant observations to which one is led by a comparison of the earlier with the later forms of religion is the procession of their dominant emotional tones. The procession begins with the obscuration of fear which, at a certain level of human development, yields the place of greater prominence to its relatives, awe and the sublime. These emotions are, in their turn, displaced by others in which fear is not only held under control, as in awe, but completely overcome. They are admiration, thankfulness, joy and the tender emotions expressive of acceptance, agreement, union, instead of rejection, disagreement, separation.

This procession is, of course, not the result of religion. To take it so would be to put the cart before the horse. Religion is the instrument, not the creator, of human impulses and desires. Whatever be the development through which it passes, that which takes place in it is no more than the manifestation in one realm of life—the religious—of that which is taking place in life generally.

Before attempting to account for the conquest of fear by the tender emotions, it will be our task to point to a few of the facts by which it may be illustrated. The obviousness of these facts makes a lengthy demonstration unnecessary.

Neither Christ, nor Gautama, nor even Mohammed, were actuated by fear. They were, it seems, of all men, fearless. But they did not represent their times. They were precursors. After their death, the religions which they had founded upon a plane much above that of

¹ On fear in infancy and childhood see the extensive researches of President G. Stanley Hall and his pupils, the outcome of which is to be found in a chapter of *Adolescence*.

their contemporaries were speedily degraded to the general level of the period, a level low enough to make it unnecessary to go further than the Christian era to find fear entrenched as the dominant religious force.

For those acquainted with history, the mention of the Dark Ages and of several subsequent centuries when cruelty and dread gave the dominant notes in the tumultuous dramas in which the Church of Rome played frequently the chief part, will be a sufficient reminder of the potency of fear in those times.

After the great Protestant schism, fear remained for another long period, on the whole, a dominant emotion in religious life. Predestination in combination with the belief in hell was, in skillful hands, an unsurpassed instrument of terror. Nowhere was the awfulness of God more seriously realized than among the Jansenists of Port Royal. Le Maitre, de Saci, Blaise Pascal, to name only three of their great leaders, were brought to God through experiences in which fear played an important, perhaps a leading, part.¹ What Fontaine reports of de Saci in the *Mémoires* quoted by Sainte-Beuve could have been asserted with equal truth, perhaps, of all the noble men who directed the movement. "Those who have said after his death that the fear of the Lord had filled him, have made a true portrait of him." "The *chaste* fear of God and respect for his infinite grandeur so possessed him that," according to the same reporter, "he was in His presence as in a continual tremor of fear."

The great movement started by John Wesley was also fed by fear, as is sufficiently attested by the frightful eloquence of most of its distinguished propagandists. Even the organization that gave itself the peaceful name of "Friends" was not at the beginning free from the incubus of fear.

The change that has come over the Christian world with regard to fear is strikingly, and it seems to me accurately, reflected in the altered emotional tone of the revivals. I do not know of any revival, older than the present generation, in which the chief, or at least one of the chief, instruments of conversion was not fear: fear of wretched-

¹ See *Port Royal* by Sainte-Beuve; on LeMaitre, I, pp. 378-380; on de Saci I, p. 339; II, p. 328; on Pascal II, pp. 502 ff.

ness in this life, fear of God's wrath visited upon the impenitent, and, most of all, fear of torments in the hereafter.

With regard to the point at issue, the Edwardian Revivals were typical of many. The conditions of life in New England at the beginning of the 18th century were favorable to the spread of the harsh Calvinistic beliefs. Frequent conflicts with an unsubdued nature and with savage Indians kept the fear-reaction uppermost. The tender emotions could hardly thrive in communities where one went to church with a gun on the shoulder and where attention was at times divided during the service between worship and the expectation of war whoops.

It was common in the revivals of that period for people "under conviction of sin" to be so frightened that they would "throw themselves on the ground and roar with anguish." The terrifying method went so far that a few ministers made an effort to soften the preaching. Edwards, however, thought that "speaking terror to them that are already under great terrors, instead of comforting them," is to be commended if done with the intention of bringing more light. He complains of the weakness of those who shrink from throwing children into ecstasies of fear with talk of hell fire and eternal damnation. "But if those who complain so loudly of this," he remarks, "really believe, what is the general profession of the country, viz., that all are by nature the children of wrath and heirs of hell; and that every one that has not been born again, whether he be young or old, is exposed, every moment, to eternal destruction, under the wrath of Almighty God; I say, if they really believe this, then such a complaint and cry as this, betrays a great deal of weakness and inconsideration. As innocent as children seem to be to us, yet, if they are out of Christ, they are not so in God's sight, but are young vipers and are infinitely more hateful than vipers and are in a most miserable condition, as well as grown persons."¹

What was the rule a hundred years ago has become the exception. The great evangelist Moody had little to say about hell and the wrath of God and a great deal about heaven and the love of Christ. In the latest of the great revivals, the Welsh Revival, the meetings were pitched in the key of the tender emotions. The practices of the salva-

¹ *Thoughts on the Revival of Religion*, by Jonathan Edwards. Edition of 1832, p. 203.

tion army is also a conspicuous example of how far, even in the lower strata of society, fear has fallen into disuse as a religious tool.

If such is the condition of the more ignorant and rougher part of our populations, that of the well-to-do and instructed portions can be inferred. The countenance of God best known to our prosperous Church goers is that of the merciful, compassionate Son of Man healing the sick and comforting the wayward. To the hissing of threats and maledictions has succeeded the singing of the Son's redeeming love and of the delights of Beulah land.

One must, however, hasten to add two corrective touches to this picture. On the one hand, the spirit of Christ has, at all times, been represented here and there in all the strength of its gentleness. There have always been, in obscure or in high places, men like Francis of Assisi and Fénélon to bear witness to the great struggle between the spirit of fear and the spirit of love. On the other hand, the antiquated method is still met with on occasion, and, naturally, chiefly among the less instructed. Here is, for instance, an account of how a certain French Priest, Curate of Notre-Dame-du-Mont, lately managed part of the religious instruction by which children are prepared for the confirmation of the baptismal vows and for their first admission to the Eucharist. On the last day of a "retreat" he would lock the doors of the church in which the children were assembled and forbid even the sexton to walk about. The church was then darkened. A pall, stretched out before the sanctuary, bore a crucifix and two holy candles. In this artfully prepared place he would preach a sixty minutes' discourse on Christ's Passion, describing with minute realism every detail of the crucifixion, the thorns penetrating into the flesh, the blood trickling down the face, the moral anguish of the loving Saviour. Before he was half through the sermon, sobs would break out and spread among the terrified children. In this state they were sent to confession.

The returns from my *questionnaire* reflect convincingly the new temper. Except in two instances fear enters into the religious life of my informants only incidentally and fitfully. It is of so little significance that its removal would leave the religiosity of the class of people represented by these data practically unaltered. The exceptions are those of an elderly French clergyman and that of a young law student. The first wrote as follows. "I feel very much that my

letter will disappoint you. The feeling of Divine justice and of its exigencies has much weakened in pious persons. In me it has continually grown stronger. The principles are neglected, and sentimentality is put in their place. Moreover, I have suffered dreadfully, physically and morally; the history of Job is constantly present to my mind. I have seen the evil spirits at work trying to injure me. I have seen Satan displaying his utmost ingenuity to make me suffer the inexpressible. You will therefore readily understand that my usual mood is not one of superficial lightheartedness, that I cannot be an optimist in the common acceptation of the word. I believe that the just man will be saved,—without that certitude there can be but despair and death; but he is to be saved painfully, as by fire. . . . I am moved to religious practices by a feeling of duty and to appease the wrath of God which rises against sinful humanity. . . . For many people the most characteristic religious experience is the feeling of God's love, of His goodness, compassion and readiness to succor those who call upon Him. I would not say that this is false, but its onesidedness brings it near to being false. . . . My experience is that, man being sinful, he must suffer, suffer much, drink also of the bitter cup of Jesus Christ. In my religious exercises I always experience fear towards the Holy God, who must inexorably avenge His broken law and His majesty outraged by sin."¹

The law student (age 23) admits that the circumstances which oftenest affects him religiously are those that frighten him or make him nervous. Fear is with him an emotion easily aroused. Several of his religious practices are kept up chiefly because of a vague fear that harm will befall him if he discontinues. This is true, for instance, of his attendance on the Y. M. C. A. meetings, although he "shrinks" from them. There is "little pleasure and some annoyance in them." He used to read the Bible morning and evening. Lately he persuaded himself to leave off the evening chapter because *it wearied him so.* "But," says he, "it was a great effort and I felt the fear for a day or two."

In these two cases of fear-ridden religiosity—the sole instances that have come to my notice through the *questionnaire*—fear is con-

¹ Reprinted from the *Monist*, "The contents of Religious Consciousness." XI (1901) pp. 563 and 564.

stitutional. Both men are mild phobiacs and their natural disposition makes what use it can of such obsolete Christian doctrines as are frightful. The young man knows that he is very nervous and he suspects that his fears may be abnormal. "It [the fear] makes me very unhappy even when I am anxious, or at least willing, to do the very thing it prompts me to do. It may be a disease; for I remember that as a mere child it led me into the most absurd habits or tricks. I would feel it my duty to pick up all the loose pieces of glass and china in our home-yard lest some poor barefoot be injured." He has passed through a storm and stress period during which his earlier beliefs have given place to others. He knows now, even at the moment it is felt, that his fear is "admittedly groundless, unreasonable and inconsistent."

In general, the attention of my correspondents is so strongly and so habitually turned in other directions that, when they write upon the impulses and motives of their religious life, they either forget fear or else have actually nothing at all to say about it. When they do mention fear it is, commonly, only in general terms as, for instance, "fear of danger." Others are more definite. One writes that she would not begin the day without prayer for fear things in general would go wrong. Another one would not dare undertake a railway journey without first securing God's protection. A few mention the fear of death itself without any reference to the Beyond, while still others seem not to dread the great crisis so much as the other world.¹ The "fear of God" appears more frequently than any other fear. Some describe it as a "reverential fear" or as a "feeling of dependence." In others it bears a more mercenary stamp. I find only five who seem to have been disturbed at any time by the thought of the Hereafter, and, of these five, four declare that they have outgrown that stage of their youth. In childhood and in adolescence it is not unusual for fear to be the principal instigator of religious life. St. Theresa confesses that it was more base fear than love which prompted her to enter the religious life. A Mrs. X, of whom I have written elsewhere, had "no use" for God in her childhood, except when frightened. "I do not think I bothered with God when I was a child, except when

¹ In his study of Conversion, Starbuck found that in 14 per cent. of his cases fear of Death and of Hell had played a considerable part. His were chiefly adolescent conversions.

frightened. Usually I did not care a button for him. I would say my prayers as directed, but automatically. Only if I got into a plight I would cling with the completest faith to what I had been taught about God's power and his readiness to answer our prayers." We have in this very common experience the ontogenetic correspondent of the phylogenetic emotional procession to which we have called attention.

In the religiosity of my correspondents fear plays, on the whole, a rôle too insignificant to attract attention. Our contemporaries, it seems, aspire to the good rather than struggle against the bad. They have the positive, not the negative attitude. Their qualities and their defects are those of an aggressive, optimistic and democratic age.

I do not, however, offer my returns as an exact measure of the degree to which fear is still present in the Christian religious consciousness. Among Roman Catholics, for instance, fear is, I have no doubt, much more conspicuous than among my correspondents.

Turning now from the facts to their interpretation, we discern three causes for the decline of fear.

In civilized societies the occasions for fear have been greatly reduced in number. The pressing dangers to which man in a state of nature is frequently exposed have almost ceased to exist for us. Wild beasts, human enemies, hunger, thirst and the horrors of war are, for most of us, mere symbols of never realized experiences. As for those possible causes of fear not removed by civilization: the celestial bodies, the clouds, the thunder, the lightning, so prolific of terrors in early times, they have lost much of their power to frighten, for they are understood, forecasted and partially mastered. Eclipses, comets, tornadoes, electric storms, are all *physical* phenomena to us.

Not only is the fear-reaction falling into disuse because of a lack of occasion, but also because the intellectual and moral training which is given to all in civilized countries, through the schools and through the wider channels of education, is producing an increased capacity for converting would-be emotional stimuli into controlled, appropriate reactions. The power of reflection and attention are natural antagonists of emotional reactions. They engender a habit of self possession: the more reflective and attentive, the less emotional.

The fundamental cause of the decline of the fear-reaction, however,

is neither increased knowledge of the physical world, nor mental training; it is to be found in the recognition of the imperfection of the reaction itself, of the inadequacy with which it fulfills its task. Considered in the light of reason, animal fear is a most clumsy and wasteful way of meeting danger.

Without entering into a detailed examination of the defects of the hereditary fear-reaction, let us recall that it meets each and every danger in one and the same manner: it brings about a more or less accentuated paralysis of the whole voluntary apparatus; it interferes with respiration; it produces spasmotic constriction of the blood vessels, shiverings, violent spasms of the heart resulting in pallor and peripheral anaemia.¹ These physiological constituents of the reaction have undoubtedly their direct or indirect value: the immobility which they enforce would, for instance, often be the wisest behavior for the threatened man or animal. But, in the case of beings able, as man is, to observe, understand and foresee, a uniform reaction, the essence of which is a lowering of vitality, a paralysis of the mind as well as of the body, is far from meeting the situation in the best way conceivable to them.

The origin of the fear-reaction accounts for its inadequacy. It arose at a comparatively low level of animal development through the natural selection of those chance variations (assisted probably by adaptive habits) which gave the animal possessing them an advantage over its fellows. Now, the struggle for life does not create improvements; all it can do is to preserve the fittest among the variations blindly produced by nature. The "fittest" is anything, however wretched, provided it be superior, for the purpose of animal life, to that which existed previously. Natural selection can do no more than preserve the *less deficient*. It deals with minimal improvements. The selected minimal improvements are transmitted through generations upon generations of animals to man, in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. So that now man, with powers of observation and of foresight immeasurably superior to those of the animals in which this way of meeting danger was established, still finds within himself the instinct to act in this same primitive, inadequate fashion when he could meet the situation more efficaciously otherwise. The

¹ See the descriptions of Lange, of Mosso, of Mantegazza, of Ribot.

typical fear-reaction is a survival of a by-gone age. "The dominant impression left by such a study" [a study of fears in children and adolescents], writes President Stanley Hall, "is that of the degrading and belittling effects of excessive fears."¹

It is because the insufficiency of the fear-reaction is felt that there is going on in civilized man an increasing warfare, not always conscious, against its manifestation. The deficiency of our legacy, in respect of fear and of the coarser emotions generally, is so evident that frequently when confronted with danger man struggles as much against fear as against its object. One of the most interesting phase of the powerful mind-cure movement is the war it wages against fear. It is to be placed "in the category of harmful, unnecessary and therefore not respectable things," says Horace Fletcher.² For these people fear is the Great Sin; it is Satan's new name.

As a matter of fact, slavery to the ancestral fear is no longer complete. In ordinary cases, it is partly inhibited or otherwise modified by the operation of new motives and of a higher intelligence. But in case of sudden and violent peril even the best among us relapse to the level of the animals in which the fear-reaction was first established.

The readjustment of our primitive instincts and impulses to the present altered internal and external circumstances is nothing else than the outcome of the struggle of the 'spiritual' 'against the 'natural' man, if one may use these conventional terms in a meaning wider than the usual.

That after which civilized man strives is, however, not the disappearance of fear, if this term is taken to mean no more than awareness of danger, eagerness to avoid it and preparation for the contingency. What is wanted is independence of the one inherited way of blindly meeting every threatening situation, it is to remain in possession of one's intellectual and muscular powers so as to make the most judicious use of them. In this sense, one might say that the goal towards which we are moving is a fearless alertness to physical and moral dangers.

It may be thought by some that we have uselessly complicated a simple problem. If the influence of fear in religion is waning, it is

¹A Study of Fears, *Amer. Jour. of Psy.*

²Happiness as found in Forethought minus Fear-thought, *Menticulture Series*, ii.

because, they might say, we have ceased to believe in the terrifying doctrines. When the beliefs in the judgment, in hell, in the devil, in the wrathful God give way, fear is dethroned. That is the long and the short of it. This account would be satisfactory if the discredit into which these doctrines have fallen was not as much the outcome of the progressive changes we have mentioned as of the activity of reason exercised directly upon religious ideas. If we no longer believe in hell, for instance, it is as much because we are not easily frightened because tuned to another key, as because we have come to admit the insufficiency of the proofs for the existence of hell. Did we not notice a little while ago in the only two among my cases in which fear held its old sway, that the beliefs were supported by a temperament in accord with them? The fear-habit was for our ancestors a strong inducement to believe in terrifying doctrines. To-day our judgment is deflected towards the doctrines which exhibit the love of God and, with regard to these, we are as easily satisfied intellectually as others used to be regarding the fearful doctrines. Love agrees better than fear with the contemporary popular temper.

The foregoing considerations warrant, it seems, the conclusion that the recession of fear in religion is not to be ascribed primarily to religious influences, neither chiefly to critical, doctrinal studies. Its more profound causes have a much wider scope. They are, as we have said, increased knowledge of the physical universe, intellectual and moral training, and, chief of all, the realization of the defects of the fear inheritance. The nature of these causes indicates that the passing of fear observed in the Christian religion must take place in all religions professed by progressive peoples, despite theologies and creeds to which they may have been wedded. As human nature changes, so do gods and religions change, or, as some may prefer to put it so as to keep closer to traditional expressions, as God changes us, so do we see Him altered and worship Him differently.

When clearly apprehended, this truth is seen to contradict the traditional assumption that, in religion, progress is from above through revelations. A "revelation" is merely the first, clear, dramatic, appearance in a person of an adaptive change, a progress, slowly working itself out in human society at large. It is as a breaking of the shell that concealed the unexpected growth.

II. Awe and the Sublime.

Awe and its near relative, the sublime, have held in religion and still hold in some forms of it, a large and honored place. In the ancient Greek mysteries; in the old Druidic rites celebrated amid the sombre majesty of forests; in the modern, imposing ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as in the Society of Friends in which simplicity, nakedness and silence, take the place occupied elsewhere by elaborateness, ornamentation, and music, awe and the sublime constitute an important if not even an essential part of the total emotional impression.

To judge by the efforts made so generally to strike with awe the worshippers, this emotional reaction must be of the highest importance for the realization of the religious purpose. One of the services awe and the sublime render religion, but not the chief one, is to bestow upon it a dignity which it is not in the power of fear to confer. Fear is hardly ever an experience of which one may be proud; it is often obviously a narrowly utilitarian and unintelligent reaction. In as far as it expresses the essential egoism of living creatures, it can only discredit religion in the eyes of those who have awoken to the nobility of the disinterested.

Awe and the sublime differ from fear in that they do not openly refer to personal needs, neither are they blatant witnesses to weakness and incapacity. They have no apparent selfish purpose; not even any obvious purpose at all. The peculiar attenuated shudder which creeps over one at the sight of the leaping waters of a cataract is neither egoistic nor altruistic, it is disinterested. It is true, however, that the awe-producing aspects of nature have all lurking about them the covert threat of potential danger.

The disinterestedness of awe is not its only virtue in the eyes of religion,—a merely negative virtue, by the way—it has a direct, enlarging, ennobling effect. To be impressed by the great, the powerful, the mysterious, and not to be afraid, is to evince one's partial kinship with them. Fear manifests antagonism, enmity; it declares isolation. Awe, involving as it does the recognition of greatness and the dawn of admiration and reverence, without any actual fear, gives the first sense of a not unfriendly relation with the cosmos. To feel power while on the verge of admiration, as we do in awe, is not only

to begin to understand but also to be attracted. The sympathetic vibrations of awe are the first organic sign of a friendship with the cosmic forces, the first step towards that ultimate union with the Great All achieved in certain forms of practical mysticism. The thrills of awe are thus ennobling, enlarging, vitalizing.

It should be observed further that there is but one, and that an easily taken, step from awe and the sublime to reverence and admiration. Now, in passing from fear through awe to reverence and admiration, man, from being a trembling beggar for protection, becomes the bestower of praises! Bent as man is upon self-respect and self-exaltation shall we wonder that he should have, amidst the glaring egoistic utilitarianism of the religiosity dominated by fear, seized upon awe and the sublime as upon redeemers of his religious nature?

It will not be out of place in this study to indicate, a little more definitely than has been done so far, the relation of awe to fear on the one hand and to the higher emotions on the other. There is in the emotional life a natural hierarchy which I must now make clear because a knowledge of it is necessary to the understanding of the course followed by religious development.

Awe might be defined arrested fear in the presence of objects whose greatness is apprehended. When these objects are connected in our minds with immediate danger, or even with a definite future danger, fear is generated. But when, although no cause for alarm is recognized, we remain to some extent under the influence of the connotation which past experience has established between great power in others and danger to us, the state induced is awe, *i. e.*, a consciousness of power on a background of arrested fear. In awe, the instinctive fear-reaction is ready to break forth, but it is held in check because the danger indicated by instinct is denied by intelligence. In as far as awe involves control over fear, it is a higher form of reaction.

The sublime is still farther removed from fear, since in the sublime there is no awakened fear-activity to be held in check. It stands, however, close to awe in the emotional hierarchy because of a vague fear residuum and also because the objective causes of both awe and the sublime have in common the characteristics of either physical or moral greatness or of both.¹

¹See Hiram Stanley: *Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling*, pp. 119 and 120.

If we go a step farther, admiration is reached. In it fear is not only overcome but all relations to it have been broken. So that admiration does not dispose to fear as awe and even the sublime do.

In coming to admiration from fear through awe and the sublime one has already gone a long way towards the tender emotions at the other end of the scale. Sympathy, affection, love, are natural antagonists of fear; they betoken agreement, appreciation, acceptance, union.

The ennobling qualities of awe and the sublime—disinterestedness and the obscure, but unifying, sense of kinship with the greater—would not of themselves be sufficient to give to these emotions the place they have gained at certain levels of religious development. The primary service they render religion is to lead man's thought, almost as forcibly as does fear, to that which is the source of religious energy: superhuman agents, gods, God, for the apprehension of greatness, power, majesty, involved in the sense of awe and of the sublime, sets the question of origin under circumstances which greatly favor a religious, as against a scientific, a secular, solution of the problem. What are these circumstances favorable to religion? They are simply the presence of emotions. Awe, as well as fear and every other emotion, favors the traditional causal explanation, *i. e.*, the explanation by reference to powers that may be described as animistic or personal or anthropomorphic. In reflective, non-emotional moments, the contemplation of natural phenomena might be referred to physical energy, while at another time, under the influence of emotional, instinctive, reactions, the same events might cause a reversion to the naïve, traditional, anthropomorphic interpretation which is the one necessary to the more common forms of religion. Emotions absorb attention, arrest the stream of thought and thus, for the moment, usually lower the intellectual level.

Awe does not, of course, always lead to the idea of God. Among the many in the present generation who have formed in youth the habit of looking upon nature as a mechanism, there are not a few who never relapse into the discarded view. Whether awed or frightened, no ghost, no God, appear to them.

An interesting problem is suggested by the persons who call awe a religious feeling even on those occasions when it does not seem to

suggest to them the existence of God. No. 51, who is frequently moved to awe by nature and also by the works of man, writes, "The same [religious] feeling I experience when meditating upon the massiveness of the Brooklyn bridge and again as I beheld such steamships as the St. Paul, Tourraine, etc." Why should this person consider the emotion induced by gigantic creations of man a religious emotion? Is it not because, on account of its frequent association with God, awe always brings along with it in these persons the feeling of a religious power? To a lover, love, by whomsoever suggested, always leads back to the thought of the beloved.

The problem grows in interest when we pass to persons not sure that there is anything in them deserving the name religion, not certain at all that they know what religion is, persons who, nevertheless, single out awe as their religious, or their *most* religious, experience, if the term is to be applied to any of them. No. 37 writes, "I prefer a religious service of much formalism. I have no religious feelings in public except as I am surrounded by the noble in architecture, in colored glass, in the pageantry of the Church. I have knelt at some shrine in walking through the country abroad, with religious feelings and I have done likewise in some altar in a cathedral. I prefer the Romish worship to any other on this account, but I refrain from having anything to do with it because I think it dangerous to liberty." No. 29 had his nearest approach to what he would call a religious feeling "while in the synagogue in thinking of the long line of continuity of race, racial sentiments of the Jews and also of others."

In these persons there is no real belief in God, not even during awe. Why then should awe be called a religious emotion? The vague consciousness of a mysterious power behind the awe-striking phenomena is all that need be admitted to account for the disposition of these people to look upon awe as a religious emotion. Their religiosity is just as inarticulate and uncertain as their idea of superhuman power and no more. If they are inclined to look upon awe as their *only* religious emotion, it is because, on the one hand, they have passed the stage at which one looks with favor upon the association of fear with religion, and, on the other hand, they have not assumed the habit of conceiving of the universe, of God, under the form of love. Therefore awe is for them the most available of the emotions which can be prominently connected with religious life.

Certain of the above passages might lead to a misunderstanding. Let me therefore say that the thought of God, however suggested, is not sufficient to create a religious moment. To it must be added a movement of the will stirred into activity by the consciousness of one's need, of one's weakness, of one's dependence.

When questioned concerning the emotions most conducive to religion, our Protestant contemporaries rarely forget to mention awe and the sublime. For one who names fear, there are hundreds who single out awe, the sublime and the beautiful as potent instigators of religious moods and activities. The following selections will illustrate the religious influence of nature.

"Mid ocean, lightning and thunder, inspire me with awe and the sense of dependence and turn my feelings toward God." No. 8.

"I can never look up at the stars at night but adoring love and worship fills my soul. The same at early dawn when the beautiful new day comes straight from the hand of God." No. 39.

"Any part of nature is so wonderful that it makes us feel how small and yet how great we are and after studying nature we are filled with an overwhelming sense of our responsibility." No. 2.

"Formerly it was chiefly a sense of awe and adoration which accompanied religious worship." No. 51.

Grandiose natural scenery, majestic or beautiful nature, are mentioned by nearly all my correspondents.

If our returns show clearly that in Protestant communities men have set their faces away from the dreadful and towards the desirable in their religious struggles for the increase of life, they indicate further that the stage of culture at which awe can be the dominant religious emotion is also passed. I imagine the worshippers of Odin and of Thor were swayed more by awe than by any other emotion. The Christianity of the past centuries knew no better ally, after fear, than awe. But now the awful, as well as the fearful, is growing obsolete. To be sure, these emotions have retained much of their ancestral power in large portions of the Christian world. The Roman Church, for instance, is not ready to dismiss an ally still so efficient. Vast, sombre cathedrals, majestic music, mysterious rites, gorgeous pageantry still entrance the faithful, subjugate the thoughtless and draw to its specta-

cles even the contemners of religion. The terrible, they have for the most part outgrown ; the awful, they have not passed ; and of the sublime, they are making all the use they can. In Protestant worship, and especially in the United States, it is quite otherwise. Yahve who was wont to thunder on the summit of Mount Sinai, in the presence of whom the august Moses himself, could hardly live, is rapidly being displaced by the God of love before whom not even prodigal sons need tremble. The 'new' revelation is a gospel of love : "children, flowers, fruit-trees, everything is full of God's love."—No. 39. In church architecture, the comfortable is put before the majestic ; in doctrine, the practical is preferred to the mysterious and in the conception of God, the amiable is not to be overshadowed by the awful.

There have, of course, been love waves before now, in Christian and even in other countries, but never has any had so wide a sweep. There is manifested in the most advanced communities, in and out of religious life, an irresistible tendency to banish awe as well as fear. The rod is proscribed in home and in school ; the child is no longer to sit at the feet of the master, they are to work arm in arm as becomes good friends ; sin is either disease or weakness, and should be met with sympathetic tenderness. Nothing is real or good except love, and the sentiments which do not antagonize it, friendship, trust, hope, courage, fortitude. The affirmative, agreeing, accepting reactions are being selected as the most efficient, while the withdrawing, rejecting, attitudes are falling into disrepute.

The desirability of this procession of emotional reactions is not to be disputed on the ground that excesses are already apparent in the form of sentimental extravagances. In many quarters, love has not only cast out fear, but also reverence, veneration and even respect. There are churches in which a mawkish Divinity is praised in giggling, rag-time, music. It may be that we are threatened with a recrudescence of the amourous piety of a St. Theresa. There is, at any rate, no indication of a return in our churches to that "most awful reverent frame of mind" which, says William Penn, was that of George Fox when in prayer.

I have given as the chief ground of the value of awe to religion its ability to direct the mind to sources of religious power. It is not without interest to observe that emotions lead to God along two different routes. They either awaken directly a *sense* of God's presence

or they lead indirectly, through reflection, to the *idea* of God. There are persons who in a forest, or in the tempest "feel the divine" within them; "something in the stars of the night reaches out" to them. In this way, the ever present animistic tendency crops out and bids dispense with rational proofs of the existence of God.¹ Frequently God is induced instead of being felt. The mind comes upon the idea of God through meditation upon the power, the richness, the orderliness, the goodness of nature. Expressions similar to the following are common in our returns. 'The impressive silence of the woods or of the prairies is favorable to deep meditations on the problems of life; 'the orderliness of nature leads one to the belief in a principle that makes for righteousness; ' "a sense of relation to the cosmos or the infinite is the basis of the reasoning which prompts me to religious practice."

Each particular aspect of nature reveals special attributes of the Divinity. When felt in mysterious might, God awes and excites the sense of the sublime; when seen in the beautiful, He delights and makes thankful; when conceived of in the orderliness of nature, He appears as intelligence and awakens admiration; when seen in goodness and kindness, He stands forth as the God of Love.

That the power of nature as a revealer of God should, in our scientific age, be as great as it appears in our returns may well excite surprise in those who have contracted in early youth the "naturalistic" vision. To them—a large and increasing number, surely—the startling noise of thunder, the waking hush of the forest, a beautiful sunset, no more announce a god than do the steam engine, an explosion in the laboratory, or the structural beauty of a bridge. They may be startled, or frightened, or delighted, but why should the thought of God arise in them from the contemplation of phenomena they can produce at will, or at least understand with the precision and definiteness possible in the mathematical sciences? Why should a person who has learned, in college or out of it, to perceive the action of mechanical forces in the dance of the fallen leaves, see God in the movement of the stars? This question should not be obscured by another one; that of the possibility of a spiritual agent modifying the course of nature. We

¹ Comp. Wm. James on the *Sense of Presence*, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 58, ff.

are considering at present the influence upon the mind of only the ordinary, commonplace, natural phenomena. Neither should this question be irrelevantly complicated by the introduction of the contentions of materialism and idealism. Whether matter or spirit be the ultimate reality, it remains agreed upon that no *personality* is manifested in the ordinary¹ natural phenomena. There is in them nothing anthropomorphic, no personal intention, no good will, no spite; it is all weighable and measurable. That is the one great conclusion which centuries of observation, experimentation and reflection have established without peradventure of a doubt. Even Christianity, in its advanced orthodox form, has practically, if not theoretically, surrendered the natural realm to physical forces. Not that God is no longer looked upon as the Creator and Sustainer of the physical order, but that this realm is admitted to be a physical one. It is well known that many of those whose thoughts and feelings are frequently called to God by nature, positively disbelieve in any cosmology which ascribes to a personal God any function in the physical universe except, possibly, that of originator and sustainer. Many of these persons admit this strange fact and wonder at their inconsistency.

In the Monist for 1901, Vol. XI, pp. 553-557, I have published a few illustrations of the illogism which makes it possible for men of trained intelligence to call upon God for assistance when they disbelieve either in His existence or in His ability to answer prayer. The case of the law student referred to in the section on Fear is also in point. He tells us that the reason he would assign in an argument for his praying habit is that one is "greatly benefitted internally by this exercise of the feelings and I hope that by strong effort I can also develop myself by the stretching up and out process. . . . When I am about to face an audience, I find myself praying very rapidly, asking forgiveness and help. I think the fact that I reiterate the prayer is fairly good evidence that I expect nothing in reply." And, after remarking that he attends the Y. M. C. A. meetings for fear that if he does not go, he may "lose all hope of God's favor," he adds "this, though I do not believe in that kind of God at all." Another University student writes, "But although the appeal is directly to Him when in sickness or trouble or in great need of sleep, I do not believe in

¹ I say "ordinary," in order not to prejudge extraordinary phenomena.

God as interested in anything save possibly the Cosmos. That is, I do not believe at all."

- This discrepancy between the Godward tendency of our thoughts in certain emotional seizures, and their movement when under the guidance of experience and knowledge, measures, on the one hand, the progress made by the individual since he discarded animism, and, on the other, the tenacity of the mental habits rooted in that distant and obsolete past.

The first notion of power is given us by our own activity, by the feeling of our will in action. It is therefore, of necessity, and in that sense, an anthropomorphic notion. From the rustling of the leaves to the eclipse of the sun, every movement of natural objects is interpreted by the savage as the doing of some man-like agent. In order to come to the conception of a force regulated by law, free from the influence of desire and emotion, there is needed a capacity for observing and for generalizing much above the possibilities of the untutored mind. Thus it happened that the race began life with animistic¹ beliefs and that each individual, no doubt, begins it likewise and continues in that habit for a length of time regulated by his aptitudes and his circumstances.

In the case of most of us the conception of a non-anthropomorphic force never acquires the firm foothold which a fast connection with instinctive reactions would give it. So that any unusual circumstance, *i. e.*, any experience awakening emotion, is likely to throw us back upon ideas associated with the primitive instincts and again we see ghosts, spirits, gods, where we would otherwise see mere physical forces. Any jar shakes off the unstable accessions of rational intelligence and uncovers the older, stabler, mental structure.

To the preceding considerations must be added the following remarks in order to account fully for the frequency and prevalence of the atavistic phenomenon under consideration. Not very long ago the general theistic belief of those professing the Christian Religion was of the kind which sees the hand of God in every natural event, however trivial. God was daily besought and thanked for weather, shelter, food and raiment, not in the conventional, unmeaning way still in vogue in official worship but in the familiar and personal manner

¹ Fetichism is a form of Animism.

of the home. This form of theism might be called an Animistic Theism, for it is not so very far removed from animism. One God with a million different, conflicting, manifestations of Himself—the popular theism—is, in its essence, much nearer animism than several Gods and one Law, the concept under which some of the old Greeks understood the universe.

The return to God through the impression made upon us by nature, be it fear, awe, the sublime or another emotion, is then in no way praiseworthy, unless forgetting that which we have learned and do believe in our clearest moments is to be commended. The powerful support which traditional Christianity—and of course, other forms of religion also—receives from the emotional reactions in question is due to the fact that both are survivals of an earlier age. Neither of them have been properly reconstructed according to present knowledge and needs. On that account, they meet on a common ground : the lapse of intelligence induced by emotion brings man down to the level of antiquated religious beliefs. If the conceptions of traditional Christianity were in accord with the modern interpretation of life, that form of religion would not find an ally in antiquated organic adaptations.¹

¹ The author would welcome any data on the subject of this paper.

THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN SACRIFICE -- INCLUDING AN EXPLANATION OF THE HEBREW ASHERAH.

BY REV. ARTHUR E. WHATHAM.

In a former article, "The Origin of Circumcision," I endeavored to show that the origin of sacrifice called for a human victim, and that lower animals were subsequently offered in substitution. W. R. Smith, however, seems to doubt the accuracy of the general view in the later ages of antiquity that "the oldest rituals demanded a human victim, and that animal sacrifices were substitutes for the life of man." He claims that "in the oldest times there could be no reason for thinking a man's life better than that of a camel or a sheep as a vehicle of sacramental communion." In conclusion he says, "indeed, if we may judge from modern examples of that primitive habit of thought which lies at the root of Semitic sacrifice, the animal life would probably be deemed purer and more perfect than that of man" (Rel. Sem., p. 361). Subsequently he tells us that "As time went on a camel's life was no longer as sacred as that of a man," though it was treated as a tribesman's life when "presented at the altar", for then it was "regarded as the substitute for a human victim" (*ib.*, pp. 361, 362).

The above shows clearly that W. R. Smith regarded a lower animal, a camel or a sheep, as the original victim of sacrifice. Mr. Elford Higgins, in his "Hebrew Idolatry and Superstition," quotes him as showing that "in earliest times a fellow tribesman was offered, not an animal" (p. 19). No such statement as this, however, occurs in his second edition of his lectures on the Religion of the Semites. On the contrary, whatever he may have said elsewhere, here he undoubtedly viewed a camel or a sheep as the original sacrificial victims which later were offered as a substitute for human life. I am inclined, therefore, to think that Mr. Higgins has misunderstood, and so misrepresented W. R. Smith's opinion in this instance, which I must confess appears to me to be somewhat vaguely expressed (see pp. 361, 362, 2nd. Ed. Rel. Sem.), though it is explained by his subsequent state-

ment touching the substitution of a camel for a man. He doubts that it was a substitute, for "In that case the ritual of the camel sacrifice would have been copied from human sacrifice, but in reality this was not so. The camel was eaten but the human victim was burned, after the blood had been poured out as a libation, and there can be no question that the former is the more primitive rite. I apprehend, therefore, that human sacrifice is not more ancient than the sacrifice of sacred animals" (*ib.*, p. 364). He might have said plainly that human sacrifice is less ancient than animal sacrifice, for that is what he means. In the Ency. Brit., he defines sacrifice as "primarily a meal offered to the deity . . . the original principle on which a sacrificial meal is chosen is that men may not eat what cannot be offered to their god" (*Sacrifice*). Returning to his "Religion of the Semites," he says, "To make the sacrifice effective, it was only necessary that the victim should be perfect and without fault," and then, as I have shown, he adds that "the animal life would probably be deemed purer and more perfect than that of man" (360).

I have been compelled to undertake this examination of W. R. Smith's statements because nowhere does he say plainly that animal sacrifice was older than human sacrifice. He does this indirectly as I have shown, but so vaguely that Mr. Higgins was led to quote him as saying that in earliest times a fellow tribesman was offered, not an animal. Mr. Joseph Jacobs, however, has correctly given his meaning. He says, "Prof. Smith has to make the most ingenious hypotheses to explain the late origin of human sacrifice amongst the Semites, among whom it certainly existed. But if ever a practice bore on the face of it the marks of primitiveness, it is that of human sacrifice" (*Biblical Archaeology*, p. 36).

Prof. Samuel Ives Curtiss, in his "Primitive Semitic Religion To-Day," rejects this idea of a commensal meal being the origin of sacrifice. After an exceedingly interesting review of facts bearing upon the point, he asks, — "In what does the sacrifice consist?" and he answers, "Primitive sacrifice consists wholly in the shedding of blood" (pp. 223, 230). He does not, however, enter into any complete examination as to the ideas underlying the act of sacrifice. "The original idea of sacrifice," he says, "seems to be one derived from experience in the East, if not in the West, that 'every man has his price,' Hence the gods have their price. If God has brought mis-

fortune upon man, he can be bought off; if he demands a human life, the price may be paid through a substitute; if the price is 'bursting forth of blood before the face of God,' then the blood of a sheep, goat, bullock, or camel, the best that a man has of animal life, may avert the misfortune and cover the sin" (p. 245).

Is it then originally the idea of sin that lies behind this attempt to buy off the wrath of God? No, for Prof. Curtiss rightly thinks that this idea of sin, *i. e.*, as transgression, was a much later development in Hebrew thought (*ib.*). Sin was not with the early Hebrews ordinarily conceived of as guilt, but rather as misfortune, and the dominant notion is that misfortune comes, not because man or woman is guilty of some sin, but because God is arbitrarily angry. Hence his favor must be bought (*ib.*, p. 220).

Now the idea that the gods jealously guarded their divine prerogatives as rulers and owners from mankind, must have been an early thought with primitive man, since not only do we find it underlying Greek mythology, but also early Israel's ideas of Yahwe were based upon the same conception (see the remarks on Gen. 3: 5, 22; 11: 6, by Dillmann, Driver, Bennett, and Marcus Dods in their respective commentaries on Genesis).

The acquisition of knowledge or property of any character by man was therefore viewed as something taken from the gods that must be paid for, *quid pro quo*, or misfortune would follow upon the possessor. Was it wisdom that was acquired, then, "man has become as one of us," and must pay for this possession by a hard life ending with death (Gen. 3: 17-24). Was it property that he became possessed of, towards the making of a great nation? then his ambition must be checked or his riches, and, consequently, his pretensions, might rival those of the gods. Thus he is driven from his home in divisions speaking different languages, and unable to understand each other, since otherwise he might gather together again and defy the gods (Gen. 11: 6-8).

Prof. Curtiss, even as Dr. Trumbull (*Threshold Covenant*), gives many illustrations of the sacrifices offered at the building of houses and other structures, but neither of these writers states why this sacrifice was thought necessary upon these occasions. It is true they note the belief of the builders that the structures would not be safe without the shedding of blood, but this does not explain why this should be so.

The answer is that the jealousy of the unseen powers must be appeased, consequently a valuable possession is offered to them in sacrifice.

Here I must not neglect to add that Trumbull as well as Curtiss rejects the idea of eating as essential to sacrifice (p. 14).

And now with all this evidence before us we can understand the ideas underlying Israel's sacrifices. All things were owned by Yahwe, therefore they must be paid for. Hebrew sacrifice therefore was based upon two motives, first the buying off of misfortune arbitrarily sent; and again, the paying for acquisition of knowledge, property, or offspring. We therefore understand why Yahwe is represented as saying that "All the earth is mine;" why he declared, "all the first born, whatsoever openeth the womb among the children of Israel, both of man and of beast, it is mine," and why they were to be redeemed (Ex. 19:5; 13:2, 12, 13). It was not on the basis of God's fatherly ownership and loving protection that these thoughts were founded. This was the work of later writers who declared that no sacrifice was required by God but that of a broken and contrite heart, since he desired mercy and not sacrifice (Psl. 51:16, 17; Hos. 6:6).

With the early Hebrews the conception of Yahwe's character was as simple and undeveloped as the age. They conceived of Chemosh of the Moabites just as they conceived of Yahwe, and no otherwise (Kent-His. Heb. Peo., p. 27).

The origin of sacrifice, therefore, according to Prof. Curtiss, consists wholly in the shedding of blood on the buying-off principle. This undoubtedly was the idea underlying early Hebrew sacrifice, but it was not the original idea underlying Semitic sacrifice, and it is with this that we are primarily dealing. It is true that even here blood-letting formed the principal feature of sacrifice, but there was here an earlier idea than that of buying off a jealous god by offering to him the most precious of human gifts. Prof. Curtiss agrees with Dr. Trumbull that the first blood was shed at the entrance of the tent, or cave of the earliest Semites; and later, when they lived in houses, on the threshold; and still later on a rock (p. 237), this latter signifying some temple shrine. He does not, however, explain this shedding of blood at the tent door or threshold, therefore we must turn to Dr. Trumbull who does.

In his "Threshold Covenant," this able writer informs us that the

threshold of the house dwelling place was the primitive altar, and the house father the earliest priest (1). The earliest temple consisted of a doorway above a threshold, this latter being the altar. Thus a doorway and sill was the earliest form of temple and altar (pp. 102, 103). This was copied from the simple doorway with its side posts and lintel, of the earlier household, the sacred entrance of the home, which, undoubtedly, as he claims, preceded the temple (p. 66). He gives many illustrations of the shedding of blood at the entrance of the home. Here animals were sacrificed, but "apparently the earlier sacrifices were of human beings" (p. 46).

The Hebrew Asherah.

And here, leaving the more immediate discussion of sacrifice, I come to a feature closely related to it, in fact, one that is bound up essentially with it, since it lies at its very foundation. I refer to the Hebrew Asherah. Strange light has within the last few years been thrown upon this much-discussed symbol by the discovery of very ancient and remarkable ruins in the Tripoli hill range by Mr. H. S. Cowper, F. R. S. The curious feature about these ruins, so numerous that Mr. Cowper thinks they indicate that at one time a dense population must have existed where now only a few bands of roving Arabs are to be met with, is the large number of upright structures resembling doorways made of stone, and consisting of two jambs and a lintel with a flat stone altar immediately in front of each of them lying flush with the ground. Each altar is grooved with a square or round channel, with one or more branches reaching to the side of the altar which meets the earth, thus carrying into the ground the blood of the victim evidently slaughtered on these altars. Mr. Cowper offers an explanation of these senams, an explanation in which there is but one thing to regret, viz., its brevity. However, his admirable suggestions and analogies afford indispensable material to the further working out of the Asherah problem.

"It is difficult not to see," he says, "that the point where the whole ritual was focussed was at the senam itself; and this brings us to the more difficult question of what the symbol was for" (Hill of the Graces, p. 178). Further on he views the Asherah symbol as possessing a similar form to that shown on certain Babylonian seals.

Here we have an altar, a pillar with a cone-shaped head or top, and an upright structure exactly similar to the senams, except that it has a cross piece about half way down. On all the senams, however, Mr. Cowper noticed that on one jamb there was a slot sunk, while on the other jamb there was a perforation right through it immediately opposite the same slot. He very naturally viewed these holes as made for the inserting of a beam which barred the entrance of the senam doorway in a similar manner to the cross piece of the doorlike structure on the Babylonian seals. Mr. Cowper, on p. 180, gives a cut of one of these seals in his own possession, and others may be seen in Perrot and Chipiez's "Chaldea and Assyria," Vol. I, p. 279; Inman's "Symbolism," pp. 80, 81, etc.

Before the British Association at Ipswich, Mr. Cowper suggested that in the "senams of Tripoli we see symbolic structures, if not identical, at any rate nearly akin to the mysterious Asherah of the Baal worshippers." Subsequent consideration, and a second visit to the country, led him to view the Asherah symbol as possessing "such a form as we see in the senams and in the Babylonian seals" (pp. 184, 184). In the opening between the senam jambs, he sees the passage through which victims were passed by the priests, indicative of their regeneration or new birth, which was to be followed by either sacrifice or the purifying rite of passage through fire (p. 184 ff).

This is practically all that Mr. Cowper tell us by way of explaining the form and character of the Asherah as gathered from a study of the senams, so I must now refer to another scholar, Dr. Trumbull, whose investigations explain in a marvellous manner Mr. Cowper's senams, although he does not appear to have heard of the latter's wonderful discovery.

"Two upright stone posts," he informs us, "with or without an overhanging stone across them, and with or without an altar stone between or before them, are amongst the most ancient remains of primitive man's handiwork, and a similar design is to be recognized all the way along in the course of history, down to the elaborate doorway standing by itself as a memorial to the revered dead" (TC, p. 102).

"In China, Japan, Korea, Siam, and India, a gate or doorway usually stands before Confucian and Buddhist and Shinto temples, but

apart from the temple, and always recognized as of peculiar sacredness. . . . They stand in front of shrines" (*ib.*, p. 104). References to the sacred gate or doorway are numerous in ancient Babylonian literature. Here, also, we are informed that the crossing of a threshold marks the change from the present to the future world; while it is needful for another life to be given for one to be reborn into this life having crossed the threshold of the region beyond (*ib.*, 110-113). "The oldest temple discovered in Egypt is little more than a doorway with an altar at its threshold;" while "the same hieroglyph represented house or temple,—a simple quadrangular enclosure, with its one doorway." "An altar stood at the doorway, or before the door, at temples of later date in Phœnicia and Phrygia, as shown on contemporary medals and coins. And so in temples in other lands (*ib.*, p. 126, 100, 121).

Dr. Trumbull intimated that two upright stone posts with or without an overhanging stone across them, signify a threshold shrine similar to the completed doorway shrine. Mr. Cowper (p. 179) refers to the images mentioned in 2 K. 10:26, as brought out of the house of Baal by order of Jehu, and burned, as parallel structures to the senams. He points out that, as we know, they were pillars, and he sees in them a likeness to the dual pillars which stood before various temples, to Jachin and Boaz that stood in Solomon's temple. Prof. Lumby, however, sees in these pillars mentioned in Kings, a mere reduplication of the Baal pillars (Cam. Bib.). He is mistaken, since the special emphasis laid on the Baal pillar which was destroyed equally with these other pillars, shows that the latter must have represented an additional feature in the Baal worship. This could have been nothing else than the female principle, Astarte, his well-known companion, as he himself represented the male principle. Singular confirmation of this conclusion is found in a Carthage votive stele dedicated to the goddess Tanith-Artemis (the heavenly virgin, a form of Astarte), with two pillars in front of a temple (Eze. Polychrome Ed., p. 186). The two pillars which Ezekiel saw in the second temple stood one in front of either jamb of the threshold entrance, signifying by their position their original character (40:49), which I conceive to have been that of the senams, the Asherim, and the structures on the Babylonian seals.

Blood Letting and the Asherah Symbol.

With all this evidence before us, let us now see what connection existed between blood letting, and the threshold of a home, later a temple shrine. Let us endeavor to ascertain when, and under what circumstances, the first blood was supposed to have been shed as the commencement of sacrifice.

It would seem that in the union of the sexes was seen the first threshold sacrifice, at the doorway of physical life. This was followed by the shedding of blood at the threshold of the home, and later, at a temple doorway. It was thus that primitive man came to believe that there was no covenant binding without the shedding of blood; no continuance of life without animal sacrifice, be it of man or beast. This is why woman was viewed as the first altar, the shape of which was originally patterned after her form, broad at the ends, contracted in the middle. This is why as far back as the Vedas themselves the term *yoni*, or doorway of physical life, is used as synonymous with altar (TC, pp. 197, 198).

Now while all this is very wonderful, it is, after all, very natural, and at once explains the significance of the senams discovered by Mr. Cowper. They are simply representations of the physical doorway of life, which later became temple shrines, and before which sacrifices were offered, both of man and beast. Thus the senam is an emblem of life, physical and mystical; it is the symbol of woman, and the emblem of divine fertility. It is, as Mr. Cowper rightly conjectured, the Asherah symbol, and we now know for the first time what this symbol was like as originally used by the Semitic Baal worshippers who had borrowed from their fellow Semites of Babylonia this emblem of their Ishtar nature cult. If I am correct, then both senams and Asherim were phallic emblems, the latter representing the goddess Asherah, while the former, which there is reason to believe were of Phœnician origin (see Cowper, p. 188; cf. Her. B. 2. c. 54), represented Astarte, otherwise Asherah. In other words, they were one and the same symbol.

I am aware, however, that W. H. Smith, in his "Religion of the Semites," states that "the opinion that there was a Canaanite goddess called Ashera and that the trees or poles of the same name were her symbols, is not tenable (p. 188, 2nd ed.). Prof. Allen (Asherah-

HDB), doubts both the existence of a goddess Asherah, and that the Asherah was a phallic symbol. Prof. Moore (Asherah-Ency. Bib.) says simply, "the shape of an Asherah is unknown. . . . The assertion still often made that in the religion of Canaan the massebas (*i. e.*, pillars) were sacred to male, the asheras (*i. e.*, posts), to female deities, is supported by no proof whatever." Finally, the view that these pillars and posts were phallic emblems, he describes as the opinion of "amateurs in the history of religion" (Massembah-Ency. Bib.).

On the other hand, Professors Barton (Sem. Orig., pp. 106, 248; 102, 137) and Sayce (Pat. Pal., p. 255) both believe in the existence of a goddess Asherah, and that a tree or post was her symbol, while a pillar was the symbol of Baal. Prof. Hommel also accepts the existence of a goddess Asherah, whom he identifies with Astarte (Anct. Heb. Trad., pp. 220, 224). But perhaps the strangest difference amongst these scholars is that W. R. Smith himself had previously stated in the Ency. Brit. (Baal), that the pillar and post in the Canaanitish worship were phallic symbols, indicative respectively of the male and female reproductive powers; while the name Asherah sometimes denoted the goddess and sometimes her symbol. All this I have shown he repudiated in his subsequent lectures, without, however, a single reference to his former opinion. Thus, as he gave no reason for discrediting this opinion, which still stands in all the new editions of the Ency. Brit., we are at liberty to adopt it, especially in view of the evidence already produced, which I am about to amplify.

In a note on Eze. 6:4, in the Polychrome Bible, we read, "The khammanim or sun-pillars were posts, pillars, or obelisks connected with the worship of a Baal of the sun, as the Asherahs were with that of Astarte." Here we have an acknowledgment that both Baal and Astarte had their respective symbols erected alongside an altar.

I believe that the idols mentioned in conjunction with the sun-pillars in Eze. 6:4, called images in the AV, and simply idols in the RV, are the Asherim, since I conceive that the altars, sun-images, and idols of this passage, correspond to the altars, Asherim, and sun-images of Isa. 17:8 (RV). In Ex. 34:13, and Deu. 12:3, the order is altars, pillars, and Asherim. The word translated idols in Eze. 6:4, signifies merely a round log or post of no definite shape in themselves, but which, when standing as dual pillars or stakes, would re-

semble the senams of the Tripoli hill range. I referred, a little while back, to the pillars brought out of the house of Baal by Jehu, and I agreed with Mr. Cowper in seeing in them, when placed in a dual position, a parallel structure to the senams. In the idols mentioned by Ezekiel, and alluded to in Lev. 26:30, in conjunction with high places and sun-images, I believe we have similar pillars to those burned by Jehu. In other words, they were the jambs of the Asherah symbol, which, shapeless and meaningless in themselves when separate, were of deep significance when in position.

From numerous passages of Scripture (see above) it is seen that the three customary sacred things at a high place were an altar, a sun-image, and an Asherah. Moore himself admits that the Israelite high-place had its altar, stone pillar, and wooden post, all of which had been taken over from the Canaanites. He further refers to the worship at these centres as pictured by Hosea in the eighth century, noting the licentious intercourse of men and women, in which the priests and consecrated women set the example (High-Place-Ency. Bib., Baal-HDB). Now how came this immorality into the worship of the Israelites? Was it original, or a new development based upon a foreign importation? A correct answer to these questions will materially aid us to the understanding of the Asherah symbol.

Israel's Early Religion.

When the Israelites entered Canaan the religion of the country "was the worship of the male and female divinities, Baal and Ash-toreth; it was accompanied by the most degrading and licentious rites." It was a civilization of this character into which the Israelites entered under Joshua, "and which they in part adopted" (Kent-His. Heb. Peop., pp. 28, 92). Budde, in his "Religion of Israel to the Exile," infers that the Baal-worship of Canaan was readily taken up by the Israelites after their entrance into their new home (p. 70). Other scholars express the same opinion. "In religion, also, the Canaanite-Israelite was a new production. He held his monotheism somewhat loosely, and was ready to worship at Canaanite shrines. . . . New to the land, he was introduced to the old sanctuaries by the old inhabitants, and thus learned to worship the local Baal, the native god of

corn and wine. Of Israel's morals during this period, little need be said" (*Israel; Judges HDB*).

We need not wonder, however, that Israel from the first adopted the local religion of the country they were invading, since their own god, Yahwe, while accompanying his people on their journeys, going with them where they went, nevertheless, had his permanent home in Sinai or Horeb (*ib.*). The gods of Canaan had indeed been conquered by Yahwe, but not driven out of the country, since Yahwe had not yet come to reside with his own people, remaining still enthroned on Mount Sinai (Budde, p. 54). In view of this latter fact, we can readily understand why from the first Israel adopted the religion of the Canaanites.

I have said that when Israel entered Canaan the religion of the country consisted in the worship of both male and female divinities. These for the most part were not called by their proper names, but designated as "Lord" or "Lady" of the place where they were worshipped, which had an altar, a sacred pillar, and a sacred tree or post (*Israel-Ency. Bib.*). It was in simple language a nature worship based upon the idea of fertility, and in which, consequently, both male and female divinities would necessarily be associated. This is the reason why mention is made of both sun-pillars and Asherah images standing together at the one altar, for sacrifice there offered included homage to both principles of nature.

W. R. Smith admits that "If a god and a goddess were worshipped together at the same sanctuary . . . and if the two sacred symbols at the sanctuary were a pole and a pillar of stone, it might naturally enough come about that the pole was identified with the goddess and the pillar with the god. . . . It is not therefore very surprising that in one or two later passages written at a time when all the worship of the high places was regarded as entirely foreign to the religion of Jehovah, the Asherim seem to be regarded as the female partners of the Baalim. . . . There is no evidence of a divine pair amongst the older Hebrews" (*Rel. Sem.*, p. 189).

That the religion of the Canaanites taken over by the Israelites was a nature religion, based upon the ideas of fertility and reproduction, including consequently homage to both male and female divinity, I think I have produced sufficient evidence to show. Thus, in opposition to W. R. Smith, I cannot but think there is ample evidence of

the worship of a divine pair amongst the older Hebrews, so that it follows, according to his own argument, that as a pillar, and another separate object, stood at a sanctuary where both a male and female deity were worshipped together, the pillar was identified with the god, and the other object with the goddess.

It further seems to me that we have entirely disposed of Prof. Moore's contention that there is no proof that the massebas were sacred to male, and the asheras to female deities.

"The Original Shape of an Asherah."

We are told that the Asherah was a wooden post or mast (Asherah-Ency. Bib.), a tree, post, or stump of a tree (Asherah-HDB); a tree or post (Rel. Sem., 188); a tree or pole (Thresh. Cov., pp. 214, 232). These four writers base their opinion upon Ex. 34:13; and Deut. 16:21. In the former passage there is a direction to "cut down their Asherim," and in the latter, "not to plant thee an Asherah of any kind of tree beside the altar of Jehovah." This is all, or nearly all the foundation upon which these scholars build their idea as to the nature of the Asherah. These two passages, however, afford no ground for any such opinion, while many others show that it is utterly untenable.

Manasseh is recorded as having set up a graven image of Asherah in the house of the Lord (2 K. 21:7), which was brought out and burned by the reforming king, Josiah (2 K. 23:6). Ahab also is recorded as making an Asherah and apparently setting it up in the house of Baal (1 K. 16:32, 33). Thus the Asherah was something that could be made, and by man's fingers, as Isaiah records (17:8). Now what can be made, set up in, and then brought out of an enclosure, is neither a living, nor a dead tree stump, nor pole. Besides, the women of the temple wove drapery for it (2 K. 23:7), or in other words, garments or tunics (Dress-Ency. Bib.), for this is what the word rendered hangings in the A and RVs signifies. To this, however, I shall refer later.

Prof. Moore (Asherah-Ency. Bib.) tells us that *perhaps* the Asherah was "sometimes carved, but the drapery especially is doubtful" Other scholars, however, think that the Asherah *was* sometimes carved. In fact, that the term Asherah probably means the wooden image of a goddess worshipped with similar rites to those of the god Baal (Asherah-HDB; Eze. Cam. Bib.).

The above difference amongst scholars has arisen from their misunderstanding of the original and subsequent development of the Asherah; together with their failure to grasp the significance of the covering woven for the Asherah by the temple women. Originally I believe that the Asherah was merely a threshold or doorway, such as the senams, and as seen on Babylonian seals, while sometimes it consisted merely of two uprights, or pillar jambs. Later, both in Babylonia and with the Hebrews, I believe it underwent a development, which will appear later.

When Israel entered Canaan, the high places which they took over from the Canaanites included, as we have seen, an altar, a Baal or sun-pillar, and what I believe to have been a threshold or doorway of wood, formed by two jambs and a lintel, called an Asherah. That the Asherah represented the feminine element in Baal worship, I think I have fully shown. If I am correct, then, when we bear in mind what Trumbull has abundantly proved, viz., that the female element was from the first represented by a threshold or doorway; when we see this symbol carried by the Phoenicians who had obtained it from Babylonia, to the people of the Tripoli hill region, are we not justified in claiming that the image depicting the female element as worshipped by the Canaanite-Israelite was similarly a threshold or doorway, represented by an actual enclosure with side posts and lintel, or merely by two upright beams or posts? As time went on, however, a change was made in the form of this symbol both in Babylonia and with the Hebrews, whereby from a mere symbol of the goddess it was made into an actual life-like image.

The New Form of the Asherah.

In 1 K. 15 : 13, AV., we read, "Maachah his mother, even her he removed from being queen, because she had made an idol in a grove; and Asa destroyed her idol, and burned it by the brook Kidron." This is not the literal rendering, so the RV gives it, "made an abominable image for an Asherah." But neither is this a literal translation, so they struck out the *an*, and put simply *for* Asherah, in the margin. The meaning of the passage seems to be that Maachah not contented with the usual simple, but suggestive Asherah symbol, made one more fully depicting the rites of the goddess symbolized by the threshold

emblem. Is it possible to ascertain this new form given to the Asherah? I think so, and will endeavor to describe it.

First, the word for idol in 1 K. 15:13, signifies a horrible image. It was, I apprehend, a representation of nature worship which by its gross literalism, shocked or disgusted its beholders. The original Asherah represented an opening indicative of the Kteis or doorway of physical life. Now, this was fully depicted in an actual likeness of a woman showing in grossly exaggerated realism her reproductive character. Figurines of Ishtar have been discovered at Nippur and elsewhere, depicting the goddess clasping her breasts with one hand, and her womb with the other (Jastrow-BAR, p. 674; Ashtoreth-Eny. Bib., HDB). Perrot and Chipiez, in their "Art in Phrygia," p. 293, give a drawing of an ancient mould, found at Thyatira, which depicts a nude figure of "the goddess-mother, Istar, or Anahith, of the religions of Anterior Asia." They draw attention to the gross realism referred to, which was a common feature of such figures throughout Semitic regions 2000 B. C. (Ellis-Psy. Sex., Vol. 11, p. 28). Maachah's horrible image seems to have been a similarly emphasized life-like representation of Asherah, otherwise, Astarte, otherwise, Ishtar. If I am correct, then the idol made by Maachah was a phallic image, and it is so accepted by Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible (Maachah). This was the opinion also of Movers, but W. R. Smith does not accept this idea, while he is emphatic in asserting that Eze. 16:17, does not refer to phallic worship (Rel. Sem., p. 456). I think, however, that Movers was justified in seeing in both passages phallic reference.

Were the Hebrews Phallic Worshippers?

Prof. T. Witton Davies, in his "Magic, Divination, and Demonology" (p. 99), does not hesitate to refer to Hosea 2:2, as showing that the women who wore the ornaments there indicated, acknowledged the heathen religion. This, however, is but another way of saying that they practiced the same rites. Now what were these ornaments to which Hosea alluded as whoredoms to be put away from the face and breast? What were these images of men with which the Hebrew women played the harlot, and for which they made coverings (Eze. 16:17, 18)? Necklaces of phalli, and similar ornaments for the face, were common in ancient Egypt and countries surrounding

Israel (Westropp-Primitive Symbolism, p. 41). In Dyer's "Pompeii," is figured a necklace of amulets with two phalli, found on a female skeleton. Worship with an abominable use of ithyphallic images was similarly widespread (Pausanias, Bk. 6. c. 26; Her. Bk. 11, c. 102; Arnobius, Bk. 5, 132; Augustine-De Civ. Dei., Bk. 6, c. 9). Amsu, or Min, was a very ancient Egyptian god of the generative and reproductive powers of nature, and was usually depicted ithyphallic.

In a former article, "The Origin of Circumcision," I showed that Abraham himself viewed the Phallus as especially sacred to deity, and so also did Jacob (Gen. 47:29). This being so, with the perversion of an originally pure idea which saw in reverence paid to the phallus devotion offered to the Creator, we can well understand Israel's acceptance of, and participation in, the sexual grossness of the age. As part of a people always prone to sexual excess (Sem. Orig., p. 42), that the Hebrew women should have adopted obscene ornaments as exhibited in their use of phallic amulets, and ithyphallic images, for no other construction can be placed upon the statements of the prophets touching whoredoms committed by the wearing of ornaments, and the making of male images, does not surprise us in the least. Indeed, Dr. Peters (EHS, p. 28) does not hesitate to refer to the worship of the Canaanites as taken over by the Israelites as "phallic and lascivious."

We now come to the drapery woven for the Asherah. It is recorded that Asa removed and destroyed the shocking image which his mother had made. That was in 951 B. C., yet in 785 B. C., the Hebrew women were wearing phallic ornaments; in 624 B. C., an Asherah, for which women of the temple were weaving drapery, was still in the house of the Lord, (2 K. 23:7); while in 595 B. C., women of the same character, if not of the same profession, were making ithyphallic images of men and supplying them with garments. From all this I apprehend that the making of phallic images with pronounced sexual parts such as I conceive to have been introduced by Maachah, was continued all through this period together with other phallic practices. As for the garments woven for these images, it was a common custom amongst the ancients, down even to a late period, to weave garments for statues of both gods and goddesses. Matrons wove a shawl for Hera; the goddesses Ilithyia and Athene were

draped; while women wove a coat for Apollo at Amyclæ every year (Pausanias, Bk. 5, 15; 1, 18, 24; 111, 16).

It must be noticed that 2 K. 23:7, records that the drapery was woven, not for the Asherim, but for the Asherah, which I take to be the Asherah made for the temple. We have here, consequently, the weaving, not of tent-shrines, as certain scholars have assumed (Eze.-Cam. Bib.; High-Place Ency. Bib.), but of corresponding clothing to that made for the Greek gods and goddesses referred to, which, we are informed, was a custom borrowed from the East (Dress-Ency. Bib.). As for the garments referred to in Eze. 16:16, these evidently were made into tent-shrines, in which whoredom seems to have been committed, for this is the sense of the passage (Eze.-SBOT). This was a new and appalling departure in depravity, since hitherto, as was the case usually at heathen sex-rites (Rel. Sem., p. 454; Her. 1, 199), the Hebrews had always abstained, even among the married, from sexual intercourse at the approach to sacred enclosures (Ex. 19:15).

I have claimed that Maachah's "shocking" Asherah was a new form given to the usual threshold-doorway Asherah. What, then, was the shape of this graven Asherah which Manasseh made? In Deu. 4:16, the word used for image, in the sentence, "an image in the form of male or female," is semel, and in 2 Ch. 33:7, which records the making of the graven image by Manasseh, first mentioned in 2 K. 21:7, this word takes the place of Asherah in the last passage, showing that, in the mind of the writer, Manasseh's Ashera, like Maachah's, was also made in human form. We have here also a confirmation of my contention that Maachah's "shocking" Asherah was an anthropomorphic image of Baal's partner.

There was, however, another form of the Asherah to which I must also refer, as it is vitally connected with our subject.

The Babylonian Asherah.

On Babylonian-Assyrian monuments, there is frequently found a conventionalized tree receiving divine homage. A cut of such a tree is given in Ezekiel in the SBOT.¹ Here two winged beings stand, one on either side, with their right hand upraised, a sign of worship.

¹ Polychrome Bible.

The tree stands within a frame, conventionalized as part of the tree, being made of branches and foliage. The frame, however, while thus forming part of one symbol, is distinctly shown as separate from the tree. It is, in fact, a threshold or doorway in which the tree stands distinct from its framework. Other illustrations of this conventionalized tree are given in Inman's "Symbolism;" Layard's "Nineveh," where the framework is even more distinctly shown as separate from the tree. Here we have an instance of the association of tree worship with Asherah worship, since I take this frame or doorway to represent the usual Hebrew Asherah, and its centre piece a tree.

I have so far described the Hebrew Asherah as possessing two forms, the original simple doorway, or threshold, and, later, a human image. Prof. Barton, however, for whose opinion I have profound respect, sees nothing more in the Hebrew Asherah than a wooden post or pole, for he says it is a well-known fact that the Asherah in the OT period was a post or pole (*Sem. Orig.*, p. 248). This opinion seems at first sight to be supported by the discovery of a clay tree-trunk enclosing a goddess (*Phoenicia-Ency. Bib.*) ; by the representation of a sacred tree in terra-cotta found in Cyprus, and an illustration of a Greek vase showing a tree standing by an altar (*Eze. SBOT*). That trees at one time were regarded as associated with or embodying divinity, we have evidence in the OT itself, in Abraham being represented as planting a tree and there calling upon the name of Yahwe (*Gen. 21:33*). Also in the representation of Deborah sitting under a palm-tree with the significance that from the tree she drew her inspiration (*Jud. 4:5*; *Sem. Orig.*, p. 89). This association lasted down to a late period, since not only did Hebrews continue worshipping under trees, erecting there the usual furniture of a high-place, an altar, a pillar and an Asherah, but on the arch of Constantine there is a representation of Apollo enshrined in laurel trees (*Smith's Dic. GR. Antiq.-Ara.*) ; while Frazer gives instances of reverence paid to trees even in our own day (*Golden Bough*, Vol. 1, p. 187).

That the Asherah symbol was associated with tree worship, I fully admit, but I also believe that the reverse is equally true, viz., that tree worship was associated with the Asherah. It seems to me that what were originally two separate ideas, each possessing its own symbol, the one a threshold, and the other a tree, were subsequently united, although separate representations of each continued to be made and

used to a late period. Thus, if I am correct, the terra-cotta tree found at Cyprus, depicts, not an Asherah, as claimed by Prof. Haupt, but the representation of a sacred tree, under which, in conjunction with an altar and a pillar, the Asherah was accustomed to stand. In like manner I would explain the tree on the Greek vase. They are representations, not of an Asherah, but of a sacred tree. Of the clay-trunk with the enclosed goddess, I shall speak later.

In the representation of tree worship engraved on Babylonian-Assyrian monuments, to which I have referred, while the trees depicted include several species, the date-palm is much more frequently represented, and of this tree it is the female which is always represented as receiving divine homage, the importance of which I shall now examine.

The date-palm is unisexual, separated into distinct male and female trees. This peculiarity has made artificial fertilization indispensable to the securing of large and edible date crops (Eze. SBOT., p. 182), a practice known to and adopted by the Semites of Arabia from early times (Sem. Orig., pp. 75, 78, 90, 162). It is not difficult, therefore, to understand how the date-palm and its culture played an important part in the development of ancient Semitic life, and early acquired a divine significance (*ib.*, 79), since its fertilization wrought by the wind, appeared to the primitive Semitic mind as a divine exhibition of sexual fertilization, and divine approval of it (*ib.*, 94). As therefore embodying a divine idea, the date-palm early became a sacred tree in Arabia, Israel, and Babylonia (*ib.*, 88 ff.), specially associated with the reproductive powers of nature. As a sacred tree it of course received divine homage, which from the nature of the case, included the idea of fertility. In keeping with all this, we have the representation on Babylonian-Assyrian monuments of divine homage paid to conventionalized trees, which Jastrow and other scholars, with good reason, describe as palm-trees (BAR, p. 662; Palm-tree,-Ency. Bib.). He further asserts that the comparison of this symbol with Phoenician and Hebrew Asherah, is fully justified, nor must I neglect to add that he sees in this mystic tree a connection with a design illustrating the worship of a deity (*ib.*, 689).

It is Prof. Barton, however, who tells us that the etymology of Ishtar is connected with palm tree (Sem. Orig., pp. 88, 89, 104), so that in the Babylonian-Assyrian symbol which Jastrow tells us we

may compare with the Phœnician and Hebrew Asherah, we see the emblem of Ishtar, which further justifies this comparison, since, in the Hebrew Asherah, we have identified a goddess whom we showed to be merely another form of Ishtar.

That the monuments referred to do actually depict tree worship, has now been generally recognized by scholars (Sem. Orig., p. 90), who also see in the design, homage to fertility (Oxford Bible, Exp. p. 1, lxxxiii).

The ordinary scholar, however, has failed to explain the significance of the conventionalized tree and frame, beyond the mere fact of this homage. Beyond this it has evidently been left to special students of sex-worship to carry us. Forlong, Inman and Howard see in these conventionalized trees the doorway of physical life, symbols of the kteis. While undoubtedly correct, so far as the frame-work of these trees is concerned, even they have failed to recognize the true character of the centre object. This is the female date-palm, its outer frame emphasizing the nature of the adoration offered to it, which was homage to the idea of fertility as indicated in the threshold or doorway of branches and foliage in which stands the sacred palm-tree. This latter symbolized the goddess Ishtar herself, who was thus enshrined in the female emblem of reproduction. There is nothing strange or overdrawn in all this. Trumbull informs us that "The doorway shrine is a common form on the Babylonian and Assyrian monuments, as a standing-place for the gods, and for kings as representative of the gods (TC, p. 105). This is only what we should have expected. If a doorway was, as there is abundant evidence to show, a well-understood sacred image, indicative of reproduction, then the framework enclosing the sacred tree, is as much a symbol as the tree itself. In that case we are amply warranted in seeing in the Babylonian-Assyrian conventionalized tree, two symbols, the sacred tree, and the sacred doorway of life. If, however, I am correct, then those writers are mistaken who assume the existence of a comparison between the Hebrew Asherah and the Babylonian-Assyrian mystic tree, unless it can be shown that the former was sometimes made like the latter, with two symbols in one.

Here I may refer to the discovery of the clay tree-trunk showing a goddess sitting within it. In his reference to this object, Meyer (Phœnicia-Ency. Bib.) associates the allusion in the Ma' Sub inscrip-

tion, which he reads "the Astarte in the Ashera." If it were possible to be certain of this reading, we might argue from it, all things being in order. But it is not possible, as the text is obscure, and can be explained in different ways (Asherah-HDB; Ency. Bib.). As given by Meyer, Moore does not explain it as referring to a goddess residing within a tree-trunk, for he reads it,— "to the Astarte in the sacred precincts." If this tree-trunk actually shows a goddess sitting within it, or if the object is a tree-trunk and not something else, then Meyer's acceptance of the reading as he gives it, and his connecting it with this particular tree-trunk, was a happy thought. On the other hand, it is strange that neither Moore, Driver, nor Allen in their respective articles on Asherah and Ashteroth (Ency. Bib.; HDB), makes any allusion to this particular tree-trunk, especially as Moore quotes the same work from which Meyer has drawn his illustration. Even in his later published "Judges," he makes no reference to it, while touching the word "Asherah," he says that, "as yet the Phoenician inscription in which the word has been found once or twice, throws no light on the subject" (p. 193). All this naturally causes us to doubt Meyer's statement that a goddess has been discovered sitting within a tree-trunk. Can it be that he has mistaken another object for this tree-trunk, a drawing of which is given in Eze.-SBOT p. 110? This latter Prof. Toy seems to view as representing the sacred dovecote of Asherah. It presents the appearance of a hollow conical shaped vessel, which Toy thinks was probably used as a censer. On one side of it, or in front, we see "Astarte in a niche, and on the back of the cone, the doves of Asherah, the holes representing openings of the sacred dovecote." The goddess is represented as sitting within a doorway, which presents an exactly similar appearance to Mr. Cowper's senams, and to the structures on the Babylonian seals. It is not a mere outline mark, but a deep threshold, which I believe to be significant of the well understood threshold opening.

It is probably *this* object which Meyer has taken for a tree enclosing a goddess, and if so, he undoubtedly is mistaken, since it more probably represents a vessel of some character, the figures on its front and back depicting the worship in which it was employed. In fact, it represents one of the vessels made for Asherah, profanely worshipped in the temple, and which with the symbols of Asherah and

Baal were brought out of the house of the Lord and destroyed by order of Josiah (2 K. 23:4, 6).

If I am correct in seeing in Meyer's tree-trunk, a mere vessel of Asherah such as I have described, then his assertion here must be dismissed, and we can understand why Moore and other scholars made no mention of it.

This dismissal, however, leaves us without any proof that the Hebrew Asherah was represented by a single tree-trunk or post indicative of a tree.

It will be remembered that I inferred, in conjunction with Mr. Cowper, that the pillars, apart from the Baal pillar, brought out of the house of Baal by Jehu, were dual pillars which represented a threshold or doorway. That the dwellers in Mesopotamia and the senam region of Tripoli were threshold-worshippers, the objects indicating this cult fully demonstrate. Have we, however, any direct proof that the Hebrews were threshold-worshippers, and so must have employed the symbol indicating this cult? Yes, even more definite than that furnished by the first mentioned people, since the objects on the Babylonian-Assyrian seals, and the senams, need to be explained, but the prophet Isaiah himself informs us that the Hebrews were threshold-worshippers. He refers (57:5), to the Hebrews as sacrificing their children *before* the clefts of the rocks, which reminds us of the altars in front of the senams.

In nature-worship, all natural orifices were reverenced as representing the yoni of the mother-earth goddess. In many places it was common to sanctify children by passing them through natural openings and crevices. It was equivalent to their regeneration (Howard-Sex-worship, p. 138). The act of squeezing between natural clefts and artificial openings, dual pillars, and holes in stones, is a world-wide custom founded upon yoni or threshold worship (Cowper, p. 186; Frazer-GB, Vol. 1, p. 307). Similarly, the worship of the smooth stones of the stream, to which the Hebrews also offered sacrifice (ver. 6), was an ancient phallic practice, part of the same cult, for as the clefts of the rocks represented the *kteis*, so these stones represented the phallus. But even as these natural clefts and stones by all sex-worshippers were reproduced in artificial openings and stone pillars, so also was it with the Hebrews, since they also had their Asherah symbols and Baal pillars. This is further evidence that the Hebrew Ashe-

rah was not a single tree-trunk or post, but rather a threshold opening formed by two jambs and a lintel, or by two upright stakes, posts, or stone pillars, or a post indicative of original dual posts.

I said a little while back that the dismissal of Meyer's asserted tree-trunk enshrined goddess, left us without any evidence that the Hebrew Asherah was ever represented by a single tree-trunk or post indicative of a tree, a statement we have seen confirmed by the examination just concluded.

At this point it is necessary to ask upon what ground does Jastrow claim to see a comparison between the Babylonian-Assyrian conventionalized date-palm, and the Asherah of the Hebrews and Phoenicians? Simply this. He assumes that the former represents merely a pole indicative of tree-worship, and that the latter similarly represents a pole indicative of the same worship. He presents no evidence himself for either assumption, referring for this to Stade. On the other hand, the Rev. G. W. Collins (PSBA, June, 1889,) sees in the Hebrew name Asherah the Assyrian *isaru*, which denotes the phallus. He thinks, therefore, that the Hebrew Asherah was a rudely shaped pole, indicative of the male generative organ. There is no proof, however, direct or indirect, that the Asherah indicated a single pillar post structure; while the evidence produced clearly shows that whatever its form it symbolized a female and not a male deity. That the symbolical tree on Assyrian sculpture included two symbols in one, we affirm, in view of its definite appearance to this end, no other explanation according so well with the shape of this mystic tree.

But while there is no evidence indicating that the Hebrew Asherah consisted of one pole or post indicative of a single pillar-like structure, there is evidence by analogy that sometimes it may have been made out of one post. Herodotus tells us that he saw in Syria-Palæstina pillars engraved with the private parts of a woman (B. 2. 106). W. R. Smith views these as masseboth dedicated to female deities. Whereupon he assumes that the whole phallic theory, which sees in the Baal pillar the male, and in the Asherah the female symbol of reproduction, is wrecked, because the masseba represent male and female deities indifferently (Rel. Sem., p. 457).

There is no point, however, in this reasoning, because, in the instance given, the pillar with the female private parts engraved upon it had a different significance in its very representation from the pillar

which usually represented the male organ. The former was engraved to depict the natural threshold of physical life, its significance resting not in its single pillar form, but in what was engraved upon it. The significance of the latter rested entirely in its single outline shape, which may or may not have been carved into a more lifelike appearance of the organ it represented.

Prof. Moore follows Smith in rejecting the phallic view of the Baal-pillar and the Asherah, because the standing stone may be a goddess as well as a god (*Massebah-Ency. Bib.*). This is true, but it is necessary to explain why, except when an aerolite, goddesses were always represented by a conical shaped stone, never a pillar. Again, why two pillars are always placed at the threshold of a female temple or shrine. I have already referred to the two pillars on the Carthage stele devoted to the goddess Tanith-Artemis, as indicating a threshold, and so possessing a phallic significance. Even Prof. Smith quotes Lucian as stating that the two pillars of the temple of Hierapolis were dedicated to the mother-goddess Hera (*Rel. Sem.*, p. 457), although he failed to see the significance here which we are tracing. The very pillars of Hercules at Gades (*Strabo. 3, 5, 5*) owed their existence to the idea of a threshold, the entrance to the empire (*TC.*, p. 181). When, therefore, we come to note that the conical stone of Aphrodite on all Cypriote coins is represented standing between two pillars, indicative of the threshold of physical life, and highly suggestive of the licentious worship practiced at the shrine, we are not disconcerted because Zeus Kasios and Elajabalus were also represented by conical stones. The position and circumstances associated with the conical stone representing a female divinity would themselves enable us to see which stone represented the male, and which the female divinity, assuming that two exactly similar stones were ever represented as standing together at the same altar, of which, however, there is no recorded instance.

For these reasons I am unable to see with Prof. Moore "the awkward fact that the standing stone may be a god as well as a goddess" (*Massebah-Ency. Bib.*); nor can I agree with Prof. Smith that upon this fact "the whole phallic theory seems to be wrecked" (*Rel. Sem.*, p. 457). Indeed, it is singular how these noted scholars jump to conclusions without the slightest warrant, and make statements utterly at variance with facts. For instance, Prof. Sayce in his "Patriarchal

Palestine," p. 255, says that the Asherah was sometimes made of wood and sometimes of stone, that in "Palestine it was usually of wood, but in the great temple of Paphos in Cyprus there was an ancient and revered one of stone." Yet he tells us in his "Early History of the Hebrews," p. 306, that the Asherah which Jehovah commanded Gideon to cut down and with the wood of it "offer a burnt offering," was "the cone of stone which symbolized the goddess Asherah." Others, scholars such as Moore, Collins, Allen, see in the directions given to Gideon at this time touching the Asherah, the strongest evidence that it was made of wood. It only shows how careful we must be before accepting the statements and conclusions of well-known scholars, whose recognized position does not guarantee their unfailing reliability.

I have said that Prof. Smith views the pillars that Herodotus saw engraved with the private parts of a woman as masseboth dedicated to female deities. On the contrary, I believe that they represented the Hebrew Asherah, and bore a resemblance to the "shocking" image made by Maachah. This image I claimed to have presented a life-like form of the goddess Asherah. In what then do I conceive this resemblance to exist? Mr. Collins thinks it difficult to imagine "in what way a phallus shaped pole could represent 'a nature-goddess the principle of physical life'" (PSBA.). He seemed to have overlooked his own previous reference to these pillars mentioned by Herodotus, and which the Encyclopedia Britannica (Sesostris) assumes to have been Asherim pillars, otherwise, female phallic symbols. The fact, as I have already pointed out, that the objects upon which these obscene engravings were carved were pillars, presents no difficulty in the way of the phallic theory, since the male masseba was identified by its outline, shaped more or less suggestively; while the female masseba was identified by the carvings upon it, the object upon which they were engraved not counting as in the case of the male masseba.

The resemblance between Maachah's image and these Asherim of Herodotus, I conceive to exist primarily, and essentially, in a similar representation of the female private parts. Both were evidently constructed for the same object, and both similarly indicated that object. The only question of uncertainty seems to be as to whether Maachah's shocking image was not a single post, such as the pillars of Herodotus. For the reasons given I am not inclined to think that it was; but even if it were, it would lend no support to the opinion

that the form and intention of the Asherah was a single post or pole, since the idea sought to be conveyed by the Asherah was that of the threshold of physical life, which could equally be represented by two uprights, or the more realistic naturally portrayed orifice carved upon a single pole, or in its natural position on the figure of a woman.

The thought has presented itself to me whether Maachah may not have placed her "shocking image" between the two jambs or uprights of the ordinary Asherah. The goddess sitting within the niche or threshold on the censer, to which I have referred, is undoubtedly enshrined in a well understood sacred enclosure. This thought seems warranted by the position of the conical stone of Aphrodite, another form of Asherah or Astarte, always or nearly always represented as placed between two pillars. Manasseh's Asherah may have been similarly placed. I said some time back that I believed the pillars brought out of the house of Baal and burned by Jehu were the dual pillars of the Asherah which Ahab is recorded as having made. We are not directly told that Ahab placed an Asherah in the house which he had built for Baal, but the new Tyrian-Baal worship which he had introduced through his wife Jezebel, was if possible even more licentious than the existing obscene Baal cult of Israel. It was essentially a worship of both the male and female principles, so that Ahab's Baal must have had his Baalath, a point conceded by Prof. Cheyne in his statement, "Of course Baalath may have had her cultus by the side of Baal" (Ahab-Ency. Bib.). It is true, he adds, that a contemporary writer could not have called either Baal or Astarte, "the Asherah." If, however, the Phoenicians employed a similar symbol for their Asherah to that in use amongst the Hebrews, and there is every reason to assume that they did, then Dr. Cheyne's last remark may be dismissed as uncalled for.

I must not neglect to add that Prof. Lumby's note on Ahab's Asherah confirms Prof. Cheyne's first statement. He explains this Asherah as "the image which was to represent the female divinity of which the Baal was the male" (Kings, Cam. Bib.). We are justified, therefore, in assuming that when Ahab set up the pillar of Baal in the house he built for him, he included the emblem of his essential counterpart. This we may see in the Asherah which Ahab is recorded as having made (1 K. 16:32, 33,) and which we identify in the pillars burned by Jehu when he also broke down the pillar of Baal (2 K. 10:

26, 27). The fact that an Asherah was still existing in Samaria after the total destruction of the house of Baal and all its contents, does not in the least affect our contention. Jehoram began his reign over Israel by destroying the pillar of Baal, including evidently the Asherah, which his father Ahab had made (2 K. 3:2), yet another Baal pillar and another Asherah seem to have been very soon made, the latter occupying its original place in the house of Baal when brought forth by Jehu and burned. Thus there was nothing strange in the statement that the Asherah still remained in Samaria in the reign of Jehoahaz forty-two years after its destruction by Jehu (2 K. 13:6). Nor does it mean that Jehu had not destroyed the Asherah in company with the Baal pillar. It signifies merely that its emblem had been renewed and its worship continued.

Meyer's Tree-trunk Ashera.

I said that I was doubtful as to the accuracy of Meyer's statement that a goddess had been found "sitting within the tree-trunk of Ashera," and I ventured to express the opinion that he had mistaken an Asherah dovecote incense burner for a tree-trunk. Since I made that statement I have made a careful study of Ohnefalsch-Richter's "Kypros," the work from which Prof. Meyer drew his supposed discovery, and I now give what this writer has to say about the matter.

He compares this "dovecote in the form of a hollow and slightly conical column," which "served as an incense bowl," with a triangle on a coin of Tarsos, stating that "in both cases the goddess is represented as dwelling in a cone or triangle." He adds that "at Tarsos in a triangular (pyramidal or conic) building of wood or stone there was set up the image of a goddess standing upon a lion's back." Further, on a coin of Paphos a dove sits on the head of a cone, just as one sits on the apex of the triangle on the Tarsian coin. From which he concludes that an anthropomorphic dove-goddess is conceived as dwelling in a conical structure which he calls an Ashera. Finally, he tells us that, "It would appear that the votive column of Kition (*i. e.*, this dovecote) is made after Egyptian models," and he produces by way of example an Egyptian votive pyramidion, a small pyramid, showing two anthropomorphic figures inclosed in a niche (Vol. 1, pp. 165, 167, 168).

From the above we see plainly that what Meyer described as the discovery of a terra cotta "tree-trunk of Ashera" with a goddess sitting within it, is after all a conical incense votive bowl, modeled, not after a tree-trunk, but after an Egyptian pyramidion. It bears no relation to a tree, but rather, according to Ohnefalsch-Richter's own line of argument, to a conical structure in which the dove-goddess was believed to reside.

An explanation of Meyer's mistake may be found in a note by Ohnefalsch-Richter, p. 168, where he says, "but the best illustration of the strange phrase in the Ma' Sub inscription ("the Astarte in the Ashera") is supplied by our Astarte seated in the Ashera post and dove cage." By the term post, however, he does not mean a tree-trunk, but merely a "slightly conical column, to use his own words, and which, as I have shown, he compares, not with an Asherah tree-trunk, but with a triangle on a coin of Tarsos. The fact that he gives other illustrations of dovecotes modeled after the pattern of a square house, should have prevented Meyer from seeing in the dovecote in question an object indicating a tree-trunk (pl. 134, figs. 4, 5).

It will thus be seen that I was correct in assuming that Meyer had taken this conical dovecote censer as representing an Asherah tree-trunk, and, consequently, that I was justified in dismissing his supposed discovery. It is true, as I have said, that Ohnefalsch-Richter refers to this dovecote as "an Asherah post," but I showed that he also calls it a "slightly conical column (1, 165), which he says, represents a cone" (1, 169), a dove-tower (1, 291), being modeled after an Egyptian pyramidion (1, 168). Thus the use of the word post means no more here than a tower-like conical structure. Finally, he calls the cone in which the Paphian goddess was supposed to reside an Asherah (1, 168), so that his use of the words Asherah and posts as applied to the Kition dovecote, do not signify that we have here an Asherah tree-trunk.

Sun-pillars and the Doorway Shrine.

Ohnefalsch-Richter, by comparing the graffiti (triangular markings, on the walls of the Tyrian grotto) with the triangular-vulva on the leaden idol of Hissarlik, the ancient Ilium, with the same on female figures on Babylonian seal cylinders, on Cyprus idols, and an Egyp-

tian relief depicting the nude goddess Kadesh, shows that a triangle was a well-understood female phallic symbol. This symbol he compares with the cones of the Paphian goddess as shown on the coins of Paphos, Byblos, Sidon (Tarsos), and on Cathagenian tablets (1, 147, 148, 149). We have previously referred to his comparison of the Kition dovecote with the triangle on the coin of Tarsos, where in both cases he represented the goddess as dwelling in a cone or triangle (1, 167). What better proof could we have than the above comparison for asserting that the triangle was a well-understood phallic symbol of the doorway of physical life. To put it another way, what better proof than the above could we have that a threshold or doorway was a well-understood female phallic symbol.

I previously pointed out that the goddess on the Kition dovecote was enframed in a well-understood sacred enclosure, and not a mere outline mark, supporting this opinion by a reference to the position of the cone of the Paphian goddess as placed between two pillars. Ohnefalsch-Richter not only refers to a goddess as dwelling in this cone (1, 167), but as "within a great tower-like" structure (1, 165). There is another dovecote, however, discovered at Idalion (1, 130), with which he compares the dovecote from Kition, referring to them both as shrines, used in acts of ritual as vessels for incense (1, 351). Both represent a goddess as sitting in an opening or doorway, but the former sits enshrined by dual pillars, one on either side of a doorway showing jambs and lintel in very slight relief; while the other sits within a doorway without any pillars in front, but with jambs and lintel standing out in very bold relief (p. 295, cf. 278; 187). May we not see in the dual pillars of the former doorway the two columns between which the cone of the Paphian goddess is so often represented? Ohnefalsch-Richter examines the cultus of the two Sun-columns, claiming that these dual pillars are the prototype of the pillars of Herakles; that they almost always appear in pairs; that the Sun-god is represented as emerging from between them; and that the columns of the primitive cult of Zeus in Arcadia reminds us of the two columns of Melqart at Tyre, Baal at Malta, and Astarte-Aphrodite at Paphos (181, 185, 186). Yes, and we may add the pillars in Solomon's temple, Jachin and Boaz, notwithstanding that Ohnefalsch-Richter agrees with W. R. Smith that they were not. He opposes the latter, however, in agreement with Movers that certain Masseboth and Asheroth

had an obscene significance, and he refers to Jeremiah 3:9. Solomon's pillars no doubt had no phallic carving upon them, yet their origin was the same as other such uprights, and signified the doorway of physical life.

Ohnefalsch-Richter informs us that the cultus column had its origin in Babylon (1, 191), and he associates it with the idea of the pillars or gates of the Sun, between which or out of which, as indicating the folding gate which turned on hinges, the sun was assumed to emerge every morning (1, 182). But he failed to associate the folding pillars or gate of the Sun with the doorway of physical life, which undoubtedly lay behind the idea of the gate, door, or folding pillars of the Sun (Trumbull-TC, p. 105).

With this evidence before us, we do not hesitate to affirm that in the bold relief doorway niche of the goddess of the Kition dovecote, we have the dual pillars of the goddess of the Idalion dovecote, which again are the Sun-pillars whose origin we have traced to the doorway of physical life.

In the dual pillars Ohnefalsch-Richter sees the Asherah brought out of the house of Baal by Jehu and destroyed in company with the Baal pillar. He reads 2 K. 10:26, 27, "they brought forth the Asherah out of the temple and burnt them; and they beat down the pillar of Baal" (1, 190). Thus has my interpretation of this passage which I gave some time back been singularly and completely confirmed.

But this is not the only important point in my present contention confirmed by Ohnefalsch-Richter's "Kypros." He asserts that "when a 'horror' is set up to Asherah . . . the female pudendum is intended" (1, 146). And on a Phoenician seal which shows a triangle on a pole before which a priest stands in an attitude of devotion, we see "the post of Asherah, the 'horror' of the Bible" (1, 149). Whether he is correct or not in the interpretation of the symbol on the Babylonian seal cylinders which he has undertaken to explain, I am not at present prepared to say. The point of confirmation is this. From my own evidence, supported by that of Ohnefalsch-Richter which I have added to my own, it must surely appear as proved that the new form given to the Asherah by Maachah was an obscene depicting of the doorway of physical life. The evidence at hand appears to confirm Movers's opinion, which is that of Ohnefalsch-Richter, that

the “shocking” image made by Maachah was a gross representation of the natural threshold of physical life. Before reading “Kypros,” I was inclined to view Maachah’s image as a complete figure such as the leaden goddess of Hissarlik. Now I am more confirmed in that opinion. The placing of the goddess within a threshold we have seen exemplified in the dovecotes of Kition and Idalion, an original Babylonian custom to which Trumbull alludes, and of which I shall now give an example.

The Sacred Tree and the Doorway Shrine.

In Mr. Fergusson’s “Palaces of Nineveh,” the author gives an illustration of an Assyrian bas-relief known as Lord Aberdeen’s black stone. Here we have a small, square temple enclosing in its doorway a representation of the Babylonian-Assyrian sacred tree. Mr. Fergusson writes, “A very important question is—to whom were these square temples dedicated? or, in other words, what is this emblem that occupies the sanctuary as here represented?” He answers, “My own impression is that it is the object so frequently mentioned in the Bible as the grove or groves.” Again he says, “The only remaining question is, what is the precise object meant to be represented by the emblem?” He suggests, “Asteroth or Astarte” (pp. 298, 300, 303). That it represents with the Hebrews, Astarte, and with the Babylonians, Istar, we have seen, so that we need not follow Mr. Fergusson any further, whose second suggestion that the Asherim represent the stars, and the Baalim the seven planets, may be dismissed in view of later research (*ib.*, 304). He has done good work, however, by his reference to this sacred tree with its temple-shrine. His suggestion that the former is the Hebrew Asherah, is the opinion of present scholars, which in part we are here opposing. Our contention being that as usually depicted this sacred tree includes two symbols in one, the outer conventionalized frame-work, and the inner conventionalized tree. We have described this frame-work as made of conventionalized branches and foliage, which Ohnefalsch-Richter explains as ribbons and other ornaments (1, 91). I cannot but think that my explanation is the better and truer one.

To return to Mr. Fergusson’s temple. Here we have a shrine similar in significance to the dovecotes of Kition and Idalion, and the cones of the Paphian goddess. Further, this temple has two pillars

or jambs in bold relief, which correspond to the jambs on the Kition dovecote, the two pillars on the dovecote from Idalion, and in front of the cones of the Paphian goddess and elsewhere. Thus we have in this sanctuary tree on Lord Aberdeen's black stone, a Babylonian-Assyrian sacred tree standing in a doorway shrine.

On an old Babylon cylinder there is engraved the representation of the sacrifice of a bull in front of a very plainly indicated sun-gate, which Ohnefalsch-Richter refers to as "a columnar altar or other object of worship," and further on as an "altar, column, or gate" (1, 84). On page 182, he refers to another engraving of the same subject, where, he says, "we have the same pillar." I have already referred to his allusion to the sun-god emerging between two columns which he says, "represent the gate of the sun (1, 181), and which were conceived as folding gates turning upon their hinges (1, 182). "One sees at once," he adds, "from the whole technique and drawing that the (dual) cylinders with the rising sun are of the same epoch and style as those on the (single) winged pillars." I gather, therefore, from the description and drawings given that the single winged column, which, as I have said, appears as a plainly indicated doorway with jambs and lintel, was meant by the engraver to represent an actual gate or rather gated doorway, and that when it was intended to picture the emerging of the sun-god, attendants were represented as rolling back two folding half gates which turned upon their hinges, and which were depicted as dual pillars. Gradually, says Ohnefalsch-Richter, the notion of movable folding doors to the gate of the sun was lost, and only the pillars remained, at first usually in pairs" (1, 182). This may be so, but the original idea of the definite gate or doorway still remained, so that dual pillars always carried the thought back to the notion of a threshold.

On a Babylonian cylinder assumed to be "Sanherib's own seal," is engraved the statue of the king himself which is placed between a sacred tree and two lotus flowers. The statue stands within a doorway enclosure similar to that in which his father is represented as standing on the stele erected in Cyprus by Sargon himself (1, 95).

The foregoing confirms our contention that dual pillars in temples, etc., originated in the idea of a threshold; while it also confirms Dr. Trumbull's reference to Babylonian doorway shrines. Further, this gateway of the sun is a similar structure to that on the Babylonian

seals in which Mr. Cowper sees his Tripoli senams. Thus the foregoing also confirms his opinion that the latter are doorway shrines.

Having now shown that the Babylonians and Assyrians understood and used doorway shrines, I will now produce the evidence upon which I claim the general prevalence of a double symbol in the Babylonian-Assyrian sacred tree.

The Sacred Tree and its Double Symbol.

On the walls of the Tyrian grotto palm branches accompany the triangular vulva, and the evidence to be produced will show that when the Babylonian-Assyrian artists desired to represent the process of fertilization as an object of divine worship, the palm tree and the doorway of life were usually shown in conjunction.

Ohnefalsch-Richter does not believe that "the palm is the sole prototype of the so-called holy-tree of the Assyrians and Babylonians," agreeing with Sayce (Rel. Anct. Bab., pp. 241, 242), that in one district of Babylonia a conifer was the prototype, and in another the palm (1, 100). Personally I believe the conifer to have been the earlier of the two, since it occurs earlier on Babylonian seals than the latter in its association with fertilization (OR., pp. 82, 92, 100). Barton considers that the artificial fertilization of the palm, a process we are warranted in assuming underlay its representation as an object of worship, "was a comparatively new introduction into Babylonia, and perhaps not generally adopted . . . in an agricultural country like Babylonia, where grain was indigenous and easily cultivated" (Sem. Orig., pp. 161, 162).

"In old Babylonian times," says Ohnefalsch-Richter, "the part played by the cypress as a holy-tree seems to have been as important as subsequently amongst the Phoenicians. . . . Next in point of importance to the cypress comes the palm, of which we find isolated examples on old Babylonian cylinders" (1, 34). The illustration he gives showing a natural palm tree corresponding to the natural cypress tree, is the one referred to in my previous section. It shows the gate of the sun before which a bull is about to be sacrificed. It is neither an altar, nor a column, but a gate or doorway in which we can see Mr. Cowper's senams. Thus we see the separate sacred tree and the separate sacred doorway as objects of reverence on ancient Babylonian

seals. Subsequently on Babylonian-Assyrian monuments we see them united, as the Paphian goddess within her triangle, her cones between their dual columns, the goddess of the dovecote within her sacred enclosure, and the sacred tree itself within its temple shrine. That I am correct in seeing this combination, the very pattern given to the conventionalized date palm in scenes depicting its sacred artificial fertilization, abundantly proves, for we see a distinct tree standing within a distinct frame or doorway made of branches and foliage, part of the same tree, yet adding its separate significance to that of the tree, thus doubly emphasizing the idea of reproduction which the whole symbol indicates.

Having seen that in Babylonia an original separate sacred tree, and an original separate sacred doorway were subsequently united, is such a development to be met with amongst the Hebrews? I have referred to Abraham as worshipping a sacred tree, and to the Israelites as worshipping a sacred doorway in the clefts of the rocks, are we not justified, therefore, in assuming by analogy that they also combined these two symbols in one like their kindred in Babylonia? We have, however, stronger proof than mere analogy. Abraham, fresh from Mesopotamia, dwelt at Shechem by a sacred tree, where he had a vision (Gen. 12: 6, 7). Yahwe revealed himself to Moses from amongst the branches of a tree, where the Egyptians believed Nut and Hathor had their dwelling (OR., p. 110). Finally, Abraham himself planted a sacred tree and there called upon Yahwe (Gen. 21: 33). It is after this that we hear of the Asherim and the doorway clefts of the rocks. In agreement with Prof. Moore, I do not believe that the Asherim were tree posts which represented original living trees. Not simply, however, because the sacred tree in Hebrew had a specific name, which would naturally have been given to its representative, nor because it is difficult to account for the setting up under a living tree of a representation of a tree, both being good points (Asherah-Eney. Bib.), but partly because of the discovery of separate tree-idols which were set up by the worshippers in Cyprus in holy groves near altars, and at the entrances of the sanctuary, idols of clay patterned after a natural tree with trunk and branches, the latter without leaves (OR., pp. 31, 128). In these idols we have distinct tree-worship, whereas Asherah worship was a combination of two separate worships, that of the separate sacred tree, and that of the separate sacred doorway. On Baby-

lonian-Assyrian monuments we have seen the symbols of both worships combined in one. So far we have not discovered such a symbol in Palestine, though possibly the cherubim and palm trees of Solomon's temple were similar representations. The non-discovery here so far of such a double symbol does not in the least indicate that it had no existence amongst the Israelites. On the contrary, by analogy and the evidence given, I believe that it had. Some time back I admitted that Asherah worship was associated with tree worship, but I claimed that tree worship was also associated with Asherah worship. I meant that Asherah worship as such, while originally the worship of the sacred doorway, developed into the worship of the conjoined sacred threshold and sacred tree depicted by one double symbol such as we see engraved on Babylonian and Assyrian monuments. It will be recalled that I admitted that with the Hebrews this symbol may have been made out of a single post, yet, if so made, it was not to indicate a tree, but an original threshold. This assumption finds strong confirmation in the reference by Ohnefalsch-Richter to the fact that the original dual pillars on Babylonian-Assyrian monuments depicting the folding doors of the gateway of the sun, were sometimes represented by a single pillar (OR., p. 181). If, therefore, the Asherah was subsequently represented by merely one post, it was not as indicative of a single tree post, but the original sacred doorway. If made, however, with one post, it must have had markings indicating its original significance. These Maachah made more gross, either on a single pillar such as seen by Herodotus, or natural but exaggerated on an anthropomorphic image placed within an Asherah doorway.

Thus I have shown what I believe to have been the original form of the Asherah, and its subsequent development by the Babylonians and Hebrews. The original form was that of Mr. Cowper's senams, and Dr. Trumbull's doorway shrine. The new form was either a post with markings indicating its original significance or a complete human image exhibiting in gross exaggeration its reproductive character.

The Attire of Jewish Women 780 B.C.

No point of this article has received greater confirmation from the study of Ohnefalsch-Richter's "Kypros," than the section on the Hebrews as phallic worshippers. We have seen the triangle abun-

dantly proved to signify the ancient worshippers of Astarte-Aphrodite, such as were the Hebrews themselves about 780 B. C. This phallic ornament representing the doorway of physical life was not only actually worn between the breasts by women at that period, who, by such an amulet worn in such a position, imagined that they would acquire unusual influence over men, but it is even worn in the same position by Cyprian maidens to-day for the same object (OR., 307). Doubtless to-day its original significance is not known, although this might be questioned. When, however, worn by the worshippers of Astarte-Aphrodite, it must have been definitely understood as a phallic ornament. This, as I have shown, was not the only phallic ornament worn at that period between the breasts of women. We can well understand, therefore, the admonition by Hosea and others to the Hebrew women of their time to put away the whoredoms from between their breasts.

The First Human Sacrifice.

In endeavoring to trace the origin of human sacrifice, I was compelled, from the standpoint assumed, to associate it with a fresh investigation into the origin and nature of the Hebrew Asherah, since I had fully adopted the opinion of Dr. Trumbull that the first human sacrifice had been offered at a simple doorway shrine, or in other words, in front of the original Asherah.

Prof. Barton holds that "the most ancient religions of the world were developed in the great river basins of the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, the Ganges, and the Yang-tske rivers. . . . The civilization of Babylon was probably the oldest of these" (Sem. Orig., p. 155). Again he tells us, "Where the beginnings of agriculture are possible, men naturally worship goddesses which they connect with the earth, or a lake, or some spring which is conceived as the giver of fertility." He further agrees with Trumbull that amongst the Semites the threshold had the sanctity of an altar, and he refers to his explanation of the sacredness of the threshold throughout the world as associated with the relation of the sexes (*ib.*, 179 : 102).

In the Euphrates valley, then, the world's oldest religion was developed as associated with the fertility of the crops conceived of as the product of the mother earth-goddess. Thus it was that the idea of mother-

hood came to be worshipped long before the idea of fatherhood. Thus, too, from the vegetation, the assumed parthenogenetic output of the earth goddess, came the idea underlying the world-wide belief in a divine mother virgin and child. "And what was the original meaning of the term 'Virgin'?" asks Prof. Cheyne. He answers,— "It expressed the fact that the great mythic mother-goddess was independent of the marriage tie" (*Bible Problems*, p. 75). But this belief which originally was strong enough to perpetuate the conception of the divine virgin and child, was early added to by the thought of the death of the child derived from the annual decay of vegetation. The earth-goddess was thus conceived of as powerful enough by herself to produce but not to continue vegetation (*Jastrow-BAR.*, pp. 483, 574). The mother goddess, then, must be stimulated by marriage,—but to whom? By the decay of vegetation it was seen that she consumed her own child in sacrifice. It was thus that her child came to be represented as her husband whom she both married and killed. Barton thinks that this later view of Tammuz as the rejected husband, whom Ishtar slew, came at a time when the original kindly relations between them had been forgotten (*ib.*, p. 85). The latter thought, however, must necessarily have followed rapidly the former. The preservation of the crops was a thought that would develop almost as soon as the recognition of their origin as the child of the mother earth, for was not their destruction readily seen in the annual decay of vegetation. Thus her child soon became her husband who was to be both married and killed to prevent the failure of the crops (*Frazer-GB.*, Vol. 2, 254; *Cheyne-BP.*, p. 74). But how married? and how killed? Mr. Frazer has shown the existence of a world-wide belief amongst primitive people that the intercourse of the sexes by sympathetic magic stimulates the growth of crops. In the sexual orgies of the Ishtar cult we may see the practice of this belief in early Babylonia. Here a temporary mock king was married to a sacred harlot who personified Ishtar, the mother-goddess, and having for a time enjoyed her company he, as the son-husband of Ishtar, was put to death (*GB.*, Vol. 3, 178). But how? Mr. Frazer quotes Dion Chrysostom as saying that he was hanged or crucified (*ib.* 24). This manner of putting the mock king to death, if it was ever followed, was evidently not the original mode. If it be true that from the growth of vegetation primitive man came to conceive the thought of a virgin mother-earth-

goddess, of her child and of her marriage to the same, it is equally true that there was another train of thought founded upon an equally early observation, and one which necessitated blood-letting. This he saw in the sacrifice of maiden virtue in the consummation of human marriage for the preservation of the race. The avenue of human life, consequently, became to him a sacred threshold at which, in order to secure the desired offspring, blood must be shed. Hunger and sex are appetites which demand equal recognition in the mind of primitive man. It is simply in accordance with the logical sequence of what must have been his thoughts on these two points that we assume he united in one offering homage to the mother earth-goddess with the blood of a male spouse shed on the altar before a threshold shrine. We know that the sacred threshold was a universal object of adoration to primitive peoples. We have seen the Hebrews themselves sacrificing their children in front of natural thresholds. I maintain, therefore, in view of all this evidence, that the first of all victims offered in sacrifice was a human being, offered not to appease an angry deity, or by way of a communal feast, but to aid the mother earth-goddess to produce an abundant harvest.

In company with Dr. Trumbull I further maintain that the place where this sacrifice was offered was on an altar in front of a structure similar to Mr. Cowper's senams. I would add that not only am I in company with Dr. Trumbull and Prof. Curtiss in rejecting W. R. Smith's idea of a communal feast as the origin of sacrifice, but also with Mr. Joseph Jacobs in his "Studies in Biblical Archaeology," where he notes W. R. Smith's mistake in assuming the late origin of sacrifice amongst the Semites; while he endorses Frazer's deduction from the evidence produced that "human sacrifices were offered in ancient times to ensure the fertility of the soil" (pp. 33-39).

1 In my former article on "The Origin of Circumcision," I referred to the sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter to Yahwe as founded upon the heathen practice of the sacrifice of maidens to male deities. Reville, in his "Native Religions of Mexico and Peru," referring to human sacrifice as practiced by the ancient Mexicans says, "It was especially girls that they immolated with the idea of giving maidens to the gods" (p. 31). As with the ancient Mexicans of the New World, so with the ancient people of the Old World. Human sacrifice was first offered to an earth-goddess, and when so offered the victims were always

males. When they were females they were offered to a god of vegetation. When either males or females were offered for the securing of crops, the original idea of the sacrifice as signifying marriage had long since been forgotten. Certain women were sacred to Dionysius (Pausanias, 4:10), while others were sacrificed to him (Fraser-GB., 2:36). Greek mythology in recording that both gods and goddesses equally had amours with mortals was but continuing the belief of those before them. Thus there is abundant evidence to show that the original idea upon which male and female human victims were offered in sacrifice was that the former were offered to female and the latter to male deities to secure good crops.

RELIGION AS A MATTER OF FEELING—A CRITICISM.

BY A. OOSTERHEERDT.

Of religion and its position in consciousness, there are nearly as many definitions and statements as there are investigators. Not to mention the whole array of philosophers, who usually approach the subject from a speculative standpoint, exalting or debasing religion as their respective metaphysics seem to require, even professed psychologists differ much among themselves as to the status of the religious consciousness, whether they shall class it under feeling, will, or knowledge, or indeed regard it as an aspect of all these conscious factors. Among these latter, Professor William James, who distinctly assigns religion to feeling, is by virtue of his eminent position as psychologist entitled to our consideration first.

In his book called "Varieties of Religious Experiences," Prof. James says the following: "As concrete states of mind, made up of a feeling *plus* a specific sort of object, religious emotions of course are psychic entities distinguishable from other concrete emotions; but there is no ground for assuming a simple abstract, religious emotion to exist as a distinct elementary mental affection by itself, present in every religious experience without exception."¹ James is too good a psychologist to suppose a bare emotion, as the abstract religious emotion theory appears to demand. He goes on to say: "As there thus seems to be no one elementary religious emotion, but only a common store-house of emotions upon which religious objects may draw, so there might conceivably also prove to be no one specific and essential kind of religious object, and no one specific and essential kind of religious act."² The second sentence seems rather unfortunate to me, because the first quoted speaks unmistakably about a "specific sort of object" which makes the religious emotion different from another emotion. In the one sentence he says that there are no specific religious objects, while according to the other such specific objects are necessary for religious emotions to exist at all! But he explains himself farther on: "Religion

¹ and ² *Varieties of Religious Experiences*, Wm. James, p. 28.

shall mean for us the feelings, acts and experiences of individuals in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."¹ "Things are more or less divine, states of mind are more or less religious, reactions are more or less total, but the boundaries are always misty, and it is everywhere a question of amount and degree. Nevertheless, at their extreme of development, there can never be any question as to what reactions are religious. The divinity of the object and the solemnity of the reaction are too well marked for doubt."² But, are they? If there be no one specific sort of religious object, however necessary this may be to constitute a religious emotion, will the vague notion of the divine make a feeling religious? But how can it, if *all* things are more or less divine, as they are indeed to some primitive peoples, and where consequently religion is coextensive with life. To say that the divinity of the object and the solemnity of the reaction are a criterion of religious reactions is only to say that things are divine because they are divine, and to forget the fact that other emotions also may be solemn. Here we have the strange dilemmas: there is no one specific religious object and yet that object is absolutely indispensable to any religious emotion; and again, men's emotions are to be considered religious when they conceive themselves in relation to the divine, which may be taken as coloring the object, and yet there is no one sure criterion of the divine, so that it might readily be distinguished from the non-divine. The fatal question of amount and degree in a world where things are more or less divine will not out; extremes will not help, because here, if ever, they meet and leave no absolute mark for a religious emotion.

However, let us hear Prof. James once more. According to him, "Religion makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary, and if it be the only agency that can accomplish this result, its vital importance as a human faculty stands vindicated beyond dispute."³ Religion, born of necessity, becomes a pleasure. "Stated in the completest possible terms, a man's religion involves both moods of contraction and moods of expansion of his being. But the quantitative mixture and order of these moods vary so much from one age of the world, from one system of thought, and from one individual to the other, that you may insist either on the dread and the submission, or on the peace and the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 31.² *Ibid.*, p. 39.³ *Ibid.*, p. 51-2.

freedom as the essence of the matter, and still remain materially within the limits of truth." This statement corresponds with Sabatier's definition : "Religion is a free act as well as a feeling of dependence. The force which bows me down is that which also lifts me up."¹ The cynic might object to this that there is small virtue in accepting what must in any case be taken, but no doubt there is an element of freedom, of expansion, of will, in religion, which fact controverts the position of James that it is primarily a matter of feeling.

It is hardly fair, however, to dismiss James without giving him a more extended hearing. He says : "Both thought and feeling are determinants of conduct, and the same conduct may be determined either by feeling or by thought. When we survey the whole field of religion we find a great variety in the thoughts that have prevailed there ; but the feelings on the one hand and the conduct on the other are almost always the same, for Stoic, Christian, and Buddhist saints are practically indistinguishable in their lives. The theories which religion generates, being thus variable, are secondary ; and if you wish to grasp her essence, you must look to the feelings and the conduct as being the more constant elements. The feelings generate the faith-state ; individuality is founded in feeling."² Here we catch real fact, real existence in the making, for the cosmic and the general are but symbols of reality, while personal phenomena are the real things of life ; our personal destinies are of greatest weight to us.

While all this is true, it is not unqualifiedly so. Feeling is by its very nature the most conservative, perhaps the deepest part of our conscious life, for it does not strive forward like the will, nor suggest the means for this striving as the intellect does, but for all that, despite the force that habit has in shaping conduct and keeping it stationary while thought advances, religion can only be considered a matter of feeling and conduct when these latter have been separated from the rest of life, when the unity of consciousness has been destroyed for the sake of a pet theory of emotions. As a matter of fact, there is no conduct determined *either* by thought *or* by feeling, because all conduct is determined by both. There is no history of feeling, as there is a history of thought and dogma, but if there were, feeling would show the same and perhaps

¹ Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, A. Sabatier, p. 29-30.

² Varieties, p. 504.

even greater changes than thought. So with conduct, the agreement between so-called "saints" of different religions is misleading, because all these saints correspond to a certain mystic type, while the active, true religion of the people runs in a different channel, and is quite unlike in each religion. The fact that dogmas follow religion is no reproach against them, but illustrates the general trend of science, especially of historical science. Again, although individuality may be founded in feeling, it is still more founded in will, and real existence caught in feeling would have little reference to us unless it were interpreted by thought. Feeling without will and thought would not be personal.

I come to M. Auguste Sabatier. In his "Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion" he makes the following remarks: "To conceive of religion as a species of knowledge is an error not less grave than to represent it as a sort of political institution. For instance, there is a religion of the *Unknowable*." According to him, "religion springs from the feeling of distress; from the initial contradiction of the inner life of man."¹ As the collision of the ego with the universe is the origin of pain and of consciousness, so the return to the very principle on which our being depends, and the moral act of confidence in the origin and aim of life is the beginning of faith or religion. "Faith in life both is and acts like the instinct of conservation in the physical world."² "This life impulse rests upon the feeling of dependence which every man experiences with respect to universal being. To be religious is, at first, to recognize, to accept with confidence, this subjection of our individual consciousness; it is to bring this back and bind it to its eternal principle."³ To speak with James: "Whatever it may be on its further side, the 'more' with which in religious experiences we feel ourselves connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life."⁴ Hence, as Sabatier says: "The essence of religion is a commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it depends. This commerce with God is realized by prayer. Prayer is religion in act, that is to say, real religion."⁵ This distinguishes religious phenomena from moral and æsthetic phenomena. "Where this inward prayer is wanting, there is no religion. Prayer springing

¹ and ² Outlines, p. 21. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 22. ⁴ Varieties, p. 512. ⁵ Outlines, p. 27.

up out of our state of misery and oppression, delivers us from it. Schleiermacher erred in insisting only upon resignation. For, as has been remarked before, religion is a free act as well as a feeling of dependence. This definition reconciles the antithetic elements which constitute the religious sentiment, the passive and the active elements, the feeling of dependence and the movement of liberty.”¹

There is much that attracts one in Sabatier’s writings, but the want of scientific precision often mars his best work. Thus he sets out with sensation and reaction *before* consciousness, as though such sensation and reaction had any reference to us. Furthermore, there is no reason to talk of the ego in conflict with the universe, from which pain and the return of the ego upon itself, or consciousness arises, for the very simple reason that there is no ego before consciousness. Whatever conflict there may have been in the remote past between the universe and its inhabitants, has not the least bearing on us because the fact of our conscious existence separates us forever from that past. We are a new order in Nature, a power that may defy the universe. Hence the feeling of dependence which Prof. Sabatier postulates is not mere dependence, it is more a sense of relation, a “conscious and willed relation,” as he expresses it. That is to say, it is not a mere feeling, devoid of object, but has a known object, which is the end of desire. Accordingly, Sabatier does well in pointing out that religion is not solely resignation, but involves freedom as well, but still he sometimes appears to be making too much of the element of feeling. Thus he says in “The Vitality of Christian Dogma” that “intellectual notion and religious emotion remain essentially different in their nature.” “The intellectual element is only the symbolical expression of religious experience.”² “A tremor is the primary religious emotion.”³

Here again, as with James, the unity of consciousness is given up in order to emphasize the difference between dogma and life, or rather between the intellect and feeling. Feeling is unduly exalted, and emotion held to be primal in religion, while the intellect and the will are correspondingly degraded. It is only a psychology that persists in separating the three aspects of conscious life into distinct faculties that can speak of the primacy of emotions in religious life. This question will be more fully discussed when Irving King’s analysis of the religious

¹Ibid., p. 28-29.

²p. 31.

³p. 29.

consciousness is taken up. Before leaving Sabatier, it is well to remark that the feeling of dependence on the universe has a decided metaphysical setting, while his ignoring of the intellect and subordination of the will suggests the mystical attitude to an alarming degree. The practical identification of religion with prayer, with communion with the power not ourselves, bears out my view of Sabatier's mysticism, which would rather enjoy than will and think.

A somewhat different, yet essentially concurrent, attitude toward religion as that of James and Sabatier, is that taken by Dr. E. D. Starbuck, the writer of a psychology of religion. In an article on the feelings and their place in religion, published in the *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, November, 1904, he takes up the thesis that the affective life is a direct source of knowledge as is the cognitive. Religion, art, and all forms of appreciation have their setting in the affective life. His arguments are: (1) Religion is a whole experience; (2) it points to a larger reality, of which (3) the person becomes conscious, and (4) places himself in an attitude to receive it by faith. "The end of religion always is to induce a heart and will response to the larger things of life that lead away towards unconditioned reality and boundless fulfillment. In the all-inclusiveness of its states, religion allies itself with the affective life. Its appeal is always to those states of consciousness and attitudes toward life—faith, hope, love, and service, which are directly opposed to the cognitive processes. Like music or poetry, although full of a sense of conviction and certainty, it is incapable of reduction to terms of ideation." Feeling, however, according to Starbuck, is a secondary and derived factor in the development of consciousness: the fundamental thing of life being a tendency toward reaction, as is held by Dewey's "organic circuit." And as intellection and feeling are thus derived, indexes of the deeper life, so the feelings in religion are but surface hints of movements going on beneath. Religion is at bottom a matter of spiritual dynamics, self-expression. Starbuck clinches the case by asserting that the affective life is the ultimate tribunal in science and philosophy, and hence it is such even more marked in morals, poetry, art, music, and religion. The conclusion of the article is therefore: "Religion is essentially non-rational. It is a life, not a system."

Here again, as with James and Sabatier, the intellect is discredited, but the will receives a larger share of attention than James gives it,

while feeling or the so-called "affective life" is exalted beyond compare. As to the question whether or not the affective life is a true source of knowledge we need not debate here; but this may be said in passing, that if it be, there is no ground for opposing it so sharply against the cognitive life, since there is no real distinction between them, except perhaps in degree of precision. That religion is a *whole* experience would rather seem to argue against Starbuck, unless he thinks that there is no "whole" outside the affective life, which, even on his own showing, is derived along with the cognitive and volitional life. But the crux of his contention seems to lie in the assumption that all conscious endeavor, knowing, and feeling have been developed from a non-differentiated unconsciousness, of which the subliminal tracts are the present survivals. Whatever the truth of the preconscious state, it is a fact that we all are more or less influenced and controlled by our subconscious existence. Feeling, cognition, and will are, indeed, to a great extent but surface indications of the deeper life currents flowing on beneath the stream of consciousness. And religion may be at bottom a matter of spiritual dynamics, of self-expression, a life, and not a system. Nevertheless, if it truly is a life, it cannot identify itself exclusively with the affective life, because this is, after all, but one phase of the whole life. Religious cognition may come relatively late and after religious volition, in order to mediate its desires, but not till then does religious affection appear. Hence there is no cause for associating religion solely with the affective life, because, although it (religion) is most likely deeper than any one of the conscious processes, in order to be felt and known it must always come up in a state of consciousness in which all three aspects of conscious life are involved, albeit that the varying interest of the individual emphasizes one, to the practical ignoring of the other two. Nor, in truth, is there good reason for asserting that the affective life is the ultimate tribunal of everything human, because the question of values, at least in morals, is determined far more by will than by feeling. Religion, then, is not essentially non-rational, no more than life is essentially non-rational.

It is with a sense of relief that one turns to Irving King's "Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness." In this monograph, which has been published as a supplement to the "Psychological Review," the clear vision of the psychologist triumphs over the partial views of

the feeling theory so dominant in the three foregoing writers, and the fact is brought to light that "since there is no such a thing as a *merely* emotional reaction, it would appear that the student of religious phenomena could never properly define religion as emotional or anything else *per se.*"¹ To King, "religion arises as a function of a developing experience."² According to him, "the development of religion is essentially one of the phases of social psychology," although to be sure, "the method of its study is derived from the psychology of the individual."³ "It is in the matrix of custom that we are to seek the first beginnings of the religious consciousness."⁴ That is to say, since "among some peoples at least everything done has a religious side," this points to the fact that there was a pre-religious state of society, just as there was a pre-legal, a pre-ethical, and a pre-aesthetic state. Consequently he holds to the primacy of habit, and the derived character of the religious attitude. He says: "Religious practices are distinguished from the earlier undifferentiated attitude by spontaneous variation or through individual initiative. In proportion as these variations in custom become emotional elements in the group-consciousness they acquire religious value."⁵ The objection against this explanation of the genesis of religion is that it assumes a so simple state of human society as probably never existed, although on the evolutionary hypothesis of the origin of human life a strong showing in favor of it can be made out. Functional psychology seems predisposed in favor of that hypothesis just now, and I am not inclined to quarrel with it on that account, so long as the recognition is made that origin does not determine value. Religion, then, is a differentiation of social habits and customs from an unorganized state of humanity, is a valuation of these habits from the standpoint of the welfare of the group.

For it must be remembered that primitive society knows nothing of the individual, but only of the tribe or group. Religion in the lower stages of humanity inevitably becomes a system of control: the group organization is the primitive form of religion, morality and law. And hence it is actually found that organized society makes for religion, as well as for law and morality, this being especially brought

¹ Different. of the Rel. Cons., Irving King, p. 56.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

out when magic is contrasted with religion, and is seen to depend upon a relatively loose tribal organization. "In communities of loose organization, magic might be quite indistinguishable from religion, and in those of strict organization the opposite would hold."¹ Religion reigns in the realm of the habitual and universal, magic in that of the occasional and particular. In proportion as society becomes organized, habit or religion grows in influence with the group as a group; in proportion as society is disorganized, magic appeals to the primitive man living without almost any consciousness of unity with a group. I have insisted upon this identification of the religious consciousness with that of the group in order to bring out its social character, as King conceives it, and its purely external nature, which makes religion consist of a lot of tribal habits and observances, invoked whenever the group acts for itself. As Robertson Smith says in "The Religion of the Semites," "Broadly speaking, religion was made up of a series of acts and observances, the correct performance of which was necessary to secure the favor of the gods; and in these observances every member of society had a share. Ritual and practical usage were, strictly speaking, the sum total of ancient religions. Religion was a part of the organized social life into which a man was born." This view of religion, which is more and more borne out by ethnology and anthropology, does away with the necessity of finding a psychological notion of a specific religious nature in primitive man, and recognizes that the ideas of the supernatural and the natural have as yet no existence, while it emphasizes the function of religion as consisting in social development and control. "If we have the correct conception of religion," says King, "it would seem that every human society would differentiate elements which would be analogous, if not identical, in function with what we have recognized as religious. That is to say, every society must have its systems of control, the more fundamental of which inevitably assume the religious form as they are taken up into the sphere of habit."² So far so good, one may say, but how does this social religion become individual?

King's answer is this: "If the religious attitude is a differentiation with reference to certain situations (those that concern the group as a whole), we cannot hold that it is continuous except as these situations

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

are more or less continuously present in consciousness. In so far as religion continues a social phenomenon, that is the expression of a certain tribal or social attitude in which the life of the whole is bound up, it is naturally present in all members of the community in approximately equal degree. As individuality becomes prominent, and social pressure less imperative, there is less likelihood of social suggestion exerting so great an influence and hence there is less uniformity in the conception of ultimate values. As individuality has developed in the modern community, the more suggestible conform to the general type more than those of overt and active temperaments. Still others by contrary suggestion tend to assume an opposite type. Still others never have their impulses defined in this way because of the looseness of the organization of modern society. Thus in two different ways a type of consciousness which is more or less non-religious is gradually produced."¹ The shift from society to the individual is thus apparently fraught with disastrous consequences to religion. But, as a matter of fact, "a great many religious values are carried over into the conduct and life of those who recognize no religious consciousness, because religion has so thoroughly mediated certain forms of conduct that they have become automatic. The religious mind is distinct from the non-religious in that it not only embodies in its life the values of religion, but does it more or less consciously."² In modern society, it is accordingly a matter of temperament whether a person shall observe the general standard of outward religion or not. Having become emancipated from external social control, he can follow the religion of the masses or shape his destiny in a different way. It is evident, however, that with every human being the question of ultimate values must be determined in some such fashion as religion employs, and it might, therefore, be urged that every one remains religious, provided the term is not taken in a narrow way. It must also be remembered that those persons who go contrary to social forms of religion usually live in an ideal society of their own mind, and in nowise escape the influence of the society which bred them as individuals. But does this account of the individualization of religion take sufficient notice of the intension which results in its conceptions and ideas? King pays but little attention to this, but I believe a plausible explanation

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 52, 53, 54.² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

might be given by referring to the growth of personality and the deepening of its aims which comes when the external shackles of society have been removed. The upshot of this last paragraph seems to be that religion, individual religion, is a much wider affair than would be thought from studying the lives of some emotional saints and that it is to be found in all expressions of the human mind whenever an ideal social world is recognized.

Having arrived at this general conception of religion, we are able to understand why there has been such a notable failure so far to analyze religious reactions. For, religion being confined to external and internal manifestations of a certain kind, one has found the emotional aspects usually the most tempting to describe and has passed these off as the "essence" of religion. As we shall see, Prof. King utterly repudiates this theory. Starting out with the thesis that "every reaction involves necessarily both the values of previous adjustments and as well the adaptation of these adjustments to the specific nature of new stimuli,"¹ he goes on to define emotional, intellectual, and habitual reactions, and ends by concluding that it is impossible, from the nature of a reaction, to describe it offhand as emotional, intellectual, or automatic. "If a reaction or attitude, therefore, is described as emotional, the question still arises as to the nature of the organization of the reaction that causes one part of it to stand out more prominently than the others,"² and as to why the reacter has been led to emphasize that aspect. "The first is answered by the statement that all expression consists of entire reactions, which are differentiated, not through their inherent and ultimate constitution, but through the varying interests and points of view of the individual himself. The second question relates to the influences that lead the individual to have constantly a certain interest or point of view regarding his reactions entirely aside from what they are as contents or processes to the psychologist. The real problem of the psychology of religion is thus not whether it is predominantly emotional or intellectual or both, for religion consists essentially in entire reactions. It is rather as to why certain elements in these reactions have been regarded as of more worth than others and consequently have tended to be abnormally developed."³

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

² *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

From this point onward King goes strongly against James and Starbuck. "The religious attitude is not something that exists entirely in and of itself. If it exists at all it is as an organic part of the entire life-process. It is a specialization of the elements involved in this process with reference to certain conditions and certain stimuli."¹ So much for his general position. Since both James and Starbuck virtually relegate religion to the subliminal consciousness or fringe, with which feeling is supposed to have an intimate connection, King replies: "Through the notion of the fringe we account for the more or less unconscious influences upon present activity and thought of a vast mass of one's past experience as well as the whole circle of instinctive impulses and tendencies. . . . Whatever forces tend to cause the focal portions of consciousness to dissipate, in so far emphasize the marginal control."² "It is not conceivable that the mind, an organization of forces for use in practical affairs, should, in unbalanced condition, be used by nature as an avenue for important revelations as to truth and duty."³ This is the gist of the whole matter. Postulate, like James and Starbuck, an extra-critical faculty for the acquiring of knowledge, and you have the way open to all kinds of vagaries and grovelling superstition, which quickly come to dominate the mind and reduce its proud superiority to imbecility. And yet, this fringe has some relation to the centre, is even organized to a certain extent, and is the producer of intuitive knowledge, all of which goes to show that it is not so incapable of explanation and criticism as the feeling advocates would like to have it. Their error, accordingly, lies not in their recognition, but in their extraordinary use of it, in making it transcend "puny" intellect and reason, which is the same as preferring anarchy to order. "We might say that the normal religious reaction is one in which the normal mechanism of control organizes the ultimate values."⁴ The question is thus not whether the fringe shall be ignored, but whether it shall have an undue influence and be translated by feeling apart from the other aspects of conscious thought, whether we shall depend on sudden conversion brought about through mysterious powers operating on the subconscious part of our existence, or upon the slow processes of education strengthening the focal control of reason. Here the utter untenability of the position assumed

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 58.² *Ibid.*, p. 60.³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

by James, Sabatier, and Starbuck is clearly disclosed, since it not only requires abolition of the unity of the consciousness, but also prefers the least disciplined portions of mental life to the highest organized control.

Nevertheless, although the work of King is a distinct improvement upon that of the three preceding writers, it is by no means above criticism. First of all, I desire to quote a statement which conflicts with another already mentioned, in order to bring out a contradiction which appears to run through the entire paper. "The religious consciousness is of the internal and mediating kind, influencing the general tone of activity as a whole rather than affording data for the solution of immediate problems."¹ Here religion is conceived as an attitude, which influences the general *tone* of activity as a *whole*; in the sentences previously quoted, the "religious attitude is a differentiation with reference to certain situations," that is of life not as a whole. Or again, "it is a specialization of the elements involved in the life-process with reference to certain conditions and certain stimuli." The contradiction is made sufficiently clear by merely quoting it, but, since it involves a central point, it is well to emphasize it. The first definition of the religious attitude maintains that it influences the whole of life, while the second limits it to certain situations and stimuli. It seems to me that the first definition is an admission to the whole-souled religionist, and that the second is more psychological. As it is, the whole of activity is opposed to a part of activity, and hence, because those situations that call forth the religious attitude may not be continuously present in consciousness, it is an easy matter to account for a non-religious person. King, in fact, agrees here with James, that a religious reaction is caused by a specific sort of object or stimulus. The difficulty of finding this specific religious object has been pointed out, and this difficulty is but increased when religion has become a part of the social organism. If it is identified with the group consciousness, why should government and religion ever have separated, unless there was from the beginning something more involved in the habits that constituted the system of control than mere social organization. If there was, what was it, and what distinguished it? If there was not, how account for the present fact of religion? This means that one must not explain even primitive

¹ Differentiation of the Rel. Consciousness, p. 49.

society in such a mechanical way, and that any such explanation of religion as King makes is bound to be very narrow, since it lays too much stress on external appearances and ignores the fact that there are no fences in mental life. He is quite right, however, in ascribing a social origin to religion, and I otherwise am fully in accord with him, although I do not think primitive society to have been composed of impersonal beings.

Of course, King would say that religious reactions require no specific objects, but are determined by the varying interests of the individual. Granted, but how then, if religion is a general attitude of life, why should one reaction be called religious and the other not; or ought religion be named a partial attitude, which only comes to light under certain conditions and through certain stimuli? The former position has usually been held by religious fanatics, who would do all things "as unto the Lord," but it now seems that it is untenable psychologically. King's position indicates the general psychological opinion. Of a certainty, the difficulty of finding a specific religious object remains, and hence also the difficulty of assigning to religion its proper sphere, because even if it is admitted that the religious reaction is in nowise different from any other reaction, and that it is caused by the interest of the individual, in mental life there are no sharp demarcations which separate religious reactions from the others, especially in a world "where things are more or less divine." Again, institutional religion has had such a long growth, and presents so many phases, that to some nearly all of life takes on a religious tint, while to others only a few actions have a religious bearing. To the earnest seeker after God the psychological explanation of religion will hardly be satisfactory, however, even if he cannot deny the validity of the psychological premises and conclusions. It appears to me that he must again question the "meaning" of religion, whether it is merely a psychological affair, or whether it is perhaps also a metaphysical matter. If the latter, then the psychology of religion will not greatly disturb him. He will grant, indeed, that "functional religion" is social in origin, may apparently disappear in some individuals, and is throughout of the same nature psychically as every other conscious aspect, *i. e.*, not primarily emotional, nor anything else, but partaking of the whole personality, but yet he will also claim that there is a metaphysical relation of all acts toward God, which in a completer sense than the functional, is true and right religion.

TYPES OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF.¹

BY JAMES BISSETT PRATT.

The psychology of religion is so new a field that many of its most promising corners remain as yet unplowed. One of the most important questions which come within the range of this young science, and one which has as yet received but scant attention,² is the problem of the basis—or the bases—of religious belief. We find our friends and neighbors almost to a man believing, with a good deal of firmness, in a being whom no one has ever seen, and whose nature they can but dimly conceive—and whom (for want, perhaps, of a better name) they call God. This is surely a striking fact—one of the most striking among the many odd facts that characterize this strange creature whom we call man. Why is it men believe thus, on what does their belief actually rest, from what does it draw its strength, and in what region of psychic life is it mainly intrenched? These are questions of the utmost importance, not only to the student of psychology or of sociology, but still more to the minister, the teacher, and the lover of men.

It was to help break ground in this new field that I made out the questionnaire on which this paper is based—a copy of which will be found appended. My chief aim was to discover, if possible, the relation of argument and of unreasoned experience to popular belief, and more in particular to gain some idea of the prevalence of any real and vital experience interpreted by the subject of it as an immediate knowledge of God—in other words to see roughly how far the “mystic germ,” as Prof. James calls it, has spread in the religious community. Much is said in religious circles about “the experience of the presence of God;” my object was to discover what in general was

¹This article is to form a chapter in a book I am now preparing on the psychological bases of religious belief.

²Excellent work has been done on closely related questions by Leuba, Starbuck, and Coe, but so far as I know not much has been done *directly* toward collecting data and coming to conclusions on this problem of the bases of religious belief.

meant by that experience, and whether it is confined to a very few or is a fairly common possession.

No one is more keenly alive to the dangers of the questionnaire method than one who has tried it. In the first place, the number of answers that one can by any possibility get is insignificant in the extreme compared with the size of the community from which they are gathered, and in which alone one is interested. The value of these answers depends, therefore, wholly upon their being thoroughly typical—"a fair sample," as Mr. Pierce would say. And with the questionnaire method fair sampling is, for several reasons, especially difficult. In the first place, Natural Selection brings answers from only one or two types of people. Those who are in any way extreme or unusual are likely to jump at the opportunity to express their views; while the people who are really typical of the community at large—just the ones, that is, whose answers would be especially valuable—often think it not worth their while to answer, since they have nothing unusual or particularly interesting to record. The interest and the value of a response often stand in inverse ratio. Moreover, even when truly typical persons do answer, their expressions as written often represent merely the mood that happened to be uppermost at the hour of writing, or depend on the chance presence in the mind of certain ideas at the time. Lastly, the mere fact that a question is presented tends to put the mind in a theoretical and unusual state and thereby very considerably to influence the answer.

While all these things are true, however, I do not think they destroy the value of the method if used with great care. The first danger—namely the tendency of Natural Selection to bring in answers chiefly from extremists—I have tried to avoid by letting Natural Selection have as little as possible to do with it. My endeavor was to distribute the greater part of my questions among truly typical religious people (so far as one can judge of "typical religious people"), and a large proportion of my responses come from persons whom I know personally to be (to all appearance), "fair samples" of the religious community. I have also carefully weeded out from the answers sent in several that obviously come from religious freaks. The second and third difficulties pointed out above of course cannot be fully obviated; yet I believe that their evil effects have been largely avoided by the fact that in my treatment of the responses I have

throughout refused to take the answers at their face value, but have interpreted each paper as a whole. Some of the questions were put in purely with this in view,—namely numbers 1, 7, 8, and 10—while nearly all, as will be seen, bear upon one general question. In a number of cases, also, I have called upon the respondents and talked over their answers with them; or when this was impossible, have sometimes written for further light on particular points. I sent out 550 copies and received 74 answers. My respondents are divisible roughly into two classes: (1) those whom I believe I may rightly call typical “church-people;” and (2) a somewhat motley collection of intellectual people, professors, graduate students, a few members of the Society for Psychical Research, etc. Whether these latter form a really fair sample of the intellectual community of America I am not certain. Of my 74 responses, 51 come from class (1), 23 from class (2). Three of my respondents did not believe in any sort of God, two were obviously “freaks,” and one response could not be safely interpreted. This leaves, therefore, 68 cases for our use.

Anything like definite statistics from so small a number of cases would of course be valueless; but I do think it will be of considerable value for the purpose of our investigation to treat my cases as types of the religious consciousness—as “straws,” so to speak—and as indicating in a general way the nature and the strength of the belief in God as it exists to-day in the Protestant communities of the eastern part of our country. If the cases be thus viewed in relation to our problem of the basis of religious belief, they fall into five classes, which I shall now consider in some detail.

The first class is made up of those who believe in God chiefly from argument or reasoning. Of my 68 cases 14 belong here. Reliance on feeling is frequently disparaged by this class of mind. One man says “I believe in God as an intellectual and moral necessity. Any feelings which I may have in the matter grow out of the perception of the realities which create these necessities—God is a reality to me as a rational being. Any experiences which I may have had which were accompanied by ‘feeling’ I have explained as above, and this, it seems to me, forms a rational basis for the explanation of all such phenomena in others.” The reasons given are various; sometimes the order and design in Nature are mentioned, sometimes the progress of the race. One says, “I believe in God because I cannot

conceive of a world like ours except as made and controlled by a Person." An example of the queer twists that get into some minds who consider their faith founded on rational grounds is seen in the following answer: "Reasons for the belief in God: (1) The argument of my belief is that I have it as a gift from Him."¹ In striking contrast to this is the following: "Defining God as the Supernatural of Answer to question 2, I think I believe in Him for the following reasons; (1) I find in every day experiences that there are impulses, attitudes, valuations, made by myself and other people which seem entirely unjustifiable by any experiences we have of things and courses of events in the world about us. The chiefest example is the way otherwise rational people act *altruistically* while every dictate of reason would seem to compel them to act with an *ultimate selfish end*. . . . (2) More intimately, I seem to have quite frequently a strong feeling of the *goodness* of certain courses of action, states of mind, etc., apart from any good this may do me, or anybody else. These feelings of goodness *seem* somehow to be *very valid* and to carry their own credentials so that they disarm doubt." One man writes, "The modern demonstration of telepathy has helped me greatly." The old argument to a "great First Cause" is not once mentioned.

A second type of religious people are those who believe in God from authority. The literal inspiration of the Bible is still accepted by a very large portion of the community, and belief in things divine is based largely upon it. Especially is this true among the less thoughtful classes, and those who are too busy to give the question any attention. Here, of course, should probably be classed the majority of Roman Catholics. I have a Catholic friend who puts the matter thus: "If I am sick I go to a doctor, for it is his business to know about medicine and the body; if I want to learn Latin I go to a Latin teacher, for he has studied and knows; in like manner, if I want to know about God I go to the Church, as represented by some priest, for the Church is the authority in religious matters, just as the physician and the teacher are in their spheres." This is doubtless the attitude of thousands both Catholic and Protestant. Nine-tenths of our "facts" we accept on faith—why not our religious facts as well?

¹ This is not one of the answers I have put in Class 1. The whole paper indicates that the man's real basis for belief is authority, but he *thinks* it is reasoning.

—especially since so many others have done so for so many years, and with such good results. Belief from authority is by no means an unreasoned belief, and differs from our first class only in the choice of the particular fact on which the reasoning is based. Of course such an argument often goes in a circle; but this is unnoticed—as for instance, in the following: “I believe in God from authority, as contained in the Bible in passages declaring Himself as God, as ‘I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like me.’ There are many other assurances that might be quoted.” Many thoughtful persons, however, who would see as quickly as any one the inconsistency of such a reason for belief, still cling to authority, but in a different sense. They may have given up the literal inspiration of the Bible, but still retain their confidence in the authority of certain prophetic persons, especially of Jesus. One woman writes, “More than on anything else I believe my belief rests on the strong and unreasoned assertions of Jesus Christ. But his assertions do not stand out in my mind as isolated facts. I find them coming as the culmination of what may well be called revelations of God through human life.”

In this connection it will be of interest to consider the answers to question 9, which had to do with the authority of the Bible. The 65 answers to this question were divided into two almost equal parts, 32 accepting the authority of the Bible and 33 rejecting it. As was to be expected, nearly all those whom I have described as belonging to the “intellectual” rather than to the “church” class were among those who answered No to my question, only 2 out of 21 recognizing the Bible’s authority. Of the 44 answers from church people 30 accepted and 14 rejected the book’s authority, 22 saying that their religious faith and their religious life were based on it. That is, exactly half of the “typical religious people” who answered my question feel that their belief and their religion are dependent on the old way of viewing the Bible, the other half feeling independent for their religious life from its authority or rejecting it (in the old sense) altogether. To the question “How would your belief in God and your life toward him and your fellowmen be affected by loss of faith in the authority of the Bible?” a few responses were received like the following: “It would take away the foundation through which I was led to believe in God.” “I would as soon give up faith in God himself

as in the authority of the Bible." "I think I should be utterly miserable and unable to accomplish any good thing." But in most cases no such serious results are imagined, the following being typical: "It would not affect my faith in God but would greatly lessen my comfort." "I believe I would still cling to my faith." "My belief in God would not be affected." The position of those who no longer accept the authority of the Bible is fairly well exemplified by the following: "There is much for me in its teachings, but I feel it is a rather second-hand statement of what I feel in my own experience." The results of question 9, if the responses are fair samples, would seem to indicate that while a good proportion of the community still cling to the authority of the Scriptures, they are gradually giving it up with increased intelligence and study, and would be able to give it up altogether without any very serious injury to their religious faith. This conclusion is illustrated also by the fact that out of 68 respondents only 6 made authority the chief basis of their belief.

The third type, according to my classification, is made up of those who believe not from argument nor authority but from habit. Inertia plays a large part in religious belief. Once started in a given direction of thought, it is hard to stop or to change the direction. "As the twig is bent, the tree is inclined." It is hard to over-estimate the tremendous influence of this factor in beliefs of all kinds. Most of us would now be good Buddhists if we had been brought up in Burmah. What we would be had we lived all our lives alone on desert islands, there is no telling. Certainly every one of us began to believe in God because when children we were taught so to believe. Hence if my question had been Why do people begin to believe in God? there would have been but one answer, and that very simple. But while this is true, it is also true that during adolescence the old beliefs of childhood get very rudely shaken; all sorts of ideas formerly held are given up, and we do not settle down to adult life until our views of things, and particularly our religious views, are considerably reshaped and made really our own. Thus it comes that these beliefs are based on many things beside the teachings of childhood. On the other hand, these early lessons retain some influence with nearly all of us, and with a large number of people their importance is immense. There are a great many intelligent people who believe because they always have believed. Others retain their faith because it is the easiest

thing to do—scepticism and atheism require rather too much energy for a busy man. The following is typical: “Entirely a matter of training. I was brought up in the Presbyterian Church—took pride in being an atheist all through my college course—though always attended church and Sunday School. When I got into life other questions crowded this one into the background where it has hovered, unsolved, ever since. So far as I have come to any conclusion at all it is this: that if there is n’t a God there *ought* to be, and I’ll act accordingly.” With all his theoretical scepticism this same man in answer to question 5 says, “I think I may say He is a very real Person to me.” The exigencies of a life given up to scientific research, have prevented him from ever getting to the end of his thought on religious questions, so he easily and naturally falls back on the habit of childhood, with the remark “My religion is a bundle of inconsistencies which I have long ago quit trying to reconcile.” I think this to be a fairly common experience. There are doubtless a great many people who simply take God for granted without further thought; they believe because they do not disbelieve. This same influence of habit is seen even more often among a large number of those whom I have called “church people.” Typical among them are such expressions as the following: “God, as I have been taught from youth up, by parents and publicly, is a spirit,” etc. “I believe in personal immortality because I have been taught it.”

Type 4 is characterized by “the will to believe.” One writes he believes, not because he has experienced God’s presence, “but rather because I need it so that it ‘must’ be true.” Another believes “chiefly because God is the only hope of the universe. Take away this belief and our existence is hopeless.” One of the most explicit is the following: “Because I personally, subjectively want to believe in Him. . . . I pray because I like to. . . . I believe in immortality because I like to.” Doubtless a great many people belong to this class without knowing it. They think it is the authority of the Bible or some argument on which their faith is based, whereas it really is the picture of the fear and despair that would follow the loss of faith that makes them cling to it. An analysis of the arguments used in many sermons whose aim is to defend orthodox doctrines would point to the same conclusion; the question discussed seems often to be not What is true? but What is pleasant to believe? The pragmatic appeal is

constantly made ; the old doctrine brings happiness, therefore let us cling to it. One respondent writes that after several years of scepticism and argument, and of keeping his nerves "on a constant and useless strain," he had to come back "to the plain, solid ideas which were drilled into us in childhood. Then comes a peace of mind regarding our religious status. We have seen the practical application. We have seen men die as Christians and others as infidels. We are awakened from our dreams of youth."

My fifth type is characterized by what seems to be a touch of mysticism, found in a variety of stages which range from vague cases, somewhat conventionally expressed, up to experiences of a very intense sort. They all agree, however, in basing their belief in God on some experience which they interpret as an immediate knowledge of Him. Typical expressions are the following : "I believe in God principally because I have experienced His presence : if at times my belief grows weak, the memory of such experiences help me." "Authority and 'argument' are practically without significance as factors determining my belief ; immediate experience of Him as an ever present Reality is my main basis for recognizing His existence." "My belief in God rests primarily I think upon experiences reaching back into childhood. . . . I have never seriously doubted the existence of God. If I ever had done so I think I should have fallen back upon my own consciousness of Him at certain times of my life as evidence that I could not doubt."

My results indicate that this is a very large class, 36 out of my 68 respondents belonging to it, while 14 more claim to have had the experience referred to, though in their case it does not seem to be the principal foundation of belief. These figures are certainly significant. That 50 people out of 68 should believe firmly that they have been in immediate communion with God is a striking fact. Moreover this is admittedly the religious experience *par excellence*; here we are at the very heart of religion. It is, therefore, a burning problem for religious psychology to discover, if possible, just what these people mean by "communion with God." What sort of an experience is it? How does God *feel*? Almost my whole questionnaire was directly or indirectly aimed at collecting data that should bear on this problem, while question 5 was written especially for that purpose. The importance of the

phenomenon will necessitate a more detailed study of the responses than I have given in the case of any of the preceding types.

There is no sharp and fast line between those who have been "conscious of God's presence" and those who have not. The experience shades down through all degrees of intensity, and the interpretation one shall put upon it depends largely on one's general religious notions. There are people absolutely devoid of any experience like that referred to. On the other hand the number of those who have had at least flashes of some faint form of mystical experience is probably considerably larger than is generally believed. Many of those who are utterly ignorant of what is meant by "communion with God" have a dim, unreasoned and untaught feeling for a beyond that is really a faint approach toward the more typically religious experience. One of my correspondents, for instance, whom I have classed as having no sense of God's presence, tells me that though he dislikes all exact definitions of God and has in vain tried to pray, he has in the background of his consciousness a dim sense of God. In its elusory, vague nature it is like a tune that keeps going in the back of one's mind and which, though always present, one can never grasp or define or analyze. His sense of God is no less faint and elusive. And yet he feels that if it should vanish, there would be a great hush, a great void in his life. Especially in times of moral crisis he feels it, as a sense of an unknown something backing him up. And although devoid of *Gottesbewustsein* in the directer and stronger sense, he adds "there is *something* in me which makes *response* when I hear utterances from that quarter made by others. I recognize the deeper voice. Something tells me:— thither lies truth."

One of the vaguest forms of experience which is interpreted by those who have it as the consciousness of God's presence is scarcely distinguishable from æsthetic emotion aroused by the beauties of nature, and coupled with the thought of God which is already in the mind. "His presence," writes one respondent "I find in the deeps of Nature and of human nature. I never feel so devotional as when in a great wood where I cannot see out, on the sea, on the seashore, or out at night, under the stars." Another writes, "yes, in one sense He is real. When I see the sunlight shining through the leaves of the forest trees and lighting up the ferns and flowers unseen by any one else save myself, I have felt a nearness of God that I have never felt

under the influence of any sermon." In such a case it is, of course, the belief that one happens to hold which turns what would otherwise be merely æsthetic pleasure into what is interpreted as a religious experience. It must be noted, however, that the emotion as actually felt is a religious one and is decidedly different from mere æsthetic delight in Nature, and, whatever its cause, it assumes great significance and authority in the life and belief of the individual.

An evanescent form of what might be called vague cosmic emotion would also belong here,—as, for instance, the following: "I do not like the masculine pronoun in speaking of the Divine Energy; consequently have not experienced *His* presence, but have felt a thrill of unspeakable joy and pleasure, as the thoughts of the Higher Life have come to me. . . . I will say in addition that *Something* comes to me, as a great mental stimulus and spiritual uplift."

The experience of the divine presence comes to many people in more definite form in times of great trouble. The emotional life is then already most intense, the sense of loss and despair is almost crushing, the will demands help but cannot find it. At such a time the idea of the "Divine Helper" in whom one has been taught to believe forces its way out of the background of consciousness, dominates the thought, and forms a centre round which the varied emotional elements crystallize. The whole organism is roused to intense excitement, the threshold is lowered and becomes, so to speak, very thin, and the conscious and the subconscious regions are less definitely separated than at quieter and more normal times. The deepest vital needs of the whole personality, ordinarily half dormant in the fringe-region, take control. It is at such times, in particular, that the sense of an invisible presence comes. One woman writes, "God as my Father is *very real*. Have I experienced His presence? Yes, and more than once. The most vivid and never to be forgotten was the strength, peace, and quietness that came as we watched the outgoing of our first little boy." "I do feel that I have experienced His presence very distinctly many times. . . . When praying for the life of very sick children, the voice came, What if it be my will to take them? Through His help I was enabled to say Thy will be done. He took them, but not only helped me to bear my burden but gave me a bright revelation of Himself." "I shall never forget the feeling of the presence of God with me on that night when all alone in a stranger's house on the hill I worked

over my precious child, realizing as I worked that I could not save his life, and that nothing could. I could almost hear the words ‘When thou passest through the waters I will be with thee’—and in the dreadful loneliness and anxiety and grief there came a wonderful peace and a feeling of God’s presence that I am very certain of.”

A not uncommon but striking form of this experience is the sudden conversion, of which so many cases are reported by Leuba, Starbuck, and James. Habits of years’ standing are overthrown in as many moments and not only the man’s evaluations of objects and his general outlook upon the world, but his very organic impulses and desires are so utterly transformed that he can scarcely recognize himself, and must needs consider such a momentous change the work of a power not himself. One of my respondents, who is now a city missionary on the East Side in New York, writes : “I came to Him a dying drunkard and He gave me repentance. I cried to Him and He saved me instantly. I have never wanted a drink, nor sworn an oath, nor stolen a cent since.”

An instance much less striking, but of the same general nature, was told me by another of my respondents. Though he had always lived a respectable and moral life and frequently attended church for his wife’s sake, he had never taken any interest in religion and had no notion of what was meant by a religious experience. One day his wife asked him to teach a class of boys in the Sunday School, and he of course refused. The next Sunday he was at the post office just before the Sunday School opened, and suddenly felt an irresistible impulse to go to the church and take a class. His words are “If a rope had been round my waist and twenty men at the other end pulling me toward the church, the impelling force would not have been stronger.” He taught the class for six months but with no special religious interest. At the end of that time his wife persuaded him one evening to go with her to “preparatory lecture.” He went merely to please her and paid no attention to what was said by the speaker. But during the course of the meeting he began to feel that he must make a change in his life then and there, and that he must get up and declare his purpose before the end of the meeting or he should die in his seat. He rose and did so, and a new experience began for him from that hour. Ever since then he has had the constant feeling that he is “never alone”

but is being guided by a power that is not himself. What this power is he does not know but he interprets it as the Holy Spirit. He cannot conceive of anything that could shake his faith, so unquestionable is the experience. It does not come in waves, but is constant; a feeling of joy and peace, but best expressed by saying that he is never alone. The *otherness* of the experience seems to be its chief characteristic.

The influence of the sub-conscious in this case is obvious. The thought of teaching the class and the feeling of duty connected with it, which he resolutely put out of his mind, had been working throughout the week in the subliminal region, and when the arrival of the hour for Sunday School suggested the thought of the class, the feeling of obligation, made intense by the week's sub-conscious gestation, forced itself upon him with a strength not to be resisted, and in a way suggested an external power. The same sub-conscious working was evidently influential in his final conversion. The necessary influence of these experiences upon his belief is obvious.

The descriptions thus far given have been somewhat indefinite as to the nature of the experience in question. Nothing seems to be harder for the average person than to put himself into the psychological attitude, or even to conceive what that attitude is. Nearly all write as if "communion with God" were a universal experience and needed no further description. I have had, however, a few definite statements and a number which though rather indefinite still help one to make out what is meant by the phrase in question. It must be remembered, however, we are dealing here with an experience which all those who have had it agree in describing as indescribable; and if such a virtuoso at introspection as St. Teresa had to despair of putting into words the nature of this experience, we must not expect too much of my respondents.

One of my questions was: "How does it (the 'communion' experience) affect you physically?" This was simply ignored by the majority, while many of the others insisted that there was no physical affect whatever. The chief reason for these answers is, of course, lack of introspective power; though there seems also to be at least one other, namely that hinted at in the following somewhat naïve expression: "When I try to describe such an experience in words, the terms are terms of sensation and they should not be."

I have, however, two definite answers, which will help to show us, in the case of two individuals at least, how God *feels*. "When I experience the presence of God I feel, physically, aggressive but self poised, exhilarated, but not impulsive, my chest swells, my breathing is deep and satisfying, and I seem to see the way to action opened up and the strength to do it." "With me the physical effects begin usually with a quivering and upheaving of the diaphragm which starts a wave of sensation upward through the chest region and into the pharynx, and results in incipient yawning. This in turn is followed by an excitement of the lachrymal glands and tears sometimes fill my eyes. All these physical sensations, considered merely as such, are mildly pleasing. After they are over comes a sense of great refreshment."

The "mental effects," as might be expected, are much more generally described—perhaps it would be more exact to say that the descriptions are more often given in conceptual than in sensational terms. The sense of God's presence, apprehended with something of the certainty of a visible presence, is frequently the only thing mentioned in the experience.¹ "God is very real to me in the experience of His presence. I talk with Him and He talks with me. He is my companion. When our fellowship is undisturbed He controls my thoughts and likewise my body." "Yes I have experienced His presence, but not so vividly since childhood. I remember, very distinctly, when I had been harshly, if not unjustly treated, and sent to bed, feeling His arms about me, so that I would even be glad to finish my prayers to feel my Heavenly Father comfort me. Since I have been a woman grown it has been only a sense of some one with me, correcting, reminding, or comforting." "As a child of seven I remember the emotion that filled me one evening at the sight of the evening star in a clear sky. It was an overpowering sense of infinity and of purity, and was perhaps the beginning of a strong personal desire to know God and to be in harmony with His great purposes. Often since then I have felt the same kind of emotion, with the sense of an encircling presence as vast as the universe and perfect in purity. The effect upon me I could describe only as calm and peace; physically

¹ Cf. Prof. James's discussion of the "sense of presence," *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 58-63.

there was nothing." The "presence" is not to be further described, but merely to be felt. "God is as real to me as the sense of happiness or the sense of love. As I sit by my friend, even abstracting the expression of his face, I often, by the communion of his soul and mine, know that he is my friend. So is God real to me. I feel that I have experienced His presence just as in church you sometimes *feel* the benediction. It is not tangible and so neither vague nor distinct. *I feel it and I trust my feelings.*"

The same "sense of presence" with the added feature of clearly spoken words, resembling St. Teresa's "locutions," is seen in the following: "The experience of His presence was as definite as the sense of touching an external object, but the sensation seemed to come, so to speak, from within instead of from without. Still the personality was clearly distinct from myself—and from any detached segment or substratum of myself. An illustration of this separate action is in the fact that the other personality could *speak to me* in words clearly enunciated but without sound. This silent form of speech . . . had the convincing force of a new revelation to me."

The experience is described in a number of other ways, some rather indefinite, but most of them emphasizing its intense nature. As for instance the following: "God is to me more real than all else besides. . . . I am thrilled and filled with his love at times." "His presence in my thought is uplifting and helpful to mind and body. It is as distinct as the effect of tea or coffee."

The appearance of the outer world is changed—a phenomenon that commonly accompanies any sudden emotional disturbance, as conversion or love. "He gave me a bright revelation of Himself; even the grass and trees looked oh so beautiful."

Joy and intense love are common characteristics of the experience, the thought of God's greatness and majesty seldom entering the mind at the time. God is a Companion—the "Lover of my soul," etc.,—it is the personal rather than the cosmical aspects of the concept that are of importance. The latter, however, are sometimes of considerable influence, as in the following: "Although I believe at all times that God is great, good, omnipresent, etc., and that I am actually in communication with Him when I choose to be, it is only at intervals, and rare at that, that I realize what it means to be in such a situation. The feeling is then one of awe and exaltation as nearly as I can express it,

and on the occasion when I can remember to have had the most vivid experience of this kind, it was so intense that I could only ask to have it taken away ; it was almost crushing."

Clearer intellectual vision and a strengthened moral purpose are frequently mentioned among the effects of the experience. The two following responses, though illustrating a number of other matters, are here in point :

" God is a very real presence to me. I feel that He is present with me at all times, only occasionally do I have an experience that seems particularly clear. It is usually at a time which seems critical to my development, when an influence may turn the course of my life from one extreme to another. At such crises I am conscious of an increase of power and will which makes stronger my determination to press forward toward righteousness. I hear no voice, I see no light or person,—but I feel an assurance that the course toward which I feel drawn is that which is best. Mentally I receive courage and a clearer vision, an added power of will, and a purer thought ; physically I have the common results of courage, a carelessness of pain, or of mental anguish, that enables me to reach an end that otherwise I am assured I should not attain. At these crises the experience is very real and distinct."

"At times God is very real to me. At such times He seems nearer and more real than any human being could be. At other times He seems real but more or less remote. There have been times throughout my life, beginning in early childhood, when I have believed myself to come consciously into the presence of God. Sometimes this has occurred when I have been in great sorrow or in great fear and dread. But sometimes I have felt this Presence without any special reason for it,—*e. g.*, when I have been alone out of doors or reading something that has touched me by its beauty and truth, I have felt a quick glad sense that He was near, " closer to me than breathing, nearer than hands or feet." Such experiences, while they last, make me feel that I have come to my true self. I seem to understand life better for them. They are accompanied by no emotional excitement, only by a deep peace and gladness. I have never spoken of them to any one. These experiences are not habitual with me, that is, they do not occur very frequently. They afford me my strongest ground for belief in God."

The last quotation suggests an interesting question, namely the age

at which these experiences begin, and how far they can be considered imitative. That they are largely imitative as to their ideational content there can be no doubt ; they occur in much the same form in all lands and at all times, the particular ideas involved being always determined in a general way by the ruling beliefs of the community. That the emotional experience itself, however, is principally imitative seems improbable. It is the almost universal assertion of those who have known it, that the experience is in reality indescribable ; that no one who has not experienced it can form any idea of what is meant by it. This may very possibly be an exaggeration ; but at least it seems to preclude the possibility of its being induced in the first instance by a description of it given by some one else. The age at which the first such experience occurs and the attending circumstances would here be in point. If, for instance, its first occurrence were very generally an incident of revival and came only at times of great religious excitement in the community, the social and imitative factors would seem to be of the first importance. Unfortunately it did not occur to me till too late to make this one of the questions of my circular. I have, however, collected ten answers to it from my respondents. Of these, two had their first experience of the kind in question during revival services—one of them at 16, the other when further along in life. In the case reported on page 86 the first occurrence was in adult life, but quite spontaneous in nature and quite uninfluenced by any social excitement. In the remaining seven cases, the experience stretches back into childhood and in most cases (so far as the memory of the respondents holds good) is quite spontaneous—though of course entirely imitative as to the ideas involved. One woman writes : “I think I was just thirteen when one night for a moment there came a feeling of great peace or rest. I almost held my breath to keep it, but it was gone, and left only the memory which became an ideal for whose realization I began to hope and work. I called it *peace* for the verse in Isaiah 26 : 3 seemed to describe the experience better than any other. I have found some old notes of that year with the verse copied, and think that it perhaps marked the beginning of my search. It may be that it was Miss Havergal’s word about ‘the permanence of the joy of the Lord’ that gave me the assurance that such a feeling of peace ought to be constant instead of coming in flashes. It came to me only in that last way at first, and I could not find a cause that

would always produce them, and yet I remember feeling that they must be governed by some law, and if I could find that law I could reproduce them at will. . . . One day I found in an old commentary a description of my experience, and it gave me as its cause absolute obedience to God. I had already felt that study of His word and prayer had a great deal to do with the coming of the peace. . . . Gradually, by spending some time alone each day, the experiences became longer and perhaps less intense. They were best expressed by the word *peace*, and I began to know that I might always have the feeling if I would instantly do the right as I saw it and would save the time for quiet study. I found that when actual necessity interfered with that, the peace would not go, but carelessness would always drive it away."

Every one will note the marked similarity between this and the descriptions given by a number of the Christian mystics. The experience comes at first unsought and in a sudden flash. This is interpreted in accordance with the religious ideas already held and is thereafter deliberately sought. Methods for regaining the experience are found in records of the experience of others—in this case an old commentary, in the case of many of the mystics the description of the orison of some previous mystic. The state is systematically cultivated. In this my quotation is certainly typical of a very great number of religious people. All the sources to which I have access agree that the experience is at first spontaneous but is thereafter very susceptible to cultivation.

Summing up the results recorded in this paper, one should note particularly that the data here collected, if at all trustworthy, point decidedly to the great preponderance of affective experience over reasoning and authority as the basis of belief. The researches of Leuba and Starbuck, so far as they touch upon this question, point in the same direction. The importance of the affective life in the religious belief of my respondents is especially striking if we consider only those whom I have called the "church people." 30 out of 49 of these were of the fifth type, while all but 7 of the 49 were persuaded that they had experienced God's presence. If my respondents are really fair samples (as I believe them to be), we may conclude that belief in God to-day, with perhaps half the religious community at least, is based not on argument nor on authority, but on a private experience spring-

ing from the great emotional background which forms the deepest and most fundamental part of our consciousness, the part most intimately bound up with life and all that life means to us.

Questionnaire.

Please answer the questions at length and in detail. *Do not give philosophical generalizations, but your own personal experience.*

1. What does religion mean to you personally? Is it

- (1) A belief that something exists?
- (2) An emotional experience?
- (3) A general attitude of the will toward God or toward righteousness?
- (4) Or something else?

If it has several elements, which is for you the most important?

2. What do you mean by God?

- (1) Is He a person—if so, what do you mean by His being a person?
- (2) Or is He only a Force?
- (3) Or is God an attitude of the Universe toward you?

How do you apprehend His relation to mankind and to you personally?

If your position on any or all of these matters is uncertain, please state the fact.

3. Why do you believe in God? Is it

- (1) From some argument?
- Or (2) Because you have experienced His presence?
- Or (3) From authority, such as that of the Bible or of some prophetic person?
- Or (4) From any other reason?

If from several of these reasons, please indicate carefully the order of their importance.

4. Or do you not so much *believe* in God as want to *use* Him? Do you accept Him not so much as a real existent Being, but rather as an ideal to live by? If you should become thoroughly convinced that there was no God, would it make any great difference in your life—either in happiness, morality, or in other respects?

5. Is God very real to you; as real as an earthly friend, though different?

Do you feel that you have experienced His presence? If so, please describe what you mean by such an experience. How vague or how distinct is it? How does it affect you mentally and physically?

If you have had no such experience, do you accept the testimony of others who claim to have felt God's presence directly?

Please answer this question with special care and in as great detail as possible.

6. Do you pray, and if so, why? That is, is it purely from habit, and social custom, or do you really believe that God hears your prayers?

Is prayer with you one-sided or two-sided—*i. e.*, do you sometimes feel that in prayer you receive something—such as strength or the divine spirit—from God? Is it a real communion?

7. What do you mean by "spirituality?" Describe a typical spiritual person.

8. Do you believe in personal immortality? If so, why?

9. Do you accept the Bible as *authority* in religious matters? Are your religious faith and your religious life based on it? If so, how would your belief in God and your life toward Him and your fellow-men be affected by loss of faith in the *authority* of the Bible?

10. What do you mean by a "religious experience?"

THE UNIVERSAL BELIEF AND ITS RATIONALITY.

BY JOSEPH I. FRANCE, M. D.

So unsatisfactory to my mind are the theories, with which I am familiar, of the origin of religious beliefs and conceptions, that I wish to state the facts, which seem to me to be the most important, in the discussion of this problem, and, while the views which I express, may all be more or less familiar, yet they are, I believe, of sufficient importance to deserve repetition, even though they may have been advanced frequently before.

It would, of course, be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss at length the prevailing theories, and I shall only mention two, the first of which would explain the existence of religious ideas by saying that they originated in the erroneous explanations which primitive man gave of natural phenomena, the second of which says that religious ideas are internal, psychic adaptations which were developed and preserved because favorable to the individual. I shall leave it for these theories to explain, as they have not yet done, why in the first instance such erroneous explanations satisfied the rational mind of primitive man, or in the second why such a complicated adaptation as religious belief was necessary to any individual, unless we assume that he had in the beginning just what we are attempting to explain, namely, a feeling of need which made religious belief necessary.

The above theories attempt to explain the existence of what they at the outset assume are fundamentally irrational conceptions, and it is not therefore strange that they are so absolutely inadequate, for, it seems to me, that with our present theories of the origin of the content of mind, we should start out, in seeking the genesis of any deeply rooted conception, to find its ultimate rational element or, in other words, its final objective source, for if we assume that there must be some sufficient and adequate cause for every one of the great fundamental instincts and feelings, we have a field of inquiry which lies in reality and not in fancy.

So far as we know, all the great fundamental instincts and feel-

ings are the result of the great primal objective facts which the organism was compelled to recognize, and these I wish to summarize:

(1) The physical and psychic life of every organism is first and always one of relation to, and absolute dependence upon, its environment or the universal.

(2) This absolute unconditional dependence is and must of necessity be recognized by every form of life, either sub-consciously or consciously.

(3) As a result of this dependence, there are developed in the organism definite physical, chemical and psychical states which impel movements which are made for the satisfaction of the specific, imperative organic need which the given state expresses. In these states of protoplasm growing out of various needs, we have the primitive, specific instincts which are later developed and specialized, but which form ever the bulk even of the highest forms of psychic life. The most primitive concrete instincts are of course the food instincts in the broadest sense, and fall under the heads of chemotropism, heliotropism, geotropism, stereotropism, etc.

(4) As a result of the active movements of the organism, portions of the external are appropriated, become internal or organic and constitute for a time the vital and nervous mechanism until discharged, to be replaced by other elements.

(5) In a word, there is a physical and chemical continuity between the individual and the universal, and this being the primal fact, the question arises whether we find in the content of mind any great feeling or instinct, in recognition of it, which would express this general sense of dependence, as the special instincts express the concrete needs. Is there a widespread world belief or feeling which is a subjective recognition of these great fundamental facts?

If, in order to answer this question, we examine carefully the different religious and philosophic systems, we do find, as we should expect, that there are certain fundamental conceptions common to them all, or, in other words, that there is a universal world belief which constitutes the foundation of every system of thought, and that consequently in the last analysis all the different systems are in essential agreement.

If it is granted that there is such a world belief or philosophy, we cannot explain its existence unless we assume that it is the universal

subjective reaction to objective reality, that it is a rational conception gradually developed by sub-conscious and conscious observation and reasoning concerning the natural processes of the universe, and that there is an essential harmony existing between the subjective conception of the universe and the external reality. If we do not assume that these conceptions are rational, we must grant, after a world belief has been shown, that it is a universal delusion or false judgment and this, from the standpoint of practical psychology, is absurd, since the more we come to realize that the content of mind has a phylogenetic as well as an ontogenetic origin, the more we are forced to trust its ultimate rationality. Indeed, to one who takes this view, the old objections to the ontological form of proof seem to fall short, for we inevitably incline toward the view that nothing can be in the mind which has not been perceived in some form at some stage of mental evolution. How any organism could originate a purely extra-natural delusion, or what such a delusion would be, it is impossible to imagine. To restate and reverse Kant's argument: If a poor man has an idea of a hundred thalers, they must exist, although their time and space relations may be such that they may not be in his own purse. Even an insane delusion is such not in the sense of being an extra-natural conception, but because a rational and natural conception has lost its proper time and space relations, or the sense organs report a natural phenomenon as existing which does not exist at the time, which is an hallucination. Every idea must have an ultimate basis in fact. No one could have conceived of the possibility of Lazarus being raised from death, if the vitalization of apparently inanimate things were not a universally perceived world process.

If we accept the views of modern genetic psychology our mental content is the result of environment acting on organisms during indefinitely long periods of the past as well as the product of our individual perceptions. We might roughly divide the perceptions of organisms into three great classes, the first of which embraces the most primitive sensations; the last two of which belong to the intellectual or human period of observation.

The first class would include all of those most fundamental of all perceptions which are so simple and primitive that the resulting state of the organism cannot be called a conception nor even be defined in terms of mind. I would describe them as somatic sensations, and they

result in some sort of a sense of contact or relation which constitutes the whole psychic life among primitive organisms. It is the internal state which results in chemotropic, heliotropic, etc., movements, which are the primordial reactions which bring the organism and the necessary external elements together. It is the most elemental expression of that sense of dependence which the individual feels for the universal. To what extent these primordial states and reactions of free moving cells are preserved in the specialized cells of higher organisms, we cannot say, but in some form they must be co-extensive with protoplasm, since, no matter how highly specialized an organism, the ultimate problems of nutrition reside in the individual cell and the reaction of its individual self to the external. A little thought will make it clear that not only then in higher organisms is there a sense of dependence on the external which resides in higher centres, but that it is present also in the lower sub-conscious levels and far lower there still exists the ultimate cell hunger for and cell dependence upon all the elements of the external. Through all the forms of life below the human, we have observations and sensations and reactions of increasing complexity, but we need not for our purposes discuss these, but pass at once to the second class of observations, which are those conscious and sub-conscious ones made by man from the beginning.

Primitive man was alert to every changing phase of his environment, and with every observation that he made there was the unconscious and conscious recognition of his dependence upon it. Every aspect of nature in all of its manifold details was perceived, and upon the multitude of these observations grew the primitive philosophic and religious system. The systems of thought thus developed were merely the conscious and rational reaction to what was perceived and felt. The ideas and religious conceptions of primitive peoples and the early systems of philosophy which followed much later, while called *a priori* for the sake of distinguishing them from conclusions and theories based upon the facts observed by a certain method which we arbitrarily call scientific, were in reality inductive, as is all so-called metaphysics, since its ultimate source and data are found in those sense perceptions which are forced upon every organism.

We have thirdly, the observations made by modern science, equipped with its marvellous intricacies of apparatus and technique. These observations while carried further into the finer relations of

things, while they are capable in many instances of quantitative statement, and while able to show the universality of certain phenomena and to state them in the abstract language of a general law, are after all not essentially different either in their scope or in their ultimate significance from the observations made by man for ages, nor is it conceivable that they will have any effect in changing those fundamental beliefs which seem to be so universal.

If mankind as a whole, as the result of ages of close observation and study of natural processes, has not arrived at a proper interpretation of them, if the content of the mind of the race is not in harmony with the objective reality, if sense perception has for ages been distorted, then, indeed, may we hope for but little light on ultimate problems from the observations of modern science, and we may as well resign ourselves to the chill and deadening atmosphere of agnosticism, surrender our hopes and efforts, and close our eyes with horror on the scene, the end of which can only be the destruction of every lofty motive, and the despair which would result from a universal acceptance of the philosophy of negation.

If, on the other hand, the external world has been correctly perceived and understood; if there is a harmony existing between the objective reality and its subjective conception, then we should expect to find, as I have said before, certain universal beliefs, and that in their last analysis all philosophical and religious conceptions, being the inevitable effect of reality upon the mind, should show an essential agreement in fundamentals. This does not mean that every individual must involuntarily consciously arrange his perceptions in a certain fixed way, or that he must necessarily be conscious of the presence in his own mind of the universal norm of belief, any more than it means that the root philosophy or belief must always be evident to the superficial observer of the different systems of thought, for in either an individual or among classes of individuals, it may be obscured or almost completely hidden by a mass of non-essential details. In spite of the multitudinous systems of thought and belief, we are coming more and more to realize that such a great fundamental world belief does and must exist from the very nature of man and the external reality.

I undertake to give below the elements which make up this universal world belief, and I present them in three forms, which differ very

little ; the first being the general statement, the second its religious statement, and the third its scientific.

I. General.

- (1) There is a universal all embracing matrix, of which all concrete things are special manifestations.
- (2) Man, as all other creatures, is at one with and hence absolutely dependent upon the universal.
- (3) The universal has a psychic quality which is made concrete in nervous and mental phenomena.
- (4) The universal and its parts are subject to constant change, but no part of it can be destroyed.

II. Religious.

- (1) There is a universal omnipresent God.
- (2) Man is absolutely dependent upon Him, since He is the all powerful creator.
- (3) He has a spiritual nature.
- (4) Man is immortal.

III. Scientific.

- (1) A primal universal force with many manifestations.
- (2) The individual is a manifestation of the universal force in a given direction and hence dependent on it.
- (3) The universal force possesses a psychic power or potentiality.
- (4) The conservation of energy and matter.

I am perfectly aware that there are many technical objections which may be raised against the above statements of what might be called the fundamental norm of belief, and the form is very imperfect, but it will suffice to convey the general idea. Of course it will be objected that it would be impossible to establish the existence of such a world belief, and that even if it could be demonstrated, it would be of no value, because its terms are too general. Certainly in the present paper, it would be impossible to meet the first of these objections, with all the details which would be necessary in order to establish a proof, and I do not attempt to do more than give a most general outline of the facts, recommending that those who are sufficiently inter-


ested weigh the evidence for themselves, so far as they may obtain it, first hand. As to whether the establishment of the existence of such a universal belief would be of any value, that, of course, would depend entirely upon the individual point of view.

If one approaches the study of religious and philosophical systems and the generalizations of modern science with the idea of ignoring the variety and terminology and the manifold non-essential details, he will, I think, soon perceive that the evidence in favor of the existence of such a world belief is at least considerable. The field of inquiry would embrace primitive religious systems, the great religions of the higher type, the ancient and modern systems of philosophy, and the theories now being advanced by modern science as they are expressed by its greatest exponents.

If in this way we first consider the religious philosophic systems of primitive peoples, we are at once impressed with the fact that primitive man views his environment as a whole, that the subjective and objective are not clearly defined, that resemblances and not differences are first observed, and that on the whole his philosophy is synthetic. The self shades off imperceptibly into the not self, and to him what, to the more analytic mind, seem widely separated phenomena, are closely related. The sense of his relation to his environment, and his dependence upon it, is very intense. He indeed feels the ultimate identity of the subjective and objective, and attributes to inanimate things a volitional and psychic power. Spencer says that in seeking to explain that which puzzled him, he formed a theory which was erroneous, while the fact is that realizing as he did his at-oneness with his environment, and that he was a part of the same, he formulated the only possible explanation, and one which, while partly incomplete, was in its last analysis rational. With him it was more a rational feeling than a judgment, and must have been the result of a sub-conscious mental process, acting on necessary observations.

If the origin of his theory was not by rational process, it remains a mystery as to how he could have originated such an extra natural or supernatural explanation, or, indeed, why as a biological entity he should have explained at all. That there was in specific instances and applications of this theory an element of error, does not affect the ultimate rationality of it.

The primitive and child mind perceive resemblances easily, and



their reasoning is synthetic; the scientific mind is analytic; the well-balanced mind, with both its analytic and synthetic powers properly developed, while recognizing outward diversity, perceives also the necessity of ultimate similarity and unity. Of these three classes of minds, the first will tend to be superstitious, the second sceptical or agnostic, while the third will develop a conception of reality which is both discriminative and comprehensive. The first will be wrong in details, the second weak in generalizations, while the third perceives the general behind the details. The first will feel truth, the second doubt it, the third will perceive the error of the other two.

Brinton says that "the universal postulate of all religious thought is the recognition or, if you will, the assumption, that behind the sensuous phenomenal world lies the immeasurable power of mind analogous in some way to our own, the unalterable faith in mind as the source of all force, all life, all being."

The primitive views of death and immortality are so diverse and so involved in various details that it would be impossible to discuss them here, but in a general way we may say that in some form a belief in life after death and in another world is universal.

If we look next at the great religious systems of a higher type, we find the same fundamental belief clearly expressed but under a wide diversity of form. "The universal postulate" of Brinton, or the world belief, is the foundation on which is built the superstructures, which in many instances are so complicated. Whether we examine the religion of the East, with its faith in a divine essence of which all is the expression and to which all returns, or the monotheism, which in its extremes becomes anthropomorphism, or the polytheism, which is a more detailed and analytic expression of the same idea, we find in them all *an ultimate essential agreement*.

If we turn to the more distinctly philosophical field, there is little difficulty in finding the presence, in each different system, of the same elements. From the system of Thales, who conceived water as the universal matrix, assuming various forms down through the early monotheistic systems, the idealism of Plato and the materialism of Democritus, which seemed its antithesis, we can trace the same conception, finding differences in terminology and in the details of its elaboration. The universal postulate which, as mentioned above, underlies all religious thought, is found also in the different systems of

philosophy. Weber brings out very forcibly in the conclusion of his history of philosophy, the idea that there are common factors present in all the different systems. He says, "if anything has remained in agreement with itself for more than two thousand years, it is metaphysics. The great hypothesis of the unity continuity and immortality of being existed prior to Plato and Aristotle, and constitutes the immutable substance, as it were, of ancient and modern speculation. . . . The historian of metaphysics is most impressed with the open and tacit agreement existing between rival movements and schools."

It would, of course, be impossible at this time to attempt to prove that both practically and theoretically present scientific thought is and must be monistic in its trend. The four axioms of the world belief, as stated above, constitute the foundations of our modern science. In no sense is modern scientific thought materialistic, according to the meaning ordinarily conveyed by that term, since the dynamic conception of matter would necessarily change the term to dynamism, and everywhere, as it were inevitably, the dynamic force tends to become stated in terms of the psychic or will. We constantly assume that nervous reaction has a chemical basis and is ultimately itself chemical, and there is no reason why we should not, but if it is chemical, it simply means that the phenomena of chemical reaction in general are different and vastly more complex than we have hitherto conceived them. If we push our study of nervous reaction down until we reach the simplest form of protoplasmic irritability, we reach a point where reaction is so direct and so inevitable that we are forced to recognize it as chemical, as we do in the terms chemotaxis, etc., and yet there has been no change, except that the reaction has become simpler and more direct. We cannot reduce nervous reaction then to chemical terms unless we modify our conceptions of such chemical reactions themselves, as we are now inevitably doing.

The above is but a most brief and superficial statement of what I wish to convey, and it is probably at the same time very incomplete, but I believe that further thought and investigation on the part of those interested, will bring them to a realization that through all ages and systems of thought we can trace an elemental conception or belief. If we now summarize the views I have advanced on the origin of this root conception, we might state it as follows:

- (1) At all times, from the beginning of his existence, each indi-

vidual is not merely in contact with his environment, but he is rather continuous with it. He is merely a vortex and aggregation of substances and force existing in the universal substratum or matrix. The apparent discontinuity between the subjective and objective is an abstraction which the mind necessarily learns as it advances from the simple to the complex condition. The system of forces which we know as the individual is continuous with those of the universal. Elements from the outside are absorbed, transformed, become for a moment part of the microcosm, and are then removed to be again replaced. Every universal force is continuous with him, and portions of the external are becoming internal and individual, and the internal are constantly becoming external and general. There is an actual physical and chemical continuity and unity between the organism and its environment. Very little thought will show not only that this must be so, but that any other idea is absolutely inconceivable. Now the continuity, the unity of the individual with his environment and his dependence upon it, is the one primal fact of life. It is the general and fundamental thesis which lies deeper than even its particular concrete aspects, such as the hunger for air and food. The need for the last are concrete and particular expressions of the general environmental need, which expresses all of the concrete needs. Now remembering these facts, it is not strange that even the primitive mind perceives unconsciously the at-oneness with the general, the continuity of the individual with and his ultimate identity with the universal. Separate organs give special sensations for special needs, but every organ and cell unconsciously feels the need for the universal, which is the whole and embraces all the elements exciting the concrete hungers. Now the organism thus feeling constantly the unity of subjective and objective, forces the mental assumption of ultimate similarity, which last gives rise to all the various philosophies, the norm of which is monoism, the forms of which are so various, such as animism, monotheism and its equivalent, polytheism, theism, hylozoism, idealism, materialism, anthropomorphism, pantheism, and all the varieties practically of philosophy and religion, all of which contain the expression of the same fundamental conception.

(2) At what stage of evolution this fundamental organic sense of the dependence of the individual upon, and his identity with, the universal, develops a definite emotional accompaniment or counterpart we

need not enquire since it is sufficient, for our purpose, to note that such an emotional reaction probably appears much earlier than is generally believed, and hence we must go far back for the elements which later develop into the religious feelings. However this may be, when we reach the higher stages of mental development we find that this feeling of dependence and unity and the consequent necessary positing of ultimate similarity, results in a spiritual or psychic interpretation of natural phenomena, and there logically follows on this the conclusion that the supreme will, which manifests itself in the impressive changes and awful cataclysms of the environment, should be propitiated, which in turn, develops all the elaborate technique of ceremony and worship which occupies such an important place in all religious systems.

The vital point to bear in mind is that the religious ideas and emotions do not arise from an accidentally discovered theory adopted to explain puzzling natural phenomena, but that we must look for their source in those organic sensations which are the inevitable result of the relations existing between the individual and the universal; that they arise in those primitive perceptions and observations, the rationality of which are proven by their resulting reactions, which preserve the organism.

(3) The individual then feels his unity with the universal, his absolute dependence, and attributes a psychic or will power to the objective, and lastly there develops the belief in immortality of the individual. Under all the changing phenomena of the universe there is inevitably recognized the final relative permanence and indestructibility of its nature. The individual passes away but the universal, into which he sinks, goes on, and if the individual is at one with it, the conclusion is that in some way the part must share the indestructibility of the whole and must be preserved. Such a fundamental belief is universal and has a rational basis, even in the light of modern science since, if we accept the doctrine of the conservation of energy, we know that the passing of an individual merely means that the universal has ceased to be individualized or vitalized at a given point, and that there has been no destruction but only a transformation of the specific forces which were centered in that particular organism. In what manner vital and nervous energy are transformed, and whether they have a mechanical or other equivalent, we do not know, and it does not concern us here since it is sufficient for our purpose to note that the

doctrine of immortality, in its broad sense, is indeed but a corollary of the proposition of the conservation of energy and matter.

The primal facts of the universe, from the standpoint of the individual, are : Unity, Dependence, Similarity, Immortality.

The most primitive form of life recognizes by some internal state preceding reaction its absolute dependence upon and unity with the universal. The special hungers are concrete expressions of this general sense, which is co-extensive with life. The assumption of ultimate similarity and the belief that the individual shares the indestructibility of the whole follows later of necessity. When we reach the intellectual stage of development, the great primal facts are more clearly perceived and given abstract expression in philosophy, and the emotional reaction to them gives us religion. The world belief, which is the recognition of these great primal facts, forms the foundation of every system of thought, and is and must be rational from the very nature of the universe itself.

PRAYER: A STUDY IN ITS HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

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This study has been pursued according to the following outline:

I. Its history.

1. Among the primitive races.
2. In ethnic religions.
3. In catholic religions.
4. In Jewish Polytheism—later in monotheism.
5. In the Christian system.
 - a: In the teachings of the founder, Christ.
 - b: The Pauline conception.
 - c: In the Church Fathers.

II. A study from example.

Including Saint Augustine, Saint Francis d'Assisi, Martin Luther, John Wesley, and others.

III. A study from experience using the questionnaire to collect data.

(See list of questions at the beginning of Part III of the study.)

Part I. History of Prayer.

The writer has had in mind not only a study in the psychology of prayer but the ethical and sociological phases of the study.

Sabatier, in his "Philosophy of Religion," says, "Perhaps a History of Prayer would be the best history of the religious development of mankind."

Among primitive people, the words to their gods is prayer. It is the ordinary concomitant of sacrifice: the prayer explains the reason of the sacrifice and urges the god to accept and in return to offer the aid that is asked. Their earliest prayers are offered at times of great emergencies and contain requests of the most primary sort.

"The earliest prayers do not, as a rule, contain definite requests, but are general appeals to the gods to be present, to partake of the feast, to join the dance, to continue his good offices toward those who call upon him." Ancient Nahnath Poetry, by D. G. Brinton.

Their prayers have a ring of urgency: they state the claim the wor-

shipper has on the god. "Most of the petitions in primitive prayer are for material benefits." *Religion of Primitive People*, by D. G. Brinton, As life grows more secure this note of urgency fades more or less out of prayer. You find signs of an appreciation of something higher. "O Lord, we know not what is good for us. Thou knowest what it is. For it we pray." (From prayer of Khonds—a tribe of Northern India.) "O merciful Lord, let this chastisement with which thou hast visited us give us freedom from evil and follies." (The prayer of an Aztec quoted in Sahagu's *History de Nueva Espana*.) Among primitive people the Indians perhaps are as prayerful as any. "It seems a startling assertion, but it is, I think, true, that there are no people who pray more than the Indians. Both superstition and custom keep always in their minds the necessity of placating the anger of the invisible and omnipotent power, and for supplicating the active exercise of his faculties in their behalf." Captain Clark's "*Indian Sign Language*," page 300.

Studying the prayers which are offered in connection with sacrifice we notice that they tend to run into form and to take the nature of a liturgy. Finally, the words of the prayer are in themselves supposed to be efficacious and to take the place of the sacrifice itself. So prayer comes to have the same virtue as sacrifice.

In the religions which belong exclusively to one nation — the Ethnic religions — we find about the same petitioning for outward good that characterizes prayer among the primitive races.

James Freeman Clarke thinks another and very important element enters into prayer among the ethnic religions—the element of adoration. He quotes the following from the Vedic hymns in illustration of his position : "Of which god now, of which of the immortals, shall we invoke the amiable name? Let us invoke the amiable name of Aditi; of the divine Agni, first of the immortals; of Varuna, the thousand eyed, skillful-handed, possessed of all resources, embracing the three worlds, whose breath is the wind, who knows the flight of the birds, the course of the far-travelling wind, and is a witness of human truth and falsehood."

Other and equally prominent illustrations of adoration are to be found in the ethnic religions. The Vedic hymns are filled with strains of adoration. Such statements as the following abound : "The light has arrived, the greatest of all lights, the glorious and brilliant illum-

nation has been born. The shining Ushas, fair and bright, has opened the doors of the sky, setting in motion all living things. Usha has awokened all creatures. Daughter of the sky, youthful, clad in shining attire, auspicious, shine on us to-day! O best of all dawns, arise! Magnificent Goddess, protecting right, imparting joy, undecaying, immortal, arise! our life, our breath!"

We have many examples preserved which indicate the conception and place of prayer among the Greeks and Romans. The philosopher, Seneca, says, "We worship and adore the framer and former of the universe, governor, disposer, keeper; him on whom all things depend; mind and spirit of the world; from whom all things spring; by whose spirit we live; the divine spirit diffused through all; God all-powerful; God always present; God above all other gods; thee we worship and adore." Plato, before beginning the *Timaeus*, says, "Since I am about to speak of the nature of the Universe, I must first invoke the gods, that I may say what is reasonable and true." It was habitual with the Greeks to pray for every undertaking which they attempted. This is an almost universal practice, in fact so generally so that Plato says, "Every man of sense, before beginning an important work, will ask help of the gods." Xenophon prays before each day's march and Pericles before each of his orations. Socrates prays at the conclusion of the dialogue which he held with Phaedrus under the palm tree, "Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one." These and other illustrations which might be offered furnish evidence that we have here a different and undoubtedly higher form of prayer than is found among the primitive religions. Adoration becomes very pronounced here.

Passing into the Catholic religions where we meet a marked tendency to universality we also meet that which is characteristic of their prayers. In this group is included Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, and the religion of the Hebrews. Here we meet with religions that seem to have no place at all for prayer. Confucianism seems to have no need of prayer and there is no prayer in Buddhism. It believes that the world is unalterably ruled by the law of Karman, hence prayer would be useless and its place is taken by meditation. On the other hand, Mohammedanism places large emphasis upon prayer. To followers of this religion prayer is en-

joined as an imperative duty. Both the times and forms of prayer are very scrupulously observed. To them, "prayer is better than sleep, as the sleeper can be aroused by the musical cry of the Muez-zion." The Koran pronounces a woe upon those who pray carelessly ; who make a long show of devotion and yet refuse to help the needy. Sufis, a Mohammedan writer, gives us the following concerning prayer : "There are three degrees of prayer. The first is when it is only spoken by the lips. The second kind is when, with difficulty and by a resolute effort, the soul succeeds in fixing its thought on divine things. The third is when it finds it hard to turn away from God. But it is the very marrow of prayer when God takes possession of the soul of the suppliant, and he is absorbed into the Divine Being and ceases from all thought, so that the prayer seems like a veil between himself and God."

In this group of religions I think I discover that which is not to be found in the ethnic religions, namely, a petition for divine leading and blessing in experiences not yet passed through. Not only a looking behind with sacrifices and pardon, and a present adoration, but a feeling that somehow Deity can and will have power over that which is yet to come to pass.

In Jewish polytheism and later as it became monotheistic we find a different conception of prayer and an evolution of the idea within the development of this one religion. In the earlier years prayer was little less than an effort to get the gods on your side. Jacob prayed, "If God be with me, and will keep me in this way," etc. He wished to make God his ally. The thought here seems to be, How can I get God to serve me? Later we find an entirely different conception. Mohammedanism regards prayer as a practical duty while the later age of Judaism makes it a voluntary communion. To David, God was near and prayer was the communion of happy trust and willing obedience. In the last days of centralized Judaism we find a very different conception prevailing. It became outward and very formal. There were rabbinical ordinances about it and it became confined in the fetters of a rigid mechanism.

In the religion of Jesus prayer seems to be a voluntary communion with God rather than an enjoined duty. Jesus surely did not attempt a philosophy of prayer. He prayed as though it was the normal and reasonable thing in life and that the promptings to pray were natural

and instinctive. Jesus had the habit of prayer; at least fifteen times the Synoptic Gospels mention his prayers. Mark 1:35, gives us one of his times of prayer, the early morning. John also mentions this time and together with other times noted we are led to think that while Jesus did not teach stated times to pray, nevertheless, His practice was such. Somewhat contrary to this idea is His statement, "Men ought always to pray," but this was given as a corrective to an established habit and not to form a new one. Some statements in the Synoptic Gospels would lead one to think that Christ shared with the Mohammedan the idea that prayer demanded a certain posture and place, but this position can surely not be maintained. It is true many of his prayers that are recorded were prayed in the desert place, on the mountain top and side, but if this teaches anything it is the value of retirement and solitary places as aids in reflection and meditation. These places no doubt furnished an opportunity for undisturbed communion. In one place Jesus says, "Men should pray in every place," but in Matt. 6:5, 6 he enjoins men not to pray in public. This injunction is no doubt given as a warning against practices which existed among the Jews. The Gospel writers represent Jesus praying at the great crises of his life: his temptation, the time of the choosing of the twelve Apostles, the time of the Galilean uprising and His experience in Gethsemane. They also represent that the great blessings of His life came during or closely connected with a season of prayer: the descent of the Holy Spirit, the Transfiguration, the heavenly Voice, etc. He prayed with others and for others. But in the little teaching he gives He seems to be much more concerned about the spirit of prayer than the form. The form would probably not have been mentioned if his disciples had not insisted that he imitate John and teach them a form of prayer. He was unique in this particular as in all others, but in response to their request gave them the short prayer commonly known as the Lord's Prayer, but I think with no thought of giving any formal prayer or of suggesting a liturgy. The spirit of prayer was uttermost in Christ's life and that was determined largely by His conception of God. He regarded God as His father, and that spiritual affinity and relationship determined His conception of prayer. It was consequently natural to have the freest intercourse and to enjoy communion.

Paul accepts the theological dogma of the Holy Spirit, so in his

teaching concerning prayer he says in Romans 8:26, "And in like manner the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity; for we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered;" God knows our needs, the Spirit makes intercession, and our petitioning only re-enforces the petition upon us.

In the Church Fathers we find a great many references to prayer and a variety of teaching.

St. Ignatius in "The Epistle to the Ephesians," "Pray also without ceasing for other men." "Pray for the Church which is in Syria." "But if Jesus Christ will give me grace through your prayers." In both the Epistle to the Trallians and the Romans we find a request to pray for the Church at Syria. In the Epistle to the Magnesians, "For I stand in need of your joint prayers in God." Tertullian writes thus concerning prayer: "In the Lord's Prayer is an epitome of the whole Gospel. Touching times of prayer nothing at all has been prescribed, except clearly, to pray at every time and place. The refreshments and nourishments of the spirit are to be held prior to those of the flesh. Old world fires used to free men from fire (Daniel 3), famine (1 Kings 18), and from beasts (Daniel 6). But how far more amply operative is Christian prayer. Christ hath willed that it be operative for no evil." In *De Corona Militis* he says, "Oblationes pro defunctis pro natalitiis anima die facimus," and in his *De Monogam* he speaks of a widow praying for her dead husband. Tertullian also cites from Marcus Aurelius's address to Scapula (*Ad. Scap.* 3:4) where he testifies to drought in Germany which is removed by prayer of Christians which served in his army. In the Twenty-second Letter of Jerome is this reference to prayer, "Prayer, as every one knows, ought to be said at the third, the sixth, and the ninth hours, at dawn and at evening." The Ninth Commandment of the "Shepherd of St. Hermas," contains the following on prayer: "Remove from thee all doubting, and question nothing at all, when thou askest anything of the Lord, saying within thyself, How shall I ask anything of the Lord and receive it seeing I have so greatly sinned against Him? Do not think thus, but turn unto the Lord with all thy heart, and ask of him without doubting, and thou shalt know the mercy of the Lord, how that he will not forsake thee but will fulfill the requests of thy soul. For God is not as man mindful of the injuries he has received; but he

forgets injuries and has compassion on his creatures. Therefore purify thy heart from all the vices of this present world, and observe the commandments I have delivered unto thee from God, and thou shalt receive whatsoever good thing thou shalt ask and nothing shall be wanting thee of all thy petitions, if thou shalt ask of the Lord without doubting. But they which are not such shall obtain none of those things which they ask. For they that are full of faith ask all things with confidence, and receive from the Lord because they ask without doubting. But he that doubts shall hardly live unto God, except he repent, wherefore purify thy heart from doubtings and put on faith and trust in God, and thou shalt receive all thou shalt ask. But if thou shalt chance to ask somewhat, and not receive it (immediately) do not therefore doubt because thou hast not presently received the petition of thy soul. For it may be thou shalt not receive it presently for thy trial or else for some sin which thou knowest not. But do not thou leave off to ask and then thou shalt receive. Else if thou shalt cease to ask thou must complain of thyself and not of God, that he has not given unto thee what thou did'st desire."

Thus we have traced the history of prayer. History always embraces but a feeble part of the reality. It is indeed difficult to discover the heart of man. This historical study surely shows a growing conception of prayer: from the simple means of gaining worldly ends to spiritual communion.

Part II. A Study from Example.

The Middle Ages form an organic period in the life of humanity. The movement of thought was decidedly religious. These were the centuries of saints and heretics. We take for study from these centuries Saint Francis of Assisi. But first we wish to give the teachings and practice of an earlier Saint, Augustine, who lived in the third century.

Saint Augustine lived in an atmosphere of prayer. He was earnest, impassioned and often spent entire nights in prayer. His prayers were frequently short, ejaculatory, as, "O Lord, may I know thee." "O Lord, may I know myself." "Licet orare quod licet desiderare." In one of his writings we find the following: "Thou did'st at that time torture me with toothache—exceeding great—I urged all my friends to pray for me to Thee. Presently we bowed our knees and

the pain departed." In his little book "On the Care of the Dead," he commends the practice of praying for the dead, though he thinks the prayers will only be a service to them.

Saint Francis of Assisi was pre-eminently the saint of the Middle Ages. The leader of the Franciscan movement, he protested against conditions: a protest against the purely contemplative life. He never occupied himself with questions of doctrine. His faith was of the moral domain, hence his prayers have more than usual interest.

To Saint Francis prayer was a necessary part of life: it was an impulse of the soul. His prayers show at once that the emphasis of his life was upon the active virtues: he petitions for strength in labor, for a mind to sacrifice, and exchanges clothes with the beggar and kisses the leper.

Of Martin Luther, Matthesius, his pupil and intimate friend, says, "He began the work of every day with prayer, according to his motto: *Bene orasse est benne studuisse.*" (To pray well is to study well.) Concerning his own prayers in the cloister, he says, "Such prayers were not what the Holy Scriptures knows as prayers. There was no joyful communion of the soul with a reconciled and loving father. Estimated by the number and frequency, so that prayers omitted at one time could be made up at another, they were only exercises of self-mortification, whereby an attempt was made to purchase God's favor." He always kept and used the prayer book. He uttered a most remarkable prayer on his dying bed and in 1520 he anticipated the Bull against him by an address in which he said, "God cares not for much prayer, but for good prayer." In this address he also says, "Few words and much meaning is Christian; many words and little meaning is heathen." Luther believed in prayer for the sick. "The prayer of the Church works great miracles. Three persons in one day it has raised from the dead, viz., me, who have oft been mortally sick, my wife, Katie, and Philip Melanchthon, who lay sick unto death at Weimar in 1540." While prayers for the dead are without any Scriptural foundation, he is unwilling to forbid them absolutely. "For the dead, since Scripture mentions nothing concerning them, I do not consider it a sin to pray thus, or the like: 'O God, if Thou hast such relationship with souls that thou canst help them, be gracious to them,' and if this occurs once or twice, let that be enough." (Confession concerning the Lord's Supper—1528.)

Spurgeon often prayed informally: naturally and spontaneously. He was one day walking with Dr. Wayland Hoyt through a wood. They were talking together and suddenly Spurgeon said, "Let us pray," and kneeling beside a log, he prayed, as though he could not help it. (I wrote Dr. Wayland Hoyt concerning this incident and he replied that it was true as here related.)

Bishop Phillips Brooks had an exalted conception of prayer and in a statement of his theology which he formulated upon his return from study abroad while yet a young man says the following on the conception of prayer: "The revelation of Christ of the intrinsic relationship of man to God furnishes the true ground for the idea of prayer, the presence of prayer outside of Christian influence being, as in the other points mentioned above, an indication that the essential truth of Christianity is everywhere present in the world. Prayer, as Christ not merely by his practice and precept, but by his nature makes it known to us in the entire expression of loving and dependent sonship—the complete resting of the life of man upon the life of God, of child upon the Father. While petition will be included in the utterance of this, it will not be limited to petition. Confidence, love, sympathy, thankfulness, all will be part of prayer. And when petitioning comes it never will be absolute, but always conditioned on the higher knowledge and complete love of the father to whom the prayer is offered. See Lord's Prayer, "Thy will be done," and prayer in Gethsemane which is the pattern of all petitions.

In this view so called difficulties of prayer by no means disappear, but are seen to be identical with difficulties of moral life in general. They are not involved in any relation of a subordinate to a superior will, one working within the other. They do not make prayer impossible or unmeaning any more than the difficulties of free-will life make choice and action impossible or fictitious. The evidence of the reality of prayer and of its efficacy must lie not in our recognition of its specific answer, but in our assurance of the nature of the Being to whom it is offered.

III. A Study from Experiences.

To secure data for this study in the psychology of prayer the following syllabus was circulated:

1. Do you regularly feel the need of prayer? When regular, how frequent is your practice? Does this vary with Sunday or festival days?

2. If the desire to pray is periodic or occasional, when is it most imperative ?
3. Have you a fixed form of prayer or does the form vary with the circumstances?
4. Is any bodily posture habitual with you in prayer? Does posture seem necessary to induce the proper mental state? Does it vary with mood: time (morning or evening): or place (solitude, family circle, cemetery, church)?
5. At what age in your life have you prayed the most, childhood or maturity?
6. What did you most frequently pray for when a child? What when you became older? (Concrete material goods or things spiritual: benefits near and immediate or remote: better disposition, firmer resolution, redeemed inward nature)?
7. Which feeling is the stronger when you are praying: dependence or communion without dependence?
8. Do you feel the presence of a higher power while you are in the act of prayer? How does this presence manifest itself: do you have any imagery or vision? Does it seem near or remote?
10. Is prayer for you chiefly: A. Confession? B. Supplication and pleading for mercy? C. The desire to find God's will, with the readiness to follow wherever it may lead?
11. What are the mental results of prayer: A. Do you get relief from confession? Have you a clearer realization of sin or fault, or is there sometimes greater confusion? C. Have you clearer realization of duty? D. Are you ever disappointed in not receiving the mental results you desire from your prayers?
12. Do you believe the results of prayer to be wholly subjective, that is, effective only in changing your outlook, vision of right and wrong, your disposition and resolution, or do you feel that external things and circumstances are changed as a direct result of prayer?
13. What do you think of praying for changes in the weather? For people who have no knowledge that you are praying for them?
14. Do you ever feel manifestations of unusual power that gives ability to accomplish ends? Do you believe this addition to your strength comes from without or is purely a manifestation of energy already latent within yourself?
15. Do you think the prayerful attitude of the mind will ever give such marked dependence upon higher power as to result in weakness to the individual?
16. Give two of the most remarkable answers to prayer that you have ever experienced.
17. Are you a member of the church? If so, of what denomination, and when did you first unite with it?

Please give age, sex, health and habits.

Inadequate as the data are in point of number replying, range of age and sex, it nevertheless is of much suggestive value.

The returns yield the following:

1. Ninety-eight per cent. of those replying state that they regularly feel the need of prayer and the majority of these pray regularly twice a day: in the morning and in the evening. Of the remaining 2% they all pray but do not feel the need of it. One says, "I say my prayers every night, but I do not always feel the need of them." Another, "It never comes from a feeling of need." The uniformity of time, morning and night, leads me to wonder if time of prayer is not regulated by habit rather than feeling of need. One says, "I believe that sometimes I pray from force of habit." Most of those replying pray most upon the Sabbath day on account of being in public worship that day, but some find greater need during the week:

"The strenuous life of the week day is very different as compared with the helpful spiritual atmosphere of Sabbath services."

2. More than 75% of those answering said that the desire to pray was periodic, but in these answers again I thought I could see that this was a habit rather than a marked desire. Of those to whom the desire to pray came occasionally it was most imperative under a great variety of conditions: At Christmas time, at Easter, when witnessing any impressive ceremony, at sacramental service, when hearing beautiful and impressive music, when some special religious work was to be done, etc. Two answers agree in the extremes of experience, that is they feel most inclined to pray when they are either "in trouble" or when "very, very happy." A number feel the need of prayer most when taking up any special and significant work, while one says: "It is most imperative after an exhausting duty or series of duties, when mind and body are very tired, or after a great deal of carelessness in spiritual things."

3. Thirty-six per cent. have no form at all, *i. e.*, in their prayers, since they have become mature, 24% claim to pray a fixed form of prayer, while the remaining 40% vary from a fixed form, according to circumstances.

4. While very few admitted that any special posture was necessary to induce the proper mental state for prayer, 46% were inclined to think that kneeling induced the proper mental state more easily.

The prejudice of a conventional bodily posture is present in many replies, and in some there is a desire to in some way atone for a lack of ability to kneel, as the following: "In my secret prayer I always sit (I am unable to kneel), but I sit with my face turned heavenward and often hold my hands above my head." Another answers, "Frequently walking is most effective. Kneeling is probably more habitual in times of relaxing; walking, when any intense personal problems are to be worked out. In morning, sitting or walking is perhaps more indulged in; at evening, kneeling."

5. Sixty-eight per cent. answer that they have prayed most at maturity but 8% answer that they have prayed most in childhood, and 20% prayed about the same in childhood as in maturity.

6. Childhood prayers were scarcely more than a form. "Cannot remember that I prayed for anything when a child except the child prayer, 'Now I lay me down to sleep,' and the Lord's Prayer, the

meaning of which was vague to me." "Rarely more than a prayer for prayer's sake as, 'Now I lay me down to sleep,' etc." "When a child my prayers were mostly just the Lord's Prayer and the little prayer, which most every child learns, 'Now I lay me down to sleep.'"

The things first prayed for after this formal stage were first, that God would keep themselves and their family from bodily harm and injury; second, material things, such as new books, privileges, etc. "One evening, just when leaving school, I tore a page in a new geography of which I thought a great deal. I placed it in the desk greatly worried, and leaving the room sadly I recalled that the teacher had taught that God could do anything, so I just prayed that he would mend my torn book. Many times that evening and the next morning I asked him in prayer to mend the page. I hastened to school early and went at once to my desk to find to my sorrow that the leaf was still torn."

Seventy-three per cent. of answers characterize the prayers of maturity as prayers for spiritual things: *i. e.*, better disposition, firmer resolution, and redeemed inward nature.

7. To 66% of those answering these questions, Dependence was the stronger feeling while engaged in prayer, and to 22% Communion was the stronger; 12% answered that the two were so intimately and closely blended that they could not tell which was the stronger.

8. Nearly 70% state that they feel the presence of a higher power while in the act of praying. To some this presence is as a vision. "I always feel a divine presence and this divine presence manifests itself to me as a divine person at my side. Sometimes this divine presence seems as if it were a great ways off, but I never feel satisfied until I feel that it is very near me." "On a very few occasions I have had vivid imagery of the presence of Christ, and in one instance that I recall a clear voice (born, of course, out of my perplexity)." "A vision but do not know if it is a higher power or imagination."

9. Many feel this presence but have no vision or imagery. One recognizes its presence by being melted to tears. "Sometimes this presence seems very near as though a very dear friend were placing his hand on my head and trying to comfort me, but yet I have no vision." "Manifest by a thrill similar to that caused by a strain of beautiful music or picture." "It might be called a mental image, *i. e.*, an abstraction, there is nothing concrete about it." "Feel its existence

rather than its presence." "I often feel the presence of a Higher Power while in the act of prayer, but it seems to me more like the very best thing in my own nature rather than anything external."

10. Confession 19%.

Supplication and pleading for mercy 9%.

Desire to find God's will, with the readiness to follow wherever it may lead, 72%.

11. But two answers did not admit that there was relief in confession, and one of these said, "there is no confession in my prayers." A very few indeed realized their sin and faults more vividly after prayer, but to most the marked mental result of prayer was the clearer realization of duty. Very few were ever disappointed in not receiving the mental results they anticipated from prayer for a willingness to accept any result was a part of the prayer itself.

12. Eighty-three per cent. believe the results of prayer to be wholly subjective ; 12% believe that results are both subjective and objective. While there are but 5% who believe that the results of prayer are mostly objective, some of this class are very dogmatic. "I know that external things and circumstances are brought to pass or changed as direct result of prayer." "In all my reasonings on the subject I believe the results of prayer to be wholly subjective, and yet sometimes when I want things very much I feel like praying for them, although I may feel at the same time that it is no use." "I do not believe the results of prayer are wholly objective. Prayer certainly changes the outlook, vision of right and wrong, disposition, and resolution, because it is such an intense mental occupation backed up by the emotions."

13. Over 75% are very positive in their conviction that it is always a mistake to pray for a change in the weather. The other 25% have a variety of convictions or none at all. "Ordinarily I think it would have no result. I can conceive of a case where the welfare of a great movement or the extension of God's kingdom might depend upon such providential guidance. In such case I think prayer would be efficacious." "I believe the will of God manifests itself very noticeably in a universal longing." "I believe God wants us to realize our dependence upon him, and I think he sometimes withholds rain to make us ask for it."

Most of the answers practice the second form of prayer: praying for people who have no knowledge that you are praying for them.

"Of no avail except in so far as it may change your attitude toward them."

14. Most every answerer feels the manifestation of unusual power which gives ability to accomplish ends. They are about equally divided as to whether this added strength comes from without or if it is purely a manifestation of energy already latent within one. "Yes, I feel the help of God to accomplish an end. I believe the power is latent and trust in the Divine is the stimulus that sets it off." "Why should not the God life stimulate the latent energy?" "I believe that I get extraordinary power for extraordinary purposes. I believe God gives us this power through our latent energies."

15. About two-thirds answer this question no, but some are very emphatic with their yes. "It might be possible to become overly self-reflective, introspective, through too much prayer." "Yes, the same as continually borrowing money to save working will weaken one's credit."

16. Comparatively few have ever had remarkable answers to prayers, and where they are given they are mostly in connection with their own "conversion," of the "conversion" of Sunday School pupils, members of their family or friends.

One mentions physical healing. One the taking away of a vicious temper. One the surrender of a large number of college men to Christ. "I found myself confronted in an important college visit by a most distressing series of unfortunate circumstances and events. Past experience in the field made me aware of my utter futility. I addressed myself to careful prayer and hard work. The situation was untangled in a really remarkable way. I cannot account for it except by providential guidance."

Among the answers there was but one that bordered on the miraculous. "Father was absent from home; mother and we children were in the little log cabin when a terrific storm swept over us. We knelt and prayed that the cyclone would not wreck our home and destroy our lives. When the storm subsided we found that the barn, a much stronger structure, was swept away, and the house not harmed, and that when it stood in the path of the storm and in position that the storm would strike it before it would the barn and other buildings which were destroyed. I cannot but believe that this was a providential answer to prayer."

These answers, together with parts I and II of the study, indicate a conclusion or two, and the following may be at least tentatively suggested :

(In making these suggestions I wish to admit the difficulty in studying prayer by this method. The objects of experience are of so intimate a nature, so close to the subject who observes that they are not accessible entirely to objective appreciation.)

1. The experimental method cannot completely solve the question as to whether the answer to a petition comes from a superior force of energy (God) as cause and effect, or is but the reflex effect upon the one who prays. It would require the testimony of God to establish this beyond a peradventure.

2. Prayer is the complement of work. It is a mode of correspondence with God, as is any intelligent labor.

3. Thus the same speculative difficulties can be raised against prayer as are raised against work : if God intends certain goods for us why does he not give them without our labor, etc.

4. Prayer is borrowing from the general energy or from God, the centre of energy. Thus prayer is not the cause of God's blessing but the occasion of the same.

5. The essential fact of prayer, considered from its objective side, is personality. It is the touch between life and life ; our life enters into communion with the larger, exhaustless life. Not life in contact with a machine or a system of law, but a personality, God. This makes God the source of Divine blessing.

6. In this study I have been again impressed with the unconventional and extreme replies of some. These are types, and from their own statements concerning their health and habits I am inclined to regard condition pathological. You must have sound eyes to see straight ; steady nerves to measure exactly. Soundness of body and mind is scientifically essential to prevent bias and impartiality.

LITERATURE.

Education in Religion and Morals, by GEORGE ALBERT COE, Ph. D. John Evans,
Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in Northwestern University.
Fleming H. Revell Company, 1904. pp. 434.

The aim of this book, in the words of the preface, is "to bring the broadest philosophy of education into the closest relation to practice; to show how principles lead directly to methods, and so to strike the golden mean between unpractical theorizing and mere routine."

The fulfillment of this aim is divided into four parts: the first, "The Theory," occupying nearly half of the book; the second, "The Child," occupying four chapters, and devoted to the development of the religious impulse; the third, "Institutions," occupying five chapters, and considering the family, the Sunday School, young people's societies and clubs, academies and colleges, and State schools; and the fourth, "The Perspective," occupying two chapters, and discussing the past attitude of the church toward the child, and the present problem of religious education. The whole is written in a series of numbered and annotated sections, permitting easy reference and reading, and is provided with a table of contents, fifteen pages of valuable selected and classified bibliographies, and a serviceable index. The volume is attractively bound, light, and barring a number of typographical errors, well printed. The style is easy, the composition of the whole good, and the interest compelling.

To follow briefly the course of the argument:

Considering the place of character in education, the author finds education to be ethical in both end and process,—"education is any effort to assist the development of an immature human being toward the proper goal of life."

Religious education is necessary to develop the religious nature, to transmit the religious history of the race, and to adjust the race to its divine environment.

The three agents in education are God, nature, and man; of these three God is the real teacher, parents and teachers having from Him their divine vocation, and carrying forward what God in nature has already begun. "And what a vocation is this of parents and teachers! In their hands as in no others lie the reins of the chariot of God."

"The Christian view of childhood" is essential in the whole discussion. Jesus found the life of children bright and wholesome, and assigned His kingdom to them, not in a typical but a real sense. "Normal child development, then, takes place entirely within the kingdom of grace." Conversion is not a step into, but within, the Christian life. Children should be taught that they are already children of God. The doctrine of total depravity is no longer held to-day,—it would contradict the whole procedure of religious education. With Horace Bushnell, let us say, "the child should grow up a Christian and never know himself as being otherwise." True, the child has unlovely impulses, traces of his animal ancestry, but it is also natural that he should win his human traits. As to religion, the

child's nature is neither negative, nor neutral, but positive. The "new birth" is properly life "from above," which the child always has and ought never to lose.

A fine summary of the modern movement in education, in contrast with the mediaeval, is given, indicating also the necessity of authority in all education or "the self-expression of our higher nature."

Religion and modern education are related to each other in one sense as theory to practice,—"the modern educational movement as a whole has consisted in the working out of certain pedagogical aspects of Christian belief."

Education is a development of live beings and persons. "The best thing that can happen to any child is to have the means of living his own life completely at each stage." The means must be free self-expression and the end must be a personality knowing itself and controlling itself.

Common mistakes in punishment are considered in contrast with the true practical aim of bringing the child to realize "that his deeper will is in harmony with the hand that chastises," that he is really punishing himself. The play impulse of children must also become a part of religious education and Christ must be presented as the master of the playground.

Reality in the form of habit and insight, must precede the symbol in the form of belief or picture, but the symbol is necessary.

After all, the great forces in education are personal and social; suggestion, imitation, and free self-conscious choice tell the story. "The one prime essential for moral and religious education is that the young should live a common life with moral and religious elders."

Seventy pages are devoted to the normal method of growth of the religious impulse in children. An analysis of the primitive religious impulse permits us to describe it as "the progressive unification of the man with himself, his fellows, nature, and all that is," involving the sense of dependence, the essentials of the ideal self, the need of God, and anthropomorphism. In the race and the child, religion begins with the beginning of experience.

The religious impulse develops primarily from within and secondarily through contact with religion. The sense of dependence is manifested toward parents,—the earliest stage of the religious impulse in the child. "'I don't need to pray to-night,' said a little child, 'for papa is going to sleep with me.'"

Then follow in succession the idealizing impulse, conscience and the sense of law, and the adolescent acceptance of God.

The periods of infancy, childhood, and adolescence are analyzed with care in the light of modern knowledge, and specific recommendations are made for religious training in each step of development. These pages are a manual for all religious teachers, to be read and re-read for guidance in dealing with specific cases. In them appear brief pointed discussions on the imagination, the expressive activities, "gangs," the sex question, athletics, hero-worship, the age of conversion, the sentiments, emotional crises, morbidness, adolescent doubts, and the spiritual value of human love.

Coming to the discussion of "Institutions," it is to be noted that family training has declined, because of our transitional era of culture from repression to spontaneous methods, our new industrial conditions, city-life, and the tendency to luxury. The family is really a moral and religious community, in which the child's character grows, not by mere conformity but by exercising the functions of a member. Home training may be improved by recognizing the family as an edu-

cational institution, by sufficiently simplifying interests to secure family companionship, by joint home occupations, by the re-establishment of regular family devotions, by specific home instruction in the truths of religion, and by making the family the unit of church membership.

The Sunday School occupies a long chapter, and one of the most serviceable of all. The church itself is a school, whose head should be an expert leader, one of whose departments is the Sunday School. The aim of the Sunday School is "the normal development of the life of its pupils." A useful outline of study is suggested for the teacher's training class, to include a general introduction to the Bible. Both pupils and lessons should be graded according to the periods of mental development. Four modern specimens of the Sunday School curriculum are presented in parallel columns. But our hope is not so much in the curriculum, important as this is, or in the use that is made of it by vital teachers, filling it in with interesting material, correlating it with week-day studies and occupations. Their proper places are assigned to the materials for impression and expression, decision-day, and catechetics.

The Young People's societies receive approbation for their emphasis on the social and expressive impulses, and their wholesome occupation of time that might otherwise be misused; they also receive several needed strictures,—the educational idea has been neglected through immature leadership, the proper age limits have not always been noted (a little girl of seven advertised as leading the devotional service in a junior rally!), and their vows and pledges contradict "the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free from legalism." The multiplication of organizations demands a unification of the forces by the church, whereby the junior and intermediate societies might be provided for in the Sunday School.

The Christian colleges and academies cannot afford to slight their educational work in the supposed interest of religion, or be partisan in any way. On the other hand, they must not forget, as they tend to do, that true education implies religion. In short, the religious college must recognize the unity of education. Its students must have a quickened sense of a divine mission to perform in society, the means to which are instruction, worship, and philanthropic work. There is considerable confusion at present as to the question of religion in the State schools. The next move forward is not faultfinding, nor restoring the Bible to the schools, nor the formal teaching of religion, but better education in home and church, and closer acquaintance between these and the school. The last needs only to take religion for granted, all public school teachers, of whatsoever faith, being a positive religious influence in their lives.

"The Perspective" shows the history of the attitude of the church toward the child in the past, from the intimacy between them in ancient Israel to the mediæval aloofness of the church and to the modern growing return to the child. The church has failed whenever any mechanism took the place of vitality, and has succeeded because her life has always been deeper than her machinery.

The concluding thoughts are that education demands the historical method of Bible study in order to put the concrete before the abstract; that education in religion which is constructive, not the revival which is remedial, is the chief means of saving the world; that the social problems can be solved only by developing the social sense in the young; and that "the historic Christ is the supreme Educator."

In reading through the whole discussion a number of noticeable features appear which a summary cannot show. A vein of conciliation between old and new views

runs through the whole; *e. g.*, the organic unity of mind and body in the present life is defended from Paul's conception that the soul has a body in the future life (p. 101).

Educational tendencies are related throughout with social and historic movements, the gospel of freedom in education being correlated, for example, with the political doctrine of freedom in the State (p. 132).

The simplicity of truth, not the confusion of argument, appears on every page, as, for example, in the treatment of the difficult matter of using wonder stories with children, and of answering the child's question aright.

Fine taste is everywhere evident, as in the relegation of the sex question to a footnote.

All the leading pertinent problems seem to have fallen under the author's comprehensive review, the parochial school problem, for example, receiving a full discussion.

The utilization of all educational material for religious purposes appears, *e. g.*, manual training,—in keeping with the author's fundamental idea that right education as such is religious.

The great point seems to be, true education is the sharing of life. This principle enthrones the teacher above any mechanical methods, and even permits us to call Jesus Saviour because he was teacher.

Religion as here presented becomes a convincing reality, and the principles by which it is to be developed in the souls of children rest upon modern knowledge of the nature of children and upon a broad philosophical foundation.

Some of these principles of Professor Coe may be here set down. Education is a unity; religious and moral education are education, not a thing apart; religious education is essentially a growth, not the safe passing of a crisis; all education is mature life showing immature life; education is by expression, not impression, nor suppression; the home is the place to begin; the church needs to unify all its educational agencies under expert leadership; the school needs not formal religious instruction but vital religious teachers; life is primary, belief is secondary, but necessary; habit first, then definition; the reality in religion before the symbol; the kingdom of God can come only by the education of youth.

The social background for such a broad, liberal and unifying treatment as this is found in two large and insistent American demands to-day, viz., that religion shall be educational, and that education shall be religious. Neither of these demands is to be interpreted narrowly, religion is not to transform itself into education, nor is education to cease being educational in becoming religious. Rather, religion must bring up to par its educational work, and education must be inspired by the indwelling presence of the religious spirit.

These demands are expressing themselves through newly organized societies, for the promotion of religious education, through the establishment of journals of religious pedagogy, through the opening of schools for the training of teachers of religion, through the introduction into theological seminaries of departments of education, and are re-echoed through the columns of the public press, and articles in magazines.

The whole movement may be regarded as a part of the practical evangelism of the new theology. It is the new bottles for the new wine. It should give confidence to all those who feared the foundations were giving way with the historical and critical movement of modern scholarship. The modern scholar is essentially a

builder. And the truth underlying the whole practical movement for religious education augurs well for a present rapider pace toward the establishment of the kingdom among men.

Toward this end Professor Coe's books, and this one in particular, are a great aid. "Education in Religion and Morals" may deservedly become a widely circulated text of the new movement. His aim, "to bring the broadest philosophy of education into the closest relation to practice," is indeed high, and I cannot but pronounce it to have been well attained. The book gathers up, arranges, adds to, and applies, the best modern results in religious pedagogy. It has made the present reviewer a better parent and teacher,—I should think it might also do the same for a minister, giving as it does a new comprehensiveness to the conception of religious education and to the religious nature of the child. A certain sanity and directness characterize the whole. The positions taken are constructive and definite, and an independent attitude is maintained toward all the current pedagogical principles, often with a critical revision, as in the case of the "recapitulation" theory.

The whole is philosophical, yet there is no philosophizing. The author's philosophy, like his religion, is a presupposition of his thinking. There are no elaborated definitions of religion, morality, God. The whole is concrete, its philosophy and its religion appear only at work. "Morals are not religion, and religion is not morals; nevertheless fullgrown religion includes morals" (p. 7),—that is all. Yet one feels there is a great deal in reserve that could be said in defense of any position brought in question.

The book has in part the defect of its virtues. Given its title, one expects rather more attention to moral education than is given. The reader, if the theoretical impulse is strong in him, may also wish for at least one paragraph in which Professor Coe should frame for us a modern tenable conception of God,—a conception that can underlie and interpret all our busy practicality. "The broadest philosophy of education," which he aims to apply, must include so much. But it is evident that the author is so intent on the realities that he does not stop to define them, and this to most readers will be welcome. Again, if education is identical with religious education, which is the foundation of the book, there is danger lest every educator consider his work religious as it is, without *making* it so. That is, the discussion does not make it quite clear that the unity of education is an *ideal*, not an actuality.

For the sake of completeness one may naturally desire discussions of the formal method of religious teaching, and of the effect of the state and business upon morals. But for this book we are grateful to the author for what he has done instead of censuring him for not doing more.

A few of the obvious typographical errors may be appended, "deveyoping" (p. 143); "reflectve" (p. 153); "overage" (p. 228); "atendance" (p. 307); "adolesence" (p. 310); "worhip" (p. 328); "entaglements" (p. 381).

Hanover, N. H.

H. H. HORNE.

The Philosophy of the Movement for Religious Education,¹ by GEO. A. COE.

The purpose of this article is to show the philosophical ideas implied in the present widespread practical movement for religious education.

¹ The American Journal of Theology, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 225-239.

Religious education is also education, and consequently the philosophy of education in general includes the philosophy of religious education in particular. In education to-day man is conceived as a continuous part of the world, and at the same time as acting for ends; so education presupposes a teleological view of the world.

Again, education implies the metaphysical theory of "personal idealism," for "the modern school reform is essentially an effort practically to fuse together nature, culture, and society," which is a reasonable undertaking "if reality is a society having the grandest of its unity in a universal person." The relation here between this metaphysical position and education seems a little strained, or it may only need further elucidation from the author.

Also, contemporary emphasis in education are, or, better, ought to be, on the ultimate spirituality of the practical and the practicality of the spiritual, thereby implying the doctrine of the immanence of God. Here, it is rather philosophy saying what education ought to be than education leading the way to philosophy.

Education touches modern psychology at several points; in rejecting "faculties," in using its laws of mental development, in emphasizing voluntarism as against intellectualism, and in adopting the evolutionary point of view, thereby revising the doctrine of depravity in favor of the category of "becoming" for the child. Incidentally the author suggests a much needed caution against regarding education as simply applied psychology; "education is the communication of life."

With the ethical revival of recent years religious education finds itself somewhat in conflict, for "ethics independent of religion is in fashion," while "moral education can complete itself only in religion."

The affiliation of religious education with the recent philosophy of religion is much closer,—the history of religion is itself a vast educational process; religious education is natural from birth since God reveals himself progressively in the developing consciousness of man; and also, epistemologically, any knowledge which education can give really implies the divine Presence.

Religious education and the philosophy of Christianity are even more closely at one, for they have the same foundation, the sharing of life by higher life. "Thus we reach our final and highest conception of religious education, namely, that it is God's self-communication through Christ and through Christly men and women."

Professor Coe thus clearly and comprehensively relates the movement for religious education to the current philosophical tendencies. Omissions that might doubtless have been profitably supplied are the relations of aesthetics, and "pragmatism," to religious education. The undertaking, itself, to see the bottom of a practical social movement fraught with so much significance and importance, must commend itself to all thorough thinkers.

H. H. HORNE.

Hanover, N. H.

The Relations of the Young Men's Christian Association Movement to the Boy, and The Work of a Boy's Department in a Young Men's Christian Association, by
GEORGE A. COE, Ph. D. Published by the Secretarial Institute and Training
School of The Young Men's Christian Association, Chicago, 1902. pp. 45.

These are two addresses read before the Fifth Annual Conference of Volunteer Workers in City, Town, and Railroad Young Men's Christian Associations, Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, August, 1902. In the first address the author discusses the topics, "Why should Young Men's Christian Associations assume responsibility

with respect to boys?" and "What it means to bring boys to Christ." He points out that there is a relative decrease of direct evangelism in the Y. M. C. A., that formative agencies guided by religious aims are taking its place, that the years from twelve to eighteen are the most favorable for molding the life of young men, that boys are qualitatively different from men and must therefore be differently approached, that religious training should be a training *in* religion and not merely a training *for* religion, and that such training may best proceed not from the point of view of innate depravity but of innate grace. In the second address, the author discusses "Some principles of modern education in their application to Boys' departments," "The mind of an adolescent boy," and "Methods of work." Here are presented the unity of the educational process, relation of Y. M. C. A. work to other educational agencies, education as a means of self-expression, gradation of boys' work, qualities of the adolescent, boys' games and interests, development of self-government in boys, boys' leaders, etc., etc.

These addresses combine in an admirable way scientific insight and practical grasp of the needs of workers among boys. They should prove helpful to all those who are trying to ground the religious training of boys in the principles of life which modern science is bringing so clearly to light. GEO. E. DAWSON.

The Spiritual Life, Studies in the Science of Religion, by Professor GEORGE A. COE,
Ph. D., of Northwestern University. New York and Cincinnati, 1900.

There are two features of this volume, which is now deservedly well known, that commend it for discussion in this *Journal*. The first is that it is the chief repository of Professor Coe's strictly scientific work in the study of religion; the other is that he not only illustrates in the volume, but criticises, the methodology of the psychology of religion.

The most imposing of the facts established is that the characteristics of religious experience are conditioned by "natural" physiological and psychological factors, chiefest among which are temperament and suggestion. That the varieties of religious experience are a function of temperament is demonstrated with the nicety of a scientific proof. The method by which it was ascertained is a good instance of painstaking scientific procedure. The well known and (for most problems) questionable questionnaire method was supplemented in various ways. "First, personal interviews were had with a large proportion of the persons examined. Second, a large proportion of the subjects were placed under careful scrutiny by myself and others, with a view to securing objective evidence as to temperament. Third, interviews were had with friends and acquaintances of certain of the persons under examination. Finally, in order to get at the facts of suggestibility, hypnotic experiments were made upon all the important cases that were accessible" (p. 109). In order to surround the subject completely, the study was wisely limited to the question of the attainment, or failure to attain, a sudden religious transformation. What are the conditions, — of temperament, of expectancy, of suggestibility and the like — which determine the attainment of such an experience, or disappointment in the presence of entire anticipation of the change, and what determines the degree of abruptness of the transformation? Temperament, which was found to be an important element, was classified in two different ways: first, as to whether sensibility, intellect or will seemed to be the most important constituent in the life processes of the person studied; and secondly, a classification combining, somewhat, the conventional fourfold grouping and the Wundtian analysis in terms of promptness and intensity of response. It is found that those persons who expect a

striking transformation and succeed in attaining it, have, with almost no exception, sensibility distinctly predominant, are either prompt-weak (sanguine) or slow-intense (melancholic), are subject to motor-automatisms and hallucinations, and under hypnotic suggestion are of the passive type. Correspondingly, those who expected a striking transformation and failed to experience it are those, for the most part, in whom intellect was predominant, are prompt-intense (choleric), are not subject to automatisms and hallucinations, and under hypnotic suggestion, are of the spontaneous auto-suggestible type. This conclusion is as important and far-reaching as it is unequivocal. “‘Would you cast the horoscope of a human life,’ says Fouillée, ‘do not study the conjunction of the stars but those of the (bodily) organs.’ Similarly we may now add,” says Coe, “would you understand the emotional aspects of religious experience? Do not ascribe them to the inscrutable ways of God, but to ascertainable differences in men’s mental constitutions; do not theorize about divine grace, but study the hidden workings of the human mind.”

Having established so clearly and unquestionably his facts from exhaustive study of concrete instances, Professor Coe has a vantage ground, in the rest of the volume, from which to approach, with a high degree of conviction, the phenomena of trance, visions, suggestion in religious meetings, and various kindred phenomena as they have shown themselves historically and in recent times. Chapter 4 is devoted to the topic of “Divine Healing.” Both the wisdom and the folly of a narrow cult are made to appear in the light of more basal mental and spiritual laws.

The closing chapter, an extremely vital one, is on “Spirituality.” It is shown how “the religion of Christ has been warped into special temperamental forms. What Jesus made so broad has been narrowed down to fit a particular kind of men, and temperamental differences have been mistaken for grades of spirituality. More than justice has been done to the melancholic and sanguine temperaments and less than justice to the choleric.” (p. 206.)

An analysis of the experiences of St. Anthony, St. Francis of Assisi and Augustine lead to the conclusion that feeling is the predominant quality, according to conventional standards, of sainthood. “The typical saint is the one who feels most, who has great fervor in prayer, or a permanent mood of calm truthfulness, or ecstatic communion with the divine, or great billows of triumphant joy. Before such experiences can be common or characteristic there must be present, first of all, a mental organization of a particular kind.” (p. 213.)

A similar truth appears from an analysis that Professor Coe has made of the matter contained in the Methodist Hymnal. He classifies the hymns on the basis of the number that have for their theme Christian activity and service viewed in a disinterested or “objective” way. Only 17 out of the 1,117 “take up the problems of the every-day activities of the adult Christian in this spirit.” (p. 226.) The greatest unfulfilled need is that of the “dynamics of a poetry of active love.”

A discussion of the temperamental differences of the sexes and of their corresponding differences in religious experiences shows that in women sensibility is more predominant, emotion is more constant and diffused, they are more suggestible, and passive virtues are more prominent than in men. “The persistent excess of women in the churches is chiefly due to a superior adaptation of church life to the female nature” (p. 247).

These conclusions are of imposing significance and they ought to be revolutionary in respect to the dominant notes that are sounded in religion. The author rightly proclaims: “The spiritual conceit of the melancholic temperament must be

resisted. The spiritual trivialities of the sanguine must be transcended. The spirituality of the moral will and of the truth-loving intellect must be not merely conceded, but preceded, insisted upon, gloried in. This is the foundation upon which the rebuilding must proceed" (p. 251).

It is one of the triumphs of the present time that religion is becoming not only practically efficient but self-critical. There can be no doubt that, in its childlike way of taking whatever happens as being *objectively* true, it has been placing on many of its conceits and mere accidents of temperament, the value of divine reality. This volume should be known and pondered by every man who regards his own self-perfecting as part of the divine plan and especially by those who, by profession, direct the destinies of their fellow-beings.

Chapters I and II, though less original, are, nevertheless, valuable. The first chapter, on "Religious Awakening," confirms the peculiarities in respect to the distribution of the age of conversion during the teens that had already been established in so far as the data were adequate. With the accumulation of evidence it tends to settle into the certainty of a law that among men, awakenings occur most frequently at 16 and 17 and that there are two other somewhat less likely periods at the very beginning and end of the teens with two quiescent periods between the three peaks of frequency.

Chapter II, on "Adolescent Difficulties," is acute in its psychological analysis, but is especially good in its sane and frank treatment of adolescent temptations.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

The Web of Indian Life, by the SISTER NIVEDITA. London, 1904. pp. 301.

The authoress, Miss Margaret Noble, is a young Irish girl, whose life, if ever it is adequately prepared and published will be a most valuable contribution to the literature of Psychology, and probably one of the most fascinating and romantic accounts of the development of a human soul that can be found in the biographical records of any time or people.

The book is an attempt, and a remarkably successful one, to set forth for English readers a brief, but careful and accurate analysis of the underlying motives and the ideals which form the cultural basis of Hindu society to-day together with suggestions for a new view point and for the construction of a new synthesis, in harmony with, and along the lines of, civilizational growth and development, which, whilst recognizing the necessity and desirability of a European or Western contribution or supplement, pleads for the preservation, cultivation and continuity of those basic and elemental conceptions now in danger of being lost or destroyed through the dominance of the foreigner. These influences, which have shaped the past and laid the foundations of moral and religious enfranchisement in the East have also entered unconsciously and organically into the thought of the West and are even now helping to rejuvenate our science and our art, our education and our philosophy, at the very moment when the rightful heirs are parting with the essentials of their heritage and making their own further advance impossible.

The chapter on the "Oriental Woman" gives an excellent analysis of some of these anti-social forces now tending to destroy the most valuable elements of the old civilization of India, especially as these affect the home and the national character. The use of common soaps manufactured in Europe instead of native earths and oils, which exercised no injurious action on the skin, the introduction of kerosene oil and the substitution of chairs for mats, etc., are noted as amongst the signs

of a decay of the national taste and judgment, and marking the loss of those high standards of living reached through many generations of human toil and effort, and of adjustment to environmental conditions, which, therefore, had become a part of the mental heredity of the people, the result of racial growth and acquirement.

India to-day is thus becoming more and more a host and a parasite of European merchants, because these civilizational changes are not the result of, nor accompanied by growth from within, or concomitant with the development of the old national conceptions, but are the result of conditions and forces imposed from without. The chapter closes with a fine declaration and an appeal to the best interests of Indian womanhood.

But it is certain that woman, with her determinately synthetic interests, will refuse long to be balked of her right to consider things as a whole. The interest of the mother is ever with the future. Women will readily understand that a single generation of accomplished defeat is sufficient to divorce a whole race from its patrimony, and she will determine, and effectively determine, that the lot of her own sons shall be victory, and not surrender.

And if once the Oriental woman seize the helm of the ship in this fashion, solving the problems of her whole country, whom is it suggested that she shall afterwards petition for the redress of her own grievances?

The enormously far reaching and benign influence of woman in the development of the best and highest instincts of the race is well brought out in the early chapters of Miss Noble's book, deeply embedded in the national and the religious consciousness of India, and expressed as these concepts are in the Sacred writings, which the chapters on the Indian Sagas, *A Study of Indian Caste*, and a *Synthesis of Indian Thought* bring to the comprehension of the ordinary reader with a clear insight and an appreciation of the underlying meaning and the significance of the creative genius of these wonderful Eastern peoples, coupled with such a masterly analysis of the philosophy and the religious ideals revealed in these old documents that has probably never before been put into the compass of less than one hundred pages of ordinary type; enabling any one, even without effort or special knowledge, in the space of an hour or so to clearly grasp the essentials of Eastern Psychology, and at once puts one into sympathetic relations with the best elements of Hindu culture.

The reader is taken by Miss Noble, almost without effort, through these subtleties, and along the road which has hitherto been unfamiliar or entirely closed to him, owing to the barriers raised by Western scholarship, which has succeeded only in losing itself in the jungle of Indian mysticism and symbolism, perhaps through the want of those inner and sympathetic relations and the real "endeavor to understand" which Miss Noble has brought to her task, qualifications which with her Western birth and education, have fitted her, more than the possession of other gifts, to be the interpreter of the real mind of her beloved East to the unimaginative, "practical" English or American reader.

The concluding paragraphs of chapter X, in so far as the judgment is just, show us that we may still gather materials for our own thought and guidance, not only in philosophy and religion, but for social direction, and that the East to-day has its contribution to offer us, rich as the past has been, and deeply indebted as we are to it already for some of the truest and wisest elements in the structure of Western thought and civilization. The Western mind has hitherto been unconscious of this indebtedness to India, and even yet misunderstands or is still ignorant of its

obligation or of the value of what India has given and still more of what it has to offer. Such a book as the one before us will help to bring East and West together and so help to secure that due understanding and establish such relations between the two as will do more than anything else, at this juncture in the world's affairs, to promote the highest interests and the onward march of humanity.

Whatever knowledge of Eastern thought and culture one may possess, the book must be of special interest to the student of education or psychology, both on account of the unique point of view and the entirely new interpretation of the East which Miss Noble offers us here. This is emphasized when we consider that it comes from a soul whose yet unknown depths have been sounded, undreamt of capacities awakened, perfect freedom and peace secured, which has in the short space of four or five years developed and blossomed to a power of utterance and an eloquence almost phenomenal under the influences brought to bear upon it by Eastern culture and surroundings, embraced with hungry and almost passionate longing, after many attempts and failures to find a home or a shelter with Western thought and aspirations, as voiced at the close of the last century by the high priests of science and religion.

Throughout the volume the fine, nervous, English style, powerful diction, ease, grace and felicity of expression arouse and sustain admiration, and, whatever our attitude may be towards Eastern mysticism, these unusual qualities compel us to recognize that we have here a genuine work of art of high rank, and possessing claims to be placed with our permanent literature. J. C. HUDSON, London.

Tales from Old Fiji, by LORIMER FISON. London, 1904. pp. 175.

In this interesting volume the author has sought to rescue the knowledge of a fancying people who unite the character of childhood with the passions and strength of men. To those who know them slightly there is much of the simplicity and even of the amiability of childhood about them, but beneath this exterior there is also, too often, a horror of both cruelty and filth. In many a house where babe and mother slept and children played there were within hand-reach underground skeletons embracing the corner posts; for with every new building, and indeed with every new venture, human victims must be sacrificed. Fison gives a large number of words, the meaning of which seems innocent on the surface, but which really designate indescribable practices. For instance, thotho, the word for "grass" re-duplicated, has as its fearful secondary meaning the strangled women with whose bodies the bottom of the grave for the dead chief is carpeted. Lango means logs in a row, but these rollers, on which in a war canoes were launched, were often the bodies of men. Another word meaning "the bird of the sail" is really a child suspended by one foot from the end of the gaff when canoes returned from successful raids. A word meaning trust flag once meant a man baked whole by processes described elaborately and which were too often actually put in practice. The young warrior is of no account until he has killed a human being, and it is greatly to his credit and there is no thought of cowardice in stealing into a tent by night and slaying a sleeping woman or even child. Some killed their dearest friends treacherously, in order to coroi, which is a kind of title or degree applied to murderers. Argument with them against this custom they meet very calmly, but it has no effect whatever.

The author holds that "man is a carnivorous animal, whatever the vegetarians may say." While he admits that it cannot be conclusively proven that cannibalism arose out of flesh hunger, he believes that his facts pave the way for such a theory.

Long continued diet on fruit, vegetables, fish, sometimes seems to give an almost irresistible craving for flesh. It is, however, carefully explained that where children were eaten, it was not those of their own tribe, but children of other towns exchanged for their own.

The body of the book is devoted to many interesting stories which have been collected and are literally reproduced and translated.

Votive und Weilegaben des katholischen Volks in Süddeutschland, von RICHARD ANDREE. Friedrich Vieweg & Sohn, Braunschweig, 1904. pp. 191.

The author's wife, to whom this work is dedicated, had for many years made collections of south German votive offerings, and here they are described with many cuts in the text and 32 full-page tables at the end. First, consecrated gifts in general are described, together with their motives, both in ancient and modern times, how they were affected by the agrarian character of culture and by the Catholic feeling for patron saints. Often polytheistic traits stand out very clearly. Some saints with power over disease and in other extremities have been created by the people without the sanction of the church; many pilgrim chapels and sacred fountains, with market stalls, great pilgrimages and the motives thereto, railroad tickets to heaven, the power of pictures, healing waters for headache, dumbness, etc., pilgrimage as an ascetic act, often connected with the carrying of a cross, chain, creeping on the knees without clothing and its relations to fasting. Many of these offerings even show the popular feeling toward the protective patrons of domestic animals. Saint Leonard in all this plays a very important rôle in south Germany. His statue at Kundl and Tamsweg was miraculous. He had many healing functions, presided over birth and was the friend of prisoners and of the insane. Some of his altars gave the right of asylum, and the method of protection was minutely prescribed. The processions in his honor were very numerous. His offerings, first animals themselves, were then images of the same, especially cast in iron, but later in the form of edibles. His churches were often entirely encompassed by a great chain, horseshoes, and countless wax offerings were his. The technique of performing some of these ceremonies is described. Indeed, there were idols and even phallic figures significant of cure of disease. The various parts of the body helped were cast in iron and offered to him—the lungs, heart, mouth, intestines, limbs, and so on. The offering of living animals, even of horses, persisted into the seventeenth century. Later the animals could be ransomed by purchase. Then they were cast in metal. Even bees played a somewhat important rôle here, as did hammers, anchors, houses, dress, crops, butter, etc. In some places there seems to have been special predilection in painting the votive offerings. Among this list we find trophies of war, offerings of hair, crude imitations of wounds and sores, bandages, ear pendants, spoons, jewels, etc. The last chapter is devoted to the story of the gradual decline, and, in some cases, the sale, burning and burial of these offerings.

La Magie dans l'Inde Antique, par VICTOR HENRY. Dujarric & Co., Paris, 1904.
pp. 286.

Here we have an interesting treatise not, to be sure, based upon original documents, but from a very copious use of publications on India in European languages. The author first compiles the general ideas of Hindu magic from Vedic times, as to the operators, operations, beneficiaries, ingredients and accessories. Under divination he treats the arts that determine or influence posterity, involve temporary pre-

vision concerning the issue of combats, the finding of lost objects, and spurious divination. There were many sacraments, ceremonies and amulets that wrought as charms to produce long life; others that concerned sex, dealing with love, marriage, rivalry, constancy, reconciliation, virility, fecundity, pregnancy and birth; others dealing with war and peace. There were many anti-demoniac rites, such as exorcisms and reprisals. Very copious, of course, were charms, curative of fever, worms, skin troubles, wounds, hemorrhages, vermin, chronic and hereditary troubles, etc. Expiatory rites, although not so numerous, are well developed and clearly appear even in antiquity. Finally, under black magic, the author treats of demoniac liturgies, imprecations, oaths, vows, sorcery, etc., and ends with certain conclusions concerning the relations of magic to myth, religion and science. This he deems to have been very close.

Der Ursprung des Harlekin, von OTTO DRIESSEN. Alexander Duncker, Berlin, 1904.
pp. 286.

This culture history problem connected with the origin of the harlequin is treated here in a large and essentially historical way, with seventeen illustrations. The author is unable to decide whether the word is of Italian or French origin, but inclines to the view that it is the latter. Probably the harlequin people were originally comic demons which were made objects of mimetic presentation. They were related to the hell of the old religious theatre, and it was only slowly that the devil in grotesque human form appeared upon the comic stage. There were often many under a chief, and the dramatic mode of presentation took different forms in different countries. He finds the harlequin of the present day pretty well developed as early as 1580.

Die Heilgotter und Heilstätten des Altertums, von LUDWIG HOPF. Franz Peitzeker, Tübingen, 1904. pp. 69.

This study in the archaeology of medicine traces curative deities and sites back to ancient Shamanism. He first describes the curative value of sleep in the temple in Mesopotamia, then describes the saints and deities that are believed to preside over the cure of disease in Arabia, India, Japan, Egypt, Greece, Rome and among the Celts and Germans, and in the last section describes the hospitals of the Buddhists in Ceylon, India and Cashmere, Jewish, Greek and Byzantine hospitals, showing in each how much power was ascribed to various deities.

Die Sage vom ewigen Juden in der neueren deutschen Literatur. von JOHANN PROST. Georg Wigand, Leipzig, 1905. pp. 167.

Prost gives a brief account of each German treatment of the story of the Wandering Jew. These are by Goethe, Schubart, Heller, Schlegel, Schreyber, Arnim, Horn, Klingemann, Jemand, Laun, Müller, Haupt, Hauff, Seidl, Auerbacher, Auerbach, Chamisso, Zedligz, Lenau, Schenk, Vogl, Smets, Duller, Hauthal, Mosen, Eugene Sues, Hamerling, Heller, Giseke, Stolte, Herrig, Mauthner, Carmen Sylva, Schönaich-Carolath, Haushofer, Varii, Lepsius, Seeber, Wolff. Since this mysterious wanderer first appeared in Hamburg, in 1542, and entered into literature in 1602, he has had an extraordinary career and has been treated in very many ways. Some emphasize the curse that impelled him on; some his blasphemy; others the wandering; others the longing for rest or death or a satisfying ideal. He has been treated as a hero, as a martyr, as a type of the Jewish race, as a representative man, a pharisee, a heretic, skeptic, a social democrat, a man with chronic

discontent, a Prometheus-like deity. Most assume that his fate will have an end, perhaps at the last judgment or at Christ's return or at the Golden Age. In some he finds rest and sleep or dies at the present day. For others he will forever wander. The author thinks that even yet despite all these efforts no one has successfully treated this great theme in a way to bring out at once its philosophic and epic possibilities. The great Dante mind that can do this is yet to appear. It needs a treatment no less noble than Goethe's *Faust*.

Die Entstehung des Gottesgedankens und der Heilbringer, von KURT BREYSIG.
Georg Bondi, Berlin, 1905. pp. 202.

Breysig has made a careful study of the religion of the American Indians. He finds their ideas at bottom quite consonant with those of earlier races in the old world. The stage where deities are personifications of nature has already been transcended. The mind of primitive man is exceedingly rich and active and in religion we deal with tangled meshes of psychoses mingled from different nationalities, but all with real, warm, heathen blood in them. The blessing bringers or saviours of mankind are innumerable. They have power enough to recast the world and human nature. They are often involved in a fight with a great animal like a dragon. The ideas of flood and chaos are universal but often fused.

Perhaps the oldest of these blessing bringers or saviours are the fire gods who brought light, created the sun and moon and rule their course. Next come the water legends of flood and chaos with dragons and snakes. Third are the great extinctions of monsters; fourth, the gods that teach agriculture, fishing, building, metallurgy, and how to found kingdoms.

This human stage is in advance of the nature stage. In adoration of the culture gods old blessings are forgotten. Often the achievements of the former are thought to be quite recent and there are many reflections of the idea of human evolution from animal ancestors. The first man often becomes a god. This state is very akin to the step from animals to man or perhaps from plants to animals, and shows the vigor of the primitive faith of the race. Indeed all gods are from men. Thus they must be revered because man cannot see his inmost self made an object of ridicule. They need distance to be revered and so are placed far back in the past. They are so exalted that they come to be invested with creative power. This is the origin of gods which are not evolved from ghosts or nature. Jesus is the best case, for he became God just as Jehovah did, but in his legend are combined many of the most essential and abiding vestiges of Indic, Persian, Egyptian and Babylonian thought. This book is a very able and new, yet learned, attempt to explain the origin of religions, and emphasizes an element not here discovered for the first time, but worked out with far more fullness than anywhere else.

Christ's Credentials, by DANIEL P. BALDWIN. Longwell & Cummings, Logansport, Ind. pp. 43.

Jesus was a sublime egoist but not an egotist. Indeed, "Jesus Christ was the most colossal egoist the world has ever known. He claimed for Himself more and uttered more colossal promises than any other character in history. In fact, the four gospels are but the succession of gigantic I's." In the swan-song discourse the night of His betrayal, there are 658 personal pronouns, 137 in the first person singular. Again, He never reasoned or argued. "His final and only authority is and was 'I say unto you.' Of no other teacher can it be said that his death made any difference whatever in the system he taught." The death of Plato, for instance,

added nothing to his teaching, and so of many more. But with Jesus all this is reversed. But for the Resurrection, the two hundred million living Christians would have had no existence. "The Saturday after His murder the heresy endorsed by Him was completely stamped out." Thus apart from His personality His whole system is mere ethics. Upon Christ's sixty-five miracles rest His claim to worship and all His promises. No one could possibly know the actual facts concerning Christ's paternity except Himself. And she had motives of the strongest kind to tell the story she did. If Jesus had an earthly father then Mary was forever disgraced. "Here, then, on the slender word of an hitherto obscure Hebrew girl rests the beginning of the structure of Christianity." The miraculous birth is the most difficult to prove of all the miracles, more so than the Resurrection, and yet "we believe this unspeakably sweet story." "After years of anxious examination I believe that the Virgin story is true. Why? Because it is so powerfully corroborated," by the potency of Jesus' later life. The miracles have a sweet reasonableness. One must, however, in a sense be born a second time to believe in them.

As to the Sermon on the Mount, if literally construed it is the romance of altruism, the message from another world not entirely mistaken. Even the doctrine of total depravity has its justification, but the law of service and the brotherhood of humanity is supreme. The Holy Spirit is simply Jesus' personality or the shadow of it dominating ours. Regeneration is the substitution of His personality for ours. The moment we drop the Resurrection Christianity is only a sweet-water ethical exhortation to be good and happy.

Life More Abundant: Scriptural Truth in Modern Application, by HENRY WOOD.
Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Co., Boston, 1905. pp. 318.

Henry Wood has written another book about Eden, the Fall, the Bible, nature, idealism, poetry, fiction, miracles, priest, prophet, the higher criticism, sacrifice, the seat of authority, salvation, manuscripts and tradition, faith and the unseen, the glory of the commonplace, the forward march. This author of many books (this seems to be the seventh) is penetrated with the idea of humanism, God's image in man, a thought world of harmony and suggestion of a believer in immortality, with an inviting attitude toward mind cure, if not toward a higher spiritualism. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a conscientious critic to give such a book much praise or blame. There are many to whom it is well calculated to do much good, but above a certain level of intelligence and mental development it will seem a little thin, trite and goody. No one can read the book without the utmost respect for the author's sincerity, and the worst critic would find it hard to point out any serious harm that such a book can do anybody.

The Boy's Life of Christ, by WILLIAM BYRON FORBUSH. Funk & Wagnall's Co., New York, 1905. pp. 318.

This is a bold and very unique innovation which, if it attracts notice, will be sure to be criticised, but which the writer has only approbation. It is an attempt to reconstruct the life of Jesus, to make it vivid with many original incidents, and anecdotes which, however, serve as a setting for texts.

Jesus was described as a boy from nowhere, his school days are described and characterized. There was a camping tour in the mountains. He was a village carpenter, then comes the story of his public career. We wish the author had told us a little more fully whether he had actually carried this on with children. He designs it for home reading by boys old enough to be faithful and intelligent. The appeal is, of course, throughout to the story interest.

Mutter Erde, ein Versuch über Volksreligion, von ALBRECHT DIETERICHS. B. G. Teubner, Leipzig and Berlin, 1905. pp. 123.

Dieterichs in a very interesting and learned book gathers from varied sources, and especially the classics, illustrations of the worship of Mother Earth. These works suggest to the author that this is a well-nigh universal cult and one of the first questions of primitive man was whither he came and whence he went. One of the first answers to the above questions was, the earth. Infants at birth are laid upon the earth as if given to her protecting care. The sick are taken from their couch and placed upon it to be revived. There are superstitions that children must be born on the first floor of the house. There are certain stones, passing near which, are reputed to cause conception. Tellus or Terra Mater was a very common thought among the Romans and was connected with the theory of Antochthomes. In some superstitions it is believed that by laying the ear upon the earth one can hear how the unborn children laugh and carouse. All plants and fruits are thought to be children of the earth, expressions of its good or ill will to man, and agriculture is often sacramentalized. In Greece, Ge has her priest and oracle and Odonna, where the oracle spoke under the inspiration of gas rising from the chasm, originated in a kind of earth cult. There are legends of people going down to the heart of the earth and coming up from it with messages from the subterranean gods. Often there were phallic elements observable in this cult.

Even yet traces of this worship are abundant. The very idea of Phuses and Natura suggest it, and Atheists who abandon the higher forms of faith often adhere all the more blindly to lower ones like this. It is doubtful whether this idea has any intimate relation with morality, although it may have with that of Demeter and Isis. Christendom felt the need of an impartial deity and in nearly all mythology earth is feminine while heaven is masculine.

The Scientific Temper in Religion, and other addresses, by P. N. WAGGETT. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1905. pp. 286.

Waggett prints a few shorthand notes of addresses given at his church in Lent. Although not marked by eminent scholarship or new views, they are in the main unusually sensible and wholesome. He treats mostly for laymen such topics as the scientific temper in religion, the effect of evolutionary doctrine, agnosticism and determinism, natural selection and theism, and Bible and evolution, biology and our view of human nature, spiritual experience and dogmatic religion, the aids which science gives to the religious mind.

Comparative Religion. Its Genesis and Growth, by LOUIS H. JORDAN. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1905. pp. 668.

Jordan gives us here a very valuable new book which hardly needs the brief introductory note of Principal Fairbairn. It is essentially the history of the development of the study of comparative religions, an account of its methods, aim, scope, founders, masters, schools, auxiliaries and tangible achievements.

The Cheyenne 2. The Sun Dance, by GEORGE A. DORSEY. Field Columbian Museum. Anthropological Series, May, 1905, Vol. 9, pp. 186.

Here, at last, we have an admirable study of the Sun Dance among the Cheyennes in all its intricacies of detail, with two hundred illustrations, a number of them colored, so that we now realize what this intricate ceremony really means as never before.

What is Religion? and Other Student Questions. Talks to College Students by HENRY S. PRITCHETT, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1906. pp. 117.

These five little lay sermons are entitled, What is Truth; What is Religion; The Science of Religion; The Significance of Prayer; Ought a Religious Man to Join the Church? Their interest, too, outside the class of technological students, to whom they are addressed, consists in the fact that they are given by a man whose sympathies are with applied science. In answer to the first question he cites a Swiss peasant of whom he asked the way to Kandersteg, and who replied, "I don't know, but there is the road to it." This illustrates our relation to truth. The momentum of a man is the formula, "His efficiency equals the moral purpose multiplied by the ability to think straight."

He quotes a patron of his school who told him that he sent his boy there because he felt that neither his religion nor his politics would be affected. This implied a low and even an impossible educational institution. Religion is divine energy typified by the sun. We have so much energy, and only a remnant of it, comparable with that which in a steam engine is transmuted into electric light, becomes spiritual efficiency. The science of religion is to the author theology, of which religion itself is as basal as chemical phenomena to chemical formulæ. The church ought to be able to invite people to its fellowship without asking them to throw away all that science has taught. Religion is psychic health.

As to prayer, one type asks for personal advantage—for instance, rain. Another is like Jesus' prayer, that the cup might be taken away, but seeks resignation if this is impossible, and the third is typified by Chrysostom's, "Grant us in this world knowledge of thy truth, in the world to come life everlasting." Prayer rests on a conception of an inner man, voice or consciousness. This impels us to the view that nothing is worth while but the truth, and that there should be no compromise or delusion. This is the note of science.

The religious young man should join a church because his religious life will be quickened by association, but he must not think this constitutes religion.

This is essentially all there is in this book. No doubt these talks were worth giving and their publication may stimulate other scientific men to a similar rapprochement with instituted religion. Everything in the book is good and commendable, but to those who know anything of the present state of thought in these fields, they must seem tedious and commonplace compared to the kind of talks that might have been given in their place. There is a curiosity, never so strong as now, to know what men, whose sympathies and associations are scientific, can have to say good about religion. But this curiosity itself is largely idle, although it is only this that President Pritchett gratifies in his book. Unfortunately it appears just at a time when it challenges comparison with the lectures of Osler and Oswald, both of which are published essentially in the same size and form, Oswald's little book being itself a great and precious addition to the world's religious thought, small as its compass is.

Etude psychologique des plus anciens réveils religieux aux Etats-Unis, par JACQUES KALTENBACH. Genève, 1905. pp. 152.

The aim of this review can hardly be more than a statement of our general appreciation of this most interesting account and lucid presentation of the most salient features of the different stages in the development of religious ideas relative to the phenomena accompanying revivals in this country.

Although the author has confined his study to a distinct period, the first group of such phenomena, known here as revivals, yet his aim has been all through to show by comparison with later developments how progress in religious conceptions has evolved from these earlier forms of belief and practices. In thus tracing back the evolution of religious revivals, and thought in connection with them, we are at once met with the difficulty of distinguishing between fact and theory, a difficulty which the author's method of treatment obviates, however, by remaining consistent with fact (or by constant reference to the facts).

In the early Puritan communities, the circumstances giving rise to revivals, whatever may have been the direct or immediate causes of their issue, must of necessity have reflected the character of the people. So we see many local or scattered patches of revival interests, where religious zeal seems to have been very inflammable and intense, for a short season only, till the receding waves of emotional stress allowed the religious life of the community to sink back to its former level. These earlier, incomplete revivals may, perhaps, best be characterized as adolescent types, which were later eclipsed by the greater, fuller and more expansive dimensions of the Edwardian type of revivals, and which are, in this book, used to illustrate all the conditions that were operative in creating the spirit of religious enthusiasm; first, as occurring in the small town of Northampton, and from thence, spreading to other localities. If, now, we stop here to compare briefly the points of similarity and dissimilarity which appear in these different stages of the development of revivals, we should first say that, although the younger elements of the population always took the initiative in religious exercises of that sort, in the latter, namely, the Edwardian revivals, the rest of the community was ultimately won over to their side. And, in the second place, that both sexes were equally represented, which was not the case in the former, when the number of women far exceeded that of the men, at all ages. In these revivals of 1735 and 1740, it was observed, as shown from different records, that when religious enthusiasm had reached a maximal point of intensity, a higher moral tone prevailed in the community, with better attendance to regular services. And, on the whole, it may be safe to assert here that these revivals were attended by good and permanent results.

In regard to the general discussion of the different phases with individual variances of conversion, the author classifies them roughly under two heads: those who are more suggestible by temperament, and those in whom physical fatigue has lessened their strength of resistance at times of great religious stress. Without wishing to do more here than to follow the general lines of development in regard to conversion, since the Edwardian revivals as compared with those of our own time, we may add that revivals have had a decided influence over the spirit and manner of preaching and the nature of religious motives upon conduct. Such emotional upheavals as are recorded in connection with the Edwardian and Kentucky revivals (in the latter were observed so many different degrees of hysteria, known then as "jerks" and "falling," when both men and women would fall to the ground) are now comparatively rare occurrences, and never thought necessary for entrance into the kingdom.

As to the moral side of revivals, the author's general conclusion is that they may serve to awaken, in a normal way, consciousness to a deeper and fuller meaning of religious experience, and bring to bear upon life higher motives of action. It must therefore follow that their effects upon our physical well-being are wholesome and beneficial.

EUCLID HELIE.

The Shadow of Life, by ANNE DOUGLAS SEDGWICK. The Century Company, New York, 1906. pp. 333.

It is difficult to say whether this novel is more philosophical or religious. It is a pathetic story of a very vigorous, healthy and intensely alive young English girl who early in life fell in love with a boy four years older than herself who had been brought up in India and had inherited the dreamy, inactive tendencies of that land, although he was of English birth. When he was fourteen or fifteen they separated, vowing eternal love, and did not meet again for sixteen years. Meanwhile both had had profound life experiences. When they were again thrown together in the country, their discussions, which make nearly half the book, are concerning the nature of reality, whether life is worth the living, whether there is a God, an ultimate sanction to morality and other questions that make up so large a part of the staple of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. These the girl knows, but detests, while for the man they sink deep into his oriental soul. Although she is constantly quarrelling with him, she becomes intensely in love and makes most of the advances, discards a very ardent, healthy and fit suitor for her hand, and finally brings him to the point of embrace and avowal and pledge of marriage, on the brink of which he has often hovered. When finding himself entirely committed, he fears he can never make her happy because he thinks everything is vain, and after the avowal steals away to his own home. She sickens and on her death bed, calls him to her and expresses only tenderness and love as she dies, while he, although he has often contemplated suicide, lives on his soulless life. The moral appears to be the desiccating, desouling influence of the conception of a world without a personal God or a definite moral law. The general effect of the dénouement of the story is simply hideous. Instead of the satisfaction we usually expect in novels, it leaves the reader with his nerves quite frazzled out with sympathy for the heroine and detestation for the moral cowardice of the hero, although he is a man of the highest sense of honor, spotless personal purity and the keenest intellectual perception.

The Aims of Religious Education. The Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the Religious Education Association, February 12-16, 1905. Published by the Association, Chicago, 1905. pp. 525.

This volume contains a condensed résumé of over a hundred different addresses given at the Convention in Boston, in February, 1905. They cover many departments: The alliance of workers with boys, religious art, summer assemblies, correspondence instruction, the press, libraries, home, young people's societies, Christian association, teacher training, elementary and secondary public schools, Sunday schools, churches and pastors, theological seminaries, universities and colleges, council of religious education, etc.

NOTE.

The readers of this *Journal* may be interested to know that *L'Année Psychologique* publishes in each of its yearly issues a critical review, written by Professor J. H. Leuba, of the most important articles and books on the Psychology of Religion that have appeared during the year.